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Abstract
In this thesis, we investigate a ﬁrm's investment timing decision and choice of market entry
mode under uncertainty and irreversibility. We investigate how a host country can aﬀect
the ﬁrm's investment decisions through providing investment incentives. The real options
approach to valuation is applied, and three main theoretical contributions are provided in
this thesis.
First, we derive the optimal form of subsidy package and ﬁnd that the optimal subsidy
package should always compensate the ﬁrm for giving up the investment opportunity and
making the investment immediately. By making a trade-oﬀ between the host country's
incremental welfare beneﬁts and the costs of the subsidy package, we obtain the optimal
timing to provide it. We also examine the eﬀects of preemption risk on the timing of
investment and the value of a subsidy package.
Second, we consider the timing of investment and the choice of entry modes. We evaluate
the investment projects and derive the investment thresholds when the ﬁrm can choose
between a joint venture (JV) and a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS). We ﬁnd that when
there is no subsidy oﬀered, the ﬁrm prefers a WOS, while the host country prefers a JV.
When there are subsidies oﬀered by the host country, we ﬁnd that both the ﬁrm and the
host country prefer a WOS. A JV will be preferred only if it has some distinctive welfare
beneﬁts that are not associated with a WOS, for instance knowledge transfer beneﬁts.
iv
vLast, we introduce product market competition into the problems of investment timing
and choice of entry mode. We ﬁnd that competition will not alter the conclusions we have
obtained. The optimal mode of entry is a WOS, unless a JV has some distinctive welfare
beneﬁts that cannot be provided by a WOS.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Questions
Investments that have externalities lead to incentives of third parties to inﬂuence the decision-
making process of the party who owns the investment opportunity. This idea is prominent
in the work of Coase (1960) who argued that, in a world where individuals' rights are
well deﬁned by law, it is possible to sue successfully for damages when investments with
negative externalities are being made. This will impose costs on the individual who makes
the investment decision, and in a perfect world, the decision maker will internalise exactly
the cost of the externality, and the socially eﬃcient investments will be made even without
interference from the government. This thesis presents the case in which investments have
positive externalities, and the problem is that too few investments are being made or that
they are being delayed because the decision maker is unable to internalise the externality.
Investment incentive is one way to internalise the externality, and this thesis examines the
optimal choices when it comes to timing, form, and targeting investment incentives. This is
the fundamental research question that is addressed.
1
2The area in which positive externalities are the most prominent is the area of foreign direct
investments (FDIs), and the thesis presents and examination of models of subsidy for such
investments. The problem is, however, considerably broader than that, and as an example,
we can point to green investments as an area of growing interest. A green investment is an
investment that replaces a traditional technology with a new one that is less damaging for
the global climate. Thus, green investments have considerable positive externality on top of
the intrinsic commercial value. Incentives to promote green investments will, therefore, have
the same structure as incentives to promote FDI.
During the last several decades, with the process of globalisation and gradual elimination
of trade and investment barriers, it has become increasingly convenient and proﬁtable for
enterprises to make investments in foreign countries. At the same time, host countries are
more open to FDIs. Through FDI, a ﬁrm can either replicate its home country-based business
in a foreign country to locate production nearer to its customers, or it can locate some stages
of its business in a foreign country to take advantage of the diﬀerences in factor prices. A
host country can also beneﬁt from FDIs in many ways. Investment from abroad not only
means the inﬂux of external capital and the increase in employment opportunities and tax
revenues from the new businesses but also involves the transfer of advanced technology,
expertise skills, and management methods. Competition from new businesses may lead to
greater productivity and eﬃciency in the relevant industry of the host country. The corporate
governance standards of the host country may also be improved. Essentially, a host country
can boost its economic development and improve social welfare through FDI. Therefore, it
is often motivated to oﬀer various investment incentives to attract FDI.
Many countries have established specialised agencies to promote and incentivise FDIs.
The FDI incentives can take various forms but are broadly ﬁscal or ﬁnancial in nature and can
3be categorised into two major types: tax relief to reduce a ﬁrm's tax burden and investment
support to subsidise a ﬁrm's investment cost. The former includes a low corporate tax
or individual income tax rate, tax holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances on capital
taxes, and other types of tax concessions, and the latter includes infrastructure subsidies,
investment ﬁnancial subsidies, free land or land subsidies, and soft loans or loan guarantees.
Buckley and Casson (1998) suggested that when ﬁrms make FDI decisions, some funda-
mental issues must be considered, such as the reason to enter a market, when to invest, which
entry mode to choose, and how to build it. The timing of investment is one of the central
concerns of decision makers within a ﬁrm. However, Rivoli and Salorio (1996) suggested
that rich explanations have been oﬀered to the 'why', 'where', and 'who' of FDI (see e.g.,
Dunning, 1988a; Dunning and Rugman, 1985). However, only a limited amount of literature
considers the 'when' of FDI (see e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1981; Casson, 1994). Among
the existing literature considering FDI timing, the timing of investment is often treated as
exogenously given or analysed in a deterministic model. Given the importance of the timing
issue and the fact that the existing literature can only partially explain it, our ﬁrst set of
research questions relate to the timing of investment and how a host country can aﬀect it
using investment incentives.
Although it has become much easier nowadays for ﬁrms to invest globally, ﬁrms still
face great uncertainty when investing in a foreign country. Dixit (1989) and Kogut (1991)
introduced market uncertainty, such as unstable revenue, changing product price/investment
cost, and evolving technology. Henisz (2000) pointed out the institutional uncertainty that
arises when ﬁrms invest in a foreign country with diﬀerent regulatory policies, laws, and
political systems. It is diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to predict the economic and political prospects of a
foreign country and the costs used to set up the investment may be more diﬃcult to recover
4in an unfamiliar place. Under the conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility, a ﬁrm should
have some ﬂexibilities in the timing to make the investment and enter a new market.
From a ﬁrm's point of view, if it makes the investment immediately and the future
market conditions improve, an early investment may lead to a higher market share and
more revenues, which is often referred to as the `ﬁrst-mover advantage'. 1. However, if the
future market conditions deteriorate, the ﬁrm may suﬀer a great loss and it may be diﬃcult
to recover its investment costs. If the ﬁrm chooses to postpone the investment and wait
until the market conditions become clearer, the 'ﬁrst-mover advantage' may vanish and the
ﬁrm can only obtain a lower market share and less revenues. Therefore, the ﬁrm needs a
reasonable decision rule on when to make the investment and enter a new market. From a
host country's point of view, the early arrival of the investment can result in incremental
tax revenues, employment opportunities, and social welfare beneﬁts. The host country also
needs to take into account the eﬀect of the competition that is brought by foreign ﬁrms to
the domestic industry. Therefore, the study of optimal timing of investment is also of great
importance to the host country.
Decision makers of the host country should necessarily know the factors that can aﬀect
a ﬁrm's investment decisions and be aware of the costs and beneﬁts associated with them.
A host country can attract investment through providing a subsidy package, which consists
mainly of tax relief and investment support. It can further inﬂuence a ﬁrm's investment
decisions through adjusting the value of the subsidy package. This is a distinctive feature of
our analysis in this thesis. Previous literature on subsidies has often analysed static models,
that is, once oﬀered, the subsidies are treated as constants (see e.g., Pennings, 2000, 2005;
1Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) stated that the three primary sources of ﬁrst-mover advantages
are technological leadership (see e.g., Michael, 1981) preemption of scarce assets (see e.g., Main, 1955;
Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Schmalensee, 1981), and switching costs/buyer choice under uncertainty (see
e.g., Klemperer, 1986; Ries and Trout, 1986)
5Yu, Chang, and Fan, 2007; Danielova and Sarkar, 2011). The ﬁrm and the host country
maximise their proﬁts/beneﬁts given these constant subsidies.
In contrast, our analysis is conducted under a dynamic setting. We argue that the host
country can aﬀect the ﬁrm's investment decision through adjusting the value of the subsidy
package. In other words, the value of the subsidies can vary according to market conditions or
the desired timing of the host country. The increase or reduction in subsidies can be regarded
as a 'reward' for speeding up the investment or a 'penalty' for delaying the investment. The
host country should ideally know the optimal value of subsidy package to maximise its own
beneﬁts. Since it is the ﬁrm's right to decide when to make the investment, it must always
be optimal for the ﬁrm at the time of investment. Since the host country can adjust the
value of the subsidy package, it should also be optimal for the host country at the time of
investment. In the following chapters, we look at the optimal value and timing of the subsidy
package that needs to be oﬀered by the host country to induce the investment to take place
at its desired timing.
When the investment payoﬀ is uncertain and the investment cost is irreversible, it is better
for investors to adopt a wait-and-see strategy and postpone the investment. In this situation,
the theory of real options applies. McDonald and Siegel (1986) introduced the concept of 'the
value of waiting'. They reached a fundamental conclusion that, under uncertainty, deferring
the investment can enhance its expected value. When the value of waiting exceeds the
beneﬁts from making the investment, the expected value of the investment always increases
with delaying. In investment under uncertainty, in other words, the real options approach
was summarised by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In the following analysis, we employ the
standard real options model in the case of a foreign monopolist investing in a single host
country. When the strategic interactions among market participants are taken into account,
6we apply the real options game model to account for the eﬀects of preemption risk.
Many studies on the timing of investment under the theoretical framework of real options
have conﬁrmed that it is optimal for a ﬁrm to postpone the investment under the assumption
of uncertainty and irreversibility. The investment threshold derived under these assumptions
will be higher than the break-even point in the analysis of net present value (NPV) when the
market uncertainty and the ﬁrm's operational ﬂexibility are assumed away. Therefore, if the
host country wants the investment to be made earlier than the ﬁrm would like to make it, the
host country must compensate the ﬁrm, usually in the form of a subsidy package. While a
ﬁrm holds the option to make an investment at its optimal timing, a host country also holds
the option to oﬀer a subsidy package. To decide when to oﬀer the subsidy package, the host
country needs to make a trade-oﬀ between the incremental welfare beneﬁts and tax revenues
from an earlier investment and the cost of the subsidy package consisting of tax relief and
investment support. The option to oﬀer a subsidy package held by a host country is similar
to the option to make an investment held by a ﬁrm in the way that both the country and
the ﬁrm have to make trade-oﬀs between the relevant beneﬁts and costs.
Since the incentives used to attract FDI can take various forms, the concern about which
one is better and how the 'optimal' subsidy package should be formed is quite universal.
Yu et al. (2007) reached the conclusion that investment support is better than tax relief,
suggesting that only the investment support should be used by the host country to attract
FDI. However, in practice, most countries use a combination of investment support and tax
relief. To reconcile the practice with the theory, this thesis presents the argument that it is
the value rather than the form of the subsidy package that matters. When a host country is
inclined to promote FDI and expects the investment to be made at its desired timing, the
only thing that matters is the value of the optimal subsidy package. 'Optimality' suggests
7that the subsidy package should be adequate, neither too much nor too little. Given the
value of the subsidy package, the speciﬁc ways in which the investment support and tax
relief are combined do not really matter and can take various forms. The combination of
investment support and tax relief only matters in the sense that the total value of the subsidy
package must be 'optimal'.
The real options model we have discussed so far is the 'standard' real options model,
which applies to the case of a foreign monopolist investing in a single host country. We also
take advantage of the real options game model to account for the eﬀects of preemption risk.
The real options game model incorporates the theoretical concepts of game theory since
many industries are characterised not only by uncertainty but also by strategic interactions
among market participants. In the second chapter of this thesis, we analyse two situations
1) when ﬁrms are competing to invest in a host country and the winning ﬁrm will preempt
other ﬁrms' investments and 2) when countries are competing to attract an investment to
their own locations and the winning country will preempt other countries.
When a ﬁrm decides to invest and take part in the business activities in a foreign country,
it can choose among many diﬀerent entry modes. The second set of research questions
analysed in this thesis relate to market entry modes. We look at the optimal timing and
value of an investment subsidy given diﬀerent entry modes and investigate the optimal mode
of entry for a subsidy. Entry mode has been deﬁned by Sharma and Erramilli as follows:
A structural agreement that allows a ﬁrm to implement its product market strategy in a
host country either by carrying out only the market operations (i.e. via export modes),
or both production and marketing operations there by itself or in partnership with others
(contractual modes, joint venture, wholly owned operations).(2004, p. 2)
According to Peng, 'these models diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of cost, commitment, risk,
8return, and control' (2002, p. 336) and can be categorised into two major types: non-
equity and equity modes. The former includes export and contractual modes, which reﬂect
relatively smaller commitments to overseas markets. The latter includes joint ventures (JVs)
and wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs), which indicate relatively larger commitments to
overseas markets.
Entry mode research is also one of the most researched areas by scholars, market practi-
tioners, and policy makers. Research on entry modes may involve identifying the factors that
may aﬀect the ﬁrms' choices of entry modes, evaluating the ﬁrms' post-entry performances
and explaining how the choices of entry modes aﬀect the ﬁrms' post-entry performances.
Many theories and constructs have been proposed in entry mode research. Some of them
have been long-established and frequently applied, such as the transaction-cost theory, in-
ternalisation theory, and culture/cultural distance theory. Some theories and constructs are
relatively new but also provide important insight into this area, such as the institutional
theory, organisational theory, and uncertainty theory. In this thesis, we take into account
the factor of uncertainty and focus on two types of equity modes: a JV and a WOS. We
employ real options valuation techniques to evaluate the investment projects when diﬀerent
entry modes are adopted. We derive their respective investment thresholds and analyse the
eﬀect of diﬀerent entry modes on the timing of investment. We investigate whether one
mode seems to be more favourable than the other under certain circumstances. We also
investigate when, how, and how much the host country should subsidise the ﬁrm in order
to induce an early arrival of investment when the ﬁrm can choose between the two types of
entry modes.
In the above analysis, we do not take into account product market competition. We
usually treat the payoﬀ of the investment project or the output price as a state variable that
9follows a certain process, in particular the geometric Brownian motion with no restrictions.
Thus, the state variable can range over (0,∞). However, in practice, there are always restric-
tions on the state variable. In a competitive industry, the ﬁrms' free entry to and exit from
a competitive market will result in both the upper and lower bounds of the state variable.
Our ﬁnal set of research questions relate to the eﬀect of product market competition. In the
last chapter of this thesis, we study investment timing and choice of entry mode when the
state variable is subject to a doubly absorbing barrier process. We attempt to address the
following questions: When is the market competitive? How do the entry and exit of ﬁrms
aﬀect the valuation of the investment projects and investment thresholds? What are the
eﬀects of product market competition on the value of the investment projects and timing
of the investment when diﬀerent entry modes are adopted? How should the host country
subsidise the ﬁrms to speed up the investment under this market structure? We also try to
investigate whether one entry mode will be preferred under this market structure.
1.2 Contributions
Corresponding to the research questions raised above, the contributions of this thesis are
three-fold. First, we derive the optimal form and timing of a subsidy package as well as
the characteristics of the industries that are targeted for subsidies. Second, we show that
investment subsidy can aﬀect the choice of entry modes. Third, we demonstrate the eﬀects
on investment subsidy when there is competition in the product market. The following
points summarise these contributions in more detail.
With respect to the optimal form and timing of a subsidy package (investigated in Chap-
ter 2) the following conclusions can be drawn:
 The investment subsidy should always be structured in such a way that it provides a
10
kind of 'reward' for the speed-up of the investment and a 'penalty' for the delay. The
optimal subsidy package should always compensate the ﬁrm for giving up the delay
of the investment opportunity (i.e., giving up the value of waiting) and making the
investment immediately.
 When the investment subsidy is oﬀered at a lower trigger point (i.e., is oﬀered earlier),
the ratio of the welfare beneﬁts to the amortised investment cost is higher.
 The preemption risk in the market for investment (i.e., a situation in which the invest-
ment has a positive externality for the host country but a negative externality for the
ﬁrm's competitors) will lower the trigger point for the optimal investment subsidy.
 The preemption risk in the market for subsidy (i.e., a situation in which the invest-
ment has a positive externality for the host country but a negative externality for the
country's competitors in the market for subsidy) will lower the trigger point for the
optimal investment subsidy.
With respect to the relationship between investment subsidy and the modes of entry
(investigated in Chapter 3), we study the modes of entry as a JV between the ﬁrm and
the host country, where the host country retains the right to maintain output at maximum
capacity in future states, versus the mode of entry as a WOS, where the ﬁrm retains all
operational ﬂexibility with regard to output. The following conclusions can be drawn:
 For modes of entry that have the same investment trigger in an unsubsidised world
(i.e., would happen at the same point in time) and no subsidy is oﬀered, the ﬁrm prefers
the WOS as the optimal mode of entry but the host country prefers the operationally
less ﬂexible JV.
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 For modes of entry that have the same NPV at the point of investment in an unsub-
sidised world, but the timing of investment is diﬀerent and no subsidy is oﬀered, the
ﬁrm prefers the WOS. The preference of the host country depends on the parameters.
 For subsidised entry, when the investment triggers are identical in an unsubsidised
world, the host country obtains the maximum welfare by oﬀering a subsidy for a WOS
as the mode of entry. This also holds when the NPV at the point of investment in an
unsubsidised world are the same regardless of mode of entry.
 For a JV to be the preferred mode of entry when an investment subsidy is oﬀered, it
must have some distinctive welfare beneﬁts that are not associated with a WOS, for
instance knowledge transfer beneﬁts.
With respect to the eﬀects of product market competition on investment timing and
choice of entry mode (investigated in Chapter 4), the following conclusions can be drawn:
 The cost structure of the investment is given endogenously by the constraint that both
modes of entry must be competitive in an unsubsidised world (i.e., both have the same
entry trigger point to the industry where the NPV is zero, and both have the same
exit trigger point from the industry where the NPV of the future operation is zero).
Therefore, there is no need to normalise the investment trigger points or the NPVs of
the investment.
 The conclusions obtained in Chapter 3 still hold. Competition will not aﬀect the
problem of choosing the optimal mode of entry, and unless a JV has some distinctive
welfare beneﬁts that cannot be associated with a WOS, the optimal mode of entry is
a WOS.
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1.3 Existing Literature
The analyses in this thesis relate to several strands of literature. The research objects of
this thesis are investment decisions about timing and entry modes, FDI incentives, and the
eﬀects of market structure on them. The existing literature related to these objects will be
reviewed and summarised in this section. The literature related to the methodology adopted
in this thesis  the standard real options model and the real options game model is also
reviewed.
1.3.1 Investment Timing
The investment timing decision is one of the central concerns of decision makers within a
ﬁrm. This thesis focuses on the FDI timing problem and investigates how a host country
can aﬀect it using investment incentives.
Although it can be traced back to Vernon (1966) who proposed the `Product Cycle
Hypothesis', which oﬀers a cost-based rationale for the switch from exporting to market-
seeking FDI and then to cost-orientated FDI, the ﬁrst attempt to predict the timing of the
switch was made by Aliber (1970). However, the early analysis of FDI timing either took it as
exogenously given or analysed it in a deterministic model (Buckley and Casson, 1981; Mackie-
Mason, 1990). Rivoli and Salorio (1996) pointed out that the existing literature oﬀers rich
explanations of the `why', `where', and `who' of FDI, but there are few studies on the timing
or the `when' of FDI (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1981; Casson, 1994). The early analyses also
ignored two important features of the investment: uncertainty and irreversibility. These two
features have been shown to profoundly aﬀect the investment decisions. `It also undermines
the theoretical foundation of standard neoclassical investment models, and invalidates the
net present value rule' (Pindyck, 1991), which has been widely used in capital budgeting and
13
investment decision making and suggests ﬁrms commit to the projects with positive NPVs.
Intuitively, when the market outlook is uncertain and the investment expenditures are
hard to recover, it is rational to be cautious and to wait and see how the market evolves.
Holding the opportunity to invest in a project with future payoﬀs is analogous to having a
call option on a common stock paying dividend, and making the investment is like exercising
the call option. This ﬂexibility in investment timing actually has value. McDonald and Siegel
(1985) introduced uncertainty and identiﬁed the eﬀect of the shut-down option on the initial
investment decision. They argued that, when investment environment is highly uncertain
in the sense that the future revenues from an investment project or the costs to install the
investment are uncertain, there may be an option for the ﬁrm to shut down the business if
operating revenues are less than variable costs. This shut-down option will aﬀect the initial
investment decision. They applied option-pricing techniques to the investment problem when
a ﬁrm has the shut-down option. McDonald and Siegel (1986) studied the optimal timing
of investment when the investment project is irreversible and the investment environment
is uncertain. The beneﬁts and the costs associated with the investment are assumed to
follow continuous-time stochastic processes, in particular the geometric Brownian motion.
They identiﬁed the value of the option to invest and derived the optimal investment rule
 that it is optimal to wait until that the beneﬁts from the project are suﬃciently large
compared with the investment costs. Pindyck (1991) stressed two important characteristics
of most investment expenditures. First, most of the investment expenditures are irreversible
in the sense that they are sunk costs and cannot be recovered. Second, the ﬁrms can
choose to wait before it makes investment expenditures. He derived the optimal investment
rules using option-pricing methods and dynamic programming. Pennings (2000) argued
that it is possible to inﬂuence the timing of overseas investment by a zero cost package
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consisting of a front-loaded lump sum ﬁnanced by a back-loaded tax on proﬁts. Pennings
(2005) showed that the cheapest subsidy package to attract new investment is to provide a
front-loaded investment combined with a positive corporate tax rate on back-loaded proﬁts.
Yu, Chang, and Fan (2007) showed that if the host country can choose between providing
cheap land and tax subsidy, it is better oﬀ with a front-loaded support in the form of
cheap land, while Danielova and Sarkar (2011) pointed out that, when debt ﬁnancing is
available, the investment support may not dominate tax relief as the cheapest way to attract
new investment since tax cuts will also reduce the value of the tax shield and, as the ﬁrm
may default at some point in the future, the equity horizon may be truncated. Under the
assumptions that the discount rates for the government and the private ﬁrms are diﬀerent and
that the government has to borrow money to ﬁnance the investment subsidy, Sarkar (2012)
provided an alternative explanation for the country to provide the investment subsidy and
tax the proﬁts at the same time. 2
1.3.2 Entry Modes
Choice of market entry mode is considered a critical strategic decision (Lu, 2002). We also
study a ﬁrm's choice of entry mode and compare the modes of entry as a JV and a WOS
under diﬀerent situations.
Foreign-market entry modes can take various forms and can be grouped into two ma-
jor types: non-equity and equity modes. The former type includes exporting, licensing,
franchising, and subcontracting, and the latter includes JVs, WOSs, greenﬁeld investments,
brownﬁeld investments, mergers and acquisitions, etc. The enormous growth in FDI is often
accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in the number of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
2In Chapter 2, we prove that the front- or back-loaded subsidies make no diﬀerence to the country's
option. In other words, the form of investment subsidy does not matter.
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As mentioned above, entry mode research is one of the most researched areas. Werner (2002)
suggested that entry mode research is the third most researched ﬁeld in international man-
agement, just behind FDI and internationalisation. Werner pointed out that entry mode
research includes 'the predictors of choices of entry mode, predictors of international equity
ownership levels, and consequences of entry mode decisions'(2002, p. 281). Meyer et al.
(2009) showed how alternative modes of entry allow ﬁrms to overcome diﬀerent kinds of
market ineﬃciencies related to both characteristics of the resources and to the institutional
context in emerging economies.
The recent review article of Canabal and White III (2008) examined the empirical studies
published during the time period from 1980 to 2006. From that paper, we can easily ﬁnd
the most commonly used theories in entry mode research and the factors that will aﬀect the
ﬁrms' choices of entry modes. Among the theories that have been proposed, some have been
long-established and often applied. New theories and constructs have also emerged. For ex-
ample, the transaction-cost theory is the most important and widely used theory. The basic
rationale behind this theory is that ﬁrms always seek to minimise their costs of entering and
operating in a foreign country (Hennart, 1989; Williamson, 1979, 1985). The second most
commonly used theory is the OLI theory where OLI stands for ownership, location, and in-
ternalisation. This theory is also referred to as the 'eclectic paradigm' (Dunning, 1993). The
third most commonly applied construct is the culture or cultural distance theory (Hallén
and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1979). The relatively new theories include the institutional theory,
organisational capacities, and uncertainty. Institutional theory suggests that, when a ﬁrm
enter a new market, it must operate in the context of certain rules, norms, and values (Davis,
Desai, and Francis, 2000; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). The embedded isomorphic pressures
can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the ﬁrm's choice of entry mode. Organisational capabil-
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ities theory investigates a ﬁrm's capabilities related to the choice of entry mode (Erramilli,
Agarwal, and Dev, 2002; Chen and Hennart, 2002). 'Uncertainty' was deﬁned as 'unpre-
dictability of environmental or organizational variables that have an impact on corporate
performance' by Miller (1993, p. 694). It also has an eﬀect on the ﬁrm's entry mode strate-
gies (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2000, 2002; Erramilli and D'Souza, 1993). Other
theories and constructs include control, internationalisation, risk, resource-based view, FDI,
knowledge-based view, etc. In summary, it appears that early theories are often based on
economics (e.g., transaction-cost theory, internalisation, etc.) and psychology (e.g., culture
or cultural distance), while theories from diﬀerent ﬁelds in recent studies have been applied
and integrated to provide a better understanding of the practice of entry mode selection.
In the existing studies, the most commonly used statistical methods are logistic regres-
sion and multinomial logit. Other methods include discriminant analysis, probit, multiple
regression, and exponential estimation. Within these regressions, the most commonly used
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, such as WOS versus JV, export versus FDI,
etc. The equity level is also commonly used as a dependent variable. It is not surprising that
the number of factors used as independent variables is very large since there are so many
theories and constructs to account for the choice of entry mode. In general, most studies
focus on the inﬂuences of the factors on the choice of entry modes.
Canabal and White III (2008) suggested future empirical researchers use diﬀerent entry
modes as independent variables to study the eﬀects of choice of entry mode on the post-
entry performances of the ﬁrm. We study the issue theoretically under the framework of the
real option theory to study the timing of investment, and we can also apply this theory to
analyse the choice of entry modes. For example, JVs are often considered a means to deal
with market uncertainty since they have the options to acquire or disinvest according to
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market conditions. Therefore, JVs can be analysed under the theoretical framework of real
options. In this thesis, we focus on the eﬀects of the ﬁrm's choice between a JV and WOS
on the timing and value of the investment. Existing literature in this speciﬁc area is quite
limited.
Dixit (1989) and Kogut (1991) introduced market uncertainty (e.g., unstable revenue,
changing product price and investment cost, evolving technology, etc.) to the problem of
foreign-market entry decisions. Dixit (1989) focused on the timing of investment (entry).
Following their method, Rivoli and Salorio (1996) discussed the strategic perspectives on the
timing of investment. Kogut (1991) considered a JV an option to acquire or expand. Chi
(2000) analysed the acquisition and disinvestment of JVs as real options. Chi and McGuire
(1996) discussed the strategic perspective on the choice of market entry modes. However,
until Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2004), there were no theoretical models that successfully
integrated the analysis of investment timing and choice of entry mode simultaneously. Pen-
nings and Sleuwaegen (2004) argued that investment timing and choice of entry mode can
be considered at the same time and derived the decision rules for when to switch from ex-
porting to establishing a JV or WOS under diﬀerential taxation. Since the choice of entry
modes can aﬀect the value of the investment project and the investment threshold, the ﬁrm
will always choose the optimal mode of entry. If the ﬁrm can choose among diﬀerent entry
modes, this kind of ﬂexibility is valuable and must be taken into account when we evaluate
the investment project.
1.3.3 Real Options
As mentioned above, when investors have the option to defer the investment under uncer-
tainty and irreversibility, real options theory should be used in decision making. In this
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thesis, we employ the standard real options model in the case of a foreign monopolist in-
vesting in a single host country. When the strategic interactions among market participants
are taken into account, we take advantage of the real options game model to account for the
eﬀects of preemption risk.
The concept of 'real options' was ﬁrst introduced by Myers (1977). He pointed out
the similarities between future investment/growth opportunities and ﬁnancial options, and
considered the value of real options to be the value of the investment/growth opportunities
in present value terms. In other words, the value of real options can be viewed as the
present value of the right to buy real assets when market conditions are favourable in the
future. This claim can be viewed as a call option on real assets. Ross (1978) identiﬁed
the inherent potential investment opportunities. He regarded such investment opportunities
as real options and discussed the theories of real options valuation. Pindyck (1991) also
stated that an irreversible investment opportunity is like a ﬁnancial call option that gives
the holder the right, not the obligation, to pay an exercise price and receive an asset, at
some future time, when the market conditions are favourable. Luehrman (1998) compared
the real options with call options and drew a clear picture of the similarities between real
options and ﬁnancial options.
Like a call option, the option to invest (i.e., the real option) is valuable when the future
payoﬀ of the investment is uncertain. If the market condition improves, the ﬁrm can make
the investment and the payoﬀ of the investment will increase. If the market condition de-
teriorates, the ﬁrm does not have to engage in investment, and all its loss is the value of
the investment opportunity. The real options help the ﬁrm retain the potential for future
proﬁts and avoid the possible losses. Therefore, the real options are valuable. This ﬁnding
undermines the theoretical foundations of the traditional NPV approach in decision mak-
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ing. When the NPV rule is applied, the management ﬂexibility is actually assumed away,
and the real options attached to the investment are ignored. Myers (1984) determined the
shortcomings of the discounted cash ﬂow (DCF) analysis. Taking into account real options,
he recommended that investment decisions should be based on option pricing rather than
the DCF approach. Hodder and Riggs (1985) argued that the risks of investment projects
gradually decrease and that management ﬂexibility may also reduce the risks. Thus, using a
single discount rate throughout the valuation of the project may not be appropriate. Trige-
orgis and Manson (1987) pointed out that the traditional NPV or DCF approach implicitly
assumes away the future uncertainty and ignores the management ﬂexibility. Thus, the NPV
or DCF rule may result in a biased result in decision making. Similar opinions are also held
by Brealey and Myers (1992), Dixit and Pindyck (1995), Ross (1995), and others. Thus,
the inherent options of an investment and the management ﬂexibility can add value to the
investment and must be taken into account when investors make investment decisions.
Real options can be classiﬁed into several categories. Trigeorgis (1993, 1996) categorised
real options into seven types: option to defer, staged investment option, option to alter
operating scale, option to abandon, option to switch, growth option, and interacting option.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) divided the real options into ﬁve categories: option to defer, option
to exit, lay-up option, scrapping option, and incremental option. Amram and Kulatilaka
(1999) grouped real options into ﬁve types: option to defer, growth option, ﬂexible option,
option to exit, and learning option.
In summary, when the investment environment is uncertain and the investment expen-
diture is irreversible, it is better to use the real option theory for decision making. In this
thesis, we follow the basic model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) in the hope to gain insight on
the value of management optionality, investment timing, and subsidies.
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The real option approach can be applied to a wide variety of situations. Lander and
Pinches summarised the application areas and topics, such as: Natural resources, competition
and corporate strategies, manufacturing, real estate, international, research & development,
regulated ﬁrms and utilities, mergers, acquisitions and corporate governance, interest rates,
inventory, the labor force, venture capital, advertising, law, `hysteretic' eﬀects and ﬁrm
behavior, and environmental compliance and conservation. (1998, p. 540)
In addition, the conceptual framework of real options has also been applied to explain
social activities, such as marriage, suicide, legal reform, and constitutions (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994; Ch. 1). Using the real option approach, Wang et al. (2010) derived a pricing model
for football player transfer and analysed the eﬀects of injuries on the value.
Real Options Valuation
The valuation methods of real options can be categorised according to the continuity of
variables or the methods adopted for pricing the real options.
According to the continuity of the variables, the valuation models can be divided into
a discrete-time model and continuous-time model. Binomial methods are the most applied
discrete-time models to value diﬀerent types of real options. Given that most real options
are analogous to American style options, this method is ﬂexible enough for the decisions to
be made at each node. However, it should be noted that the binomial method has diﬃculty
handling high-dimensional problems. When the continuous-time model is employed, time
is considered to be continuous and inﬁnite, and the variables are always assumed to follow
certain processes, for instance the geometric Brownian motion. McDonald and Siegel (1986)
assumed both the payoﬀ and the cost of the investment follow a geometric Brownian motion
and derived the value of the option to defer. Carr (1988) derived a valuation formula for a
compound exchange option by assuming that the returns on the underlying assets follow a
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geometric Brownian motion.
There are three major methods to value real options. The contingent claims approach
applies option-pricing theory to the valuation of real options. It regards real options as
contingent claims whose values depend on the values of other assets. By forming a riskless
portfolio consisting of real options and other assets, the value of real options can be calcu-
lated. The dynamic programming approach is also employed to value real options. Both the
contingent claims approach and the dynamic programming approach are used extensively
in the work by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The Monte Carlo simulation method has also
been increasingly applied to real options valuation, especially to high-dimensional problems.
Boyle (1977) is one example of this. Gamba (2002) used the Monte Carlo simulation method
to value multiple real options. Recent developments in real options valuation include the
Datar-Mathews method (Mathews, Datar, and Johnson, 2007) and the fuzzy payoﬀ method
(Collan, Fullér, and Mezei, 2009).
Standard Real Options Models
The standard real options models are used extensively in real options literature (see e.g.,
Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986). As summarised by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), the focus of the standard real options model is the derivation of the ﬁrms'
value functions and the investment thresholds under the assumption of risk-neutrality of the
ﬁrms and the absence of arbitrage opportunities. The assumptions imply that the sum of
the ﬂow payoﬀ and the expected capital gain over an inﬁnitesimal time interval must equal
the risk-free return of the capital over the same time interval. Once the investment threshold
has been derived, the principle of the use of the investment threshold is that a ﬁrm should
invest at the instant when the investment threshold is crossed for the ﬁrst time.
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Real Options Game Models
Real options theory is employed in making investment decisions when the market condi-
tions are highly uncertain. However, the market conditions are characterised not only by
uncertainty but also by strategic interactions among market participants. This promotes the
real options models to incorporate the concepts of game theory. However, the standard real
options approach does not take into account the eﬀect of competition. When only one ﬁrm
is to invest in an uncertain world, real options theory suggests that it is better for the ﬁrm
to wait and see. The ﬁrm is actually a monopolist. However, in a competitive market, when
ﬁrms make investment decisions and take certain actions, they must take into account how
their competitors will think and react. This can be viewed as a 'game' among ﬁrms.
Smets (1993) ﬁrst incorporated interactions between ﬁrms into real option analysis. His
methodology is followed by many researchers. Since then, a new stream of literature on the
merger between the real options theory and game theory has emerged. Chevalier-Roignant
et al. (2011) suggested the real options game models can be used to analyse various research
objects, such as the timing of entry, the staging of entry, the scale of production, the type
and quality of product, etc.
According to the continuity of the variables, the real options game models can be cate-
gorised into discrete-time models and continuous-time models.
Smit and Ankum (1993) analysed the situation when both ﬁrms have the opportunities
to enter a new market with the same costs. They incorporate binomial models to describe
the movement of the market and the decisions of the two ﬁrms. They assume that the ﬁrm
who enters the market ﬁrst will have the higher market share, and if they enter the market
at the same time, they will have the same market share. The information is assumed to be
complete. Then, the two ﬁrms need to decide whether to enter the market simultaneously
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or sequentially under diﬀerent situations. Zhu and Weyant (2003a, 2003b) analysed the
interactions between two ﬁrms using the binomial method by assuming that only one ﬁrm
has complete information while the other ﬁrm just knows the probability distribution of the
cost of its rival.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) proposed a continuous-time, symmetric duopoly model based
on Smets (1991). They assumed that the product price is aﬀected by some random variable
Y . When Y is smaller than some threshold Y1, neither ﬁrm will invest; when Y1 < Y < Y2,
only one ﬁrm will invest, and when Y > Y2, both ﬁrms will invest. However, their model
does not take into account the ﬁrst-mover advantage. Weeds (2002) analysed competition
in research activities in an oligopoly model and investigated the eﬀects brought by the
competition pressure on the ﬁrm's research activities. She followed the methodology of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) and considered the ﬁrst-mover advantage, especially the winner-takes-all
situation. Mason and Weeds (2010) considered the positive and negative externalities of the
leader to the follower. They suggested that the characteristics of externalities will aﬀect the
investment decisions.
According to the type of information assumed in the models, the real options game models
can be grouped into models with complete information and models with incomplete informa-
tion. Most models we have mentioned above assume complete information, except Zhu and
Weyant (2003a, 2003b), which are the examples of discrete-time models with incomplete
information. Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) derived a dynamic model with incomplete
information. Their model also takes into account competition in the form of preemption.
The assumption of incomplete information implies that ﬁrms do not know exactly the costs
of its competitors but only know the probability distributions of the costs. The eﬀects of
preemption and incomplete information on the investment threshold are investigated in their
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paper.
In this thesis, we extend the analysis of Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) to the situations
in which the ﬁrms are competing to invest in a single host county and in which the countries
are competing to attract the investment of a ﬁrm to their own locations.
Other literature employing real options game models include the analyses of investing in
a new project (see e.g., Grenadier, 1996; Huisman and Kort, 1999; Boyer et al., 2004; Murto,
2004; Pawlina and Kort, 2006), exiting the industry (see e.g., Sparla, 2004; Murto, 2004),
and staged investments (see e.g., Miltersen and Schwartz, 2004).
1.3.4 Investment Incentives
The FDI incentives have been extensively studied in the existing literature. Our analysis
assumes that investment incentives can be used as means to aﬀect a ﬁrm's investment de-
cisions. The value of the subsidy package can be adjusted by a host country to provide a
reward for speeding up the investment and a penalty for delaying the investment. In this
section, we review the main theoretical and empirical studies of investment incentives.
In economics literature, it is generally agreed that FDIs are mainly attracted by strong
economic fundamentals of the host countries, such as market size, real income levels, avail-
ability of skilled labour, availability of infrastructures and other facilitates, and political and
macroeconomic stability (see Dunning, 1993; Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; Shapiro and
Globerman, 2001).
Investment incentives are also widely used to attract FDI. However, empirical studies
show that the eﬀects of investment incentives are very limited in the determination of the
international pattern of FDI (Blomström et al., 2000). Investment incentives are considered
to be secondary to the economic fundamentals in attracting FDI. They might only play a
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role for investment decisions on the margin. In other words, investment incentives may alter
the ﬁrms' investment decisions only when they face the choices that are more or less the
same in economic fundamentals.
As mentioned above, investment incentives can be broadly categorised into two major
types. Tax incentives, which are ﬁscal in nature, include tax holidays, special zones, invest-
ment tax credit, investment allowance, accelerated depreciation, reduced tax rate (typically
the corporate income tax rate), exemptions from various taxes, and ﬁnancing incentives (e.g.,
reduced withholding taxes on dividends) (Klemm, 2009)). Investment subsidies, which are
ﬁnancial in nature, include grants, infrastructure subsidies, investment ﬁnancial subsidies,
free land or land subsidies, and soft loan or loan guarantees. Other incentives include market
preferences, monopoly rights, etc. Since ﬁnancial subsidies usually come from the govern-
ment budget directly, they are expected to be used more frequently by developed countries.
Developing countries are more inclined to use ﬁscal incentives that do not require up-front
use of government budget.
Investment incentives have been extensively studied, typically from the aspects of why
they are granted, whether they can be justiﬁed, what their costs and beneﬁts are, and how
to choose the appropriate forms. However, the relative advantages and disadvantages of in-
vestment incentives in promoting FDI have never been clearly established. Some spectacular
successes as well as notable failures are all documented.
Tax incentives are commonly employed in promoting FDI around the world and especially
in developing countries. A more general economics literature has conﬁrmed the signiﬁcance
of the eﬀect of taxation on FDI (Hines, 1999; Devereux and Griﬃth, 2002; De Mooij and
Ederveen, 2003). This ﬁnding implies that tax incentives may also aﬀect FDI. Mintz (1990)
found that a tax holiday is used in about half of developing countries. Some studies observed
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that indirect tax incentives, such as investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation, are
more popular in developed countries (Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1996; Zee, Stotsky,
and Ley, 2002). Morisset and Pirnia (2000) found that the investment subsidies are used
more often than tax cuts in Western-European countries. Bloom et al. (2002) paid special
attention to R&D incentives (e.g., tax credits). Klemm and Van Parys (2009) found that
tax incentives, especially tax holidays, can boost FDI but have no robust eﬀect on total
investment.
Despite their popularity, economists are actually sceptical of tax incentives. To justify
tax incentives on theoretical grounds, their costs and beneﬁts must be assessed. Descriptions
of tax incentives and their costs and beneﬁts can be found in the work of Bird (2000), Shah
(2005), Zee, Stotsky, and Ley (2002), and Klemm (2009). Some empirical studies show that
the overall beneﬁts of tax incentives are unclear. Sometimes they may work in promoting FDI
when certain preconditions are met and the correct design is chosen. Detailed assessments
of almost all typical tax incentives are provided by Klemm (2009). The decision of whether
to oﬀer tax incentives and the choice among diﬀerent types of tax incentives should be
based on the evaluation of their respective costs and beneﬁts. It should be noted that the
total costs of tax incentives are beyond the loss of tax revenues, and according to Klemm:
They include distortions to the economy as a result of preferential treatment of investment
qualifying for incentives, administrative costs from running and preventing fraudulent use of
incentives schemes, and social costs of rent-seeking behaviour, including possibly an increase
in corruption. (2009, p. 11)
Therefore, it is diﬃcult to quantify the actual costs of tax incentives. In addition, the
beneﬁts of tax incentives are also diﬃcult to quantify since the economic performance can
be aﬀected by many other factors. It is suggested that when we evaluate the beneﬁts of
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tax incentives, the aggregate investment must be evaluated since other investments may be
crowded out. The cost-beneﬁt analysis of tax incentives may be misleading if they ignore
the general equilibrium eﬀects.
The eﬀects of investment subsidies seem to be more straightforward. They reduce the
initial costs to set up an investment. The question left is whether these costs can be covered
by the beneﬁts from the investment (from the host country's perspective). In practice, the
two types of investment incentives are often used together (Bond and Samuelson, 1986; Nam
and Radulescu, 2004; Pennings, 2000, 2005; Yu et al., 2007).
Among existing studies concerning investment incentives, some of them have paid atten-
tion to the situations in which uncertainty exists. MacKie-Mason (1990) analysed nonlinear
taxes and found that the tax policy may have surprising eﬀects on investment decisions when
the output is uncertain. Rodrik (1991) and Hassett and Metcalf (1999) studied the eﬀect of
taxes on investment when uncertainty exists in the tax system and tax rate. Pennings (2000,
2005) investigated why host countries subsidise the ﬁrms and tax away the beneﬁts at the
same time and reached the conclusion that by providing a self-ﬁnanced subsidy package, the
host country can lower the investment trigger and speed up the investment. Yu et al. (2007)
argued that investment subsidies dominate tax cuts. By providing an investment incentive
of the same value, investment subsidies will result in a lower investment threshold and an
earlier arrival of the investment, and the costs of investment subsidies will be lower to obtain
the same investment threshold. However, their conclusion contradicts the fact that both
types of investment incentives are used by host countries. Danielova and Sarkar (2011) and
Sarkar (2012) challenged the conclusion of Yu et al. (2007) and oﬀered some explanations
for the fact that both types of incentives are used together by introducing debt ﬁnancing.
In this thesis, we will study the eﬀects of investment incentives under uncertainty. It
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should be stressed that the models actually study the eﬀects on the margin, with all other
things being equal. Through the cost-beneﬁt analysis, we will try to discover the optimal
subsidy package consisting of investment support and tax relief. We argue that neither the
host country nor the ﬁrm should be able to extract rent from providing (by the host country)
or receiving (by the ﬁrms) the subsidy packages. On one hand, the host country should know
what the optimal subsidy package is. Otherwise, the host country may give up too much
value to the ﬁrm (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000). On the other hand, the ﬁrm should also be
aware of the value of the subsidy package to avoid losses. In our analysis, we regard the
subsidy package to be 'optimal' when the incremental beneﬁts from providing the subsidy
package are maximised.
1.4 Overview of Remaining Chapters
In this chapter, we have reviewed the research questions, contributions, and existing litera-
ture. The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
In Chapter 2, we introduce the standard real options model and derive the value of the
investment project and investment threshold. By assuming that the host country can aﬀect
the ﬁrm's investment timing decision through adjusting the value of the subsidy package,
we derive the optimal form of subsidy. We evaluate the host country's incremental welfare
beneﬁts and the costs of the subsidy package, and obtain the optimal timing to oﬀer it.
Then, we introduce the real options game model and examine the eﬀect of competition in
the form of preemption on the timing of investment and the value of subsidy package. Two
situations are analysed when diﬀerent ﬁrms compete to invest in a single country and when
diﬀerent countries compete to attract investments to their own locations.
In Chapter 3, we consider the timing of investment and the choice of entry modes simul-
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taneously. We evaluate the investment projects and the associated welfare beneﬁts when
the ﬁrm can choose between two diﬀerent entry modes  a JV and WOS. We study the ef-
fects of diﬀerent entry modes on the timing of investment and compare them and ﬁnd that,
when there is no subsidy oﬀered, the ﬁrm prefers a WOS, while the host country prefers a
JV. Next, we analyse the situation in which the host country is able to inﬂuence the ﬁrm's
investment timing decision and choice of entry mode using a subsidy package. We ﬁnd that
both the ﬁrm and the host country prefer a WOS in this situation. We ﬁnd that a JV will
be preferred only if it has some distinctive welfare beneﬁts that are not associated with a
WOS, for instance knowledge transfer beneﬁts.
In Chapter 4, we study the eﬀect of competition in the product market on investment
timing and choice of market entry mode. When the movement of output price is regulated, we
evaluate the investment projects and the welfare beneﬁts by solving systems of equations. We
ﬁnd that the cost structure of the investment is determined endogenously by the constraint
that both modes of entry must be competitive in an unsubsidised world. Firms in either
mode will have the same entry trigger point to the industry and the same exit trigger point
from the industry. We also ﬁnd that the conclusion obtained in Chapter 3 still holds. In
other words, competition will not aﬀect the choice of entry modes  the optimal mode of
entry is a WOS, unless a JV has some distinctive welfare beneﬁts that cannot be provided
by a WOS. In Chapter 5, we conclude the thesis.
Chapter 2
Investment Subsidy
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the decision by a country to inﬂuence investment behaviour of ﬁrms
by oﬀering investment subsidies. The objective of the country is to capture the incremental
welfare eﬀect of attracting an investment at an earlier time than would happen without the
subsidy. Speciﬁcally, we look at the following questions:
 How should an investment subsidy be implemented to give the maximum eﬀect?
 What is the optimal timing of the subsidies?
 How does the level of competition in the market for investment aﬀect the optimal
subsidy?
 How does the level of competition in the market for subsidy aﬀect the optimal subsidy?
The analysis is applied to the area of FDI subsidy but has considerable relevance beyond this
speciﬁc area, as it applies to any situation in which a country has an interest in inﬂuencing the
investment behaviour of its ﬁrms. Investments that have externalities  this can be positive
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externalities in the form of employment or knowledge transfers or negative externalities
in the form of pollution  are relevant to our analysis. For instance, our model can be
applied to the design of investment subsidy for ﬁrms that consider the investment in a
switch from traditional to green technology. The objective for the country may be to meet
welfare enhancing emission targets, and they may consider the use of investment subsidy to
achieve this. Many of the recommendations for the design of such schemes that apply to FDI
can be transferred directly into the problem of designing schemes for investments in green
technologies.
The area of FDI is nonetheless one where there is both a long-standing practice of us-
ing incentives and a large related literature, and we discuss the empirical relevance of our
ﬁndings by reviewing some of the evidence and casual observations in this literature. The
number and size of the deals subsidising FDI are large. Thomas (2007) estimated that
within the European Union in 2005 ¿8.4bn were distributed in regional aid, which probably
underestimates the total number, and he cited estimates of between $40-50bn for the US
for 2002. An estimate by the World Trade Organization was a total of $250bn in 2003 for
21 developed countries. The research questions above are therefore interesting in their own
right, as it is important to understand how these deals are structured to give the maximum
welfare eﬀect in the cheapest way, which is the primary motivation of this chapter. The
existing literature can only partially shed light on the questions we raise above, which forms
another motivation.
Empirically, subsidy packages take many forms  cash grants or capital injections, tax re-
lief, cheap loans or loan guarantees, guaranteed excessive rates of proﬁts, below-cost supplies
of inputs including land and power, to mention some  but we can essentially discuss only
two classes of subsidy, those that provide a front-loaded investment support and those that
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provide a back-loaded tax relief. Thomas (2007) found signiﬁcant variation in all regions of
the world. Some examples taken from his report are the following. In North America, the
US often uses front-loaded incentives, such as accelerated depreciation, whereas Mexico uses
exceptions from corporate income tax. In Central and South America investment incentives
are common throughout the region, but Brazil heavily uses tax credits and tax exemptions.
In Africa, Egypt makes use of tax holidays, whereas Morocco uses grants, tax credits, and
tax holidays. In Europe, Ireland operates with low tax rates, whereas the UK makes use of
grants. In the Asia-Paciﬁc region, Australia makes use of grants, whereas Malaysia makes
use of a combination of tax holidays and will allow depreciation of the investment in building
and equipment at over 100% of the cost. When it comes to the timing question, there is very
little related work done theoretically and empirically; the former due to the lack of dynamic
modelling in this area. There is vast theoretical literature on the eﬀects of competition in the
markets for FDI investments and subsidy; however, there is little done in dynamic models
with some notable exceptions (Pennings, 2000, 2005; Yu, Chang, and Fan, 2007; Asano,
2010, among others).
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Form matters for investment subsidy. The optimal
form of the subsidy package must provide some discouragement for the ﬁrm to defer the
investment decision (i.e., the optimal subsidy should become smaller the longer the ﬁrm holds
out before making the investment decision). We do not ﬁnd, however, that implementation
of the optimal form of subsidy matters beyond providing the necessary penalty for deferral.
For instance, a dollar generated through a tax relief has the same eﬀect as a dollar oﬀered
as cheap ﬁnancing. We ﬁnd, therefore, that the observed diversity of subsidy design is
consistent with our model as long as the subsidy is calibrated to become smaller as the
ﬁrm gets closer to the unsubsidised investment trigger. This eﬀect is similar to the well-
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known sales technique where special oﬀers are valid only for a short period  implying it is
withdrawn if we do not take advantage of it quickly.
The timing of subsidy depends on the ratio of welfare beneﬁts to the amortised investment
cost. Barring the eﬀects created by ﬁrst-mover advantages, this is the only determinant of
the timing of investment subsidy. This implies that sectors where the ratio is high are
likely targets for investment subsidy. The investment may bring new corporate capital and
employment to an area that may be lacking in both, and it may also bring new technology
to areas where technology has been lacking. These create welfare beneﬁts that can justify
investment subsidies. Surprisingly, even India, where the wage level is low, has used subsidies
to attract labour-intensive FDI to areas where the unemployment is high and the investment
cost is low (often in the form of call centres).
Competition matters, however, and more competition will generally lead to an increased
activity in the investment subsidy market. We study competition in the market for invest-
ment in the form of preemption risk. If there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage in the market for
investment where the establishment of a facility by one ﬁrm has a deterring eﬀect of the
attractiveness of other ﬁrms to make similar investments, a competitive eﬀect is generated
for that investment. An example of such a ﬁrst-mover advantage is strategic commitment.
Consider, for instance, Phillips' large investment in compact disc (CD) technology in the
early 1980s, which was made to deter its competitors from making similar investments.
From a narrower perspective, Phillips would have beneﬁted from delaying investment and
gaining more information about whether the new technology would become a new standard
in the music industry, but since the investment had a strategic commitment value, it chose
to move early. Preemption risk leads, therefore, to rent dissipation. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect
of an increase in preemption risk in the market for investment is that the investment is made
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sooner at a lower commercial value, and a country seeking to attract FDI can utilise this
eﬀect to its advantage and oﬀer subsidies for investments, which further speed up investment
at even lower commercial value. The industries where preemption risk is high, therefore, are
targets for investment subsidy.
We also study competition between countries. The eﬀect here is similarly driven by
preemption risk, where there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage to the country oﬀering investment
subsidy that attracts new investment. A subsidy oﬀered by one country leads to a loss
of welfare in other countries where a similar subsidy is no longer feasible. This can also be
interpreted as strategic commitment. For instance, a country may seek to attract investment
in research and development facilities, which are very rare. Such investments are likely
to strengthen the country's technological knowledge base and therefore have high welfare
eﬀects, but the scarcity of such investments generate competition between countries for
such investments. Preemption risk between countries increases; therefore, the likelihood of
investment subsidies being oﬀered and the industries where such investments take place are
also targets for subsidies.
These eﬀects arise in the context of optimal timing decisions, developed to solve invest-
ment problems under uncertainty when the timing is part of the decision problem. These
problems are discussed extensively in Dixit (1993), and our model uses the smooth-pasting
techniques developed there. The timing problem is solved by working out the value of in-
vestment at any point in time, and comparing it to the value of the option to defer the
investment. At the optimal point, both the values and the marginal value of both decisions
are the same. If the ﬁrst of these conditions is satisﬁed but not the latter, for instance if the
marginal value of the investment is greater than the marginal value of the option to delay
investment, then a deferral is expected to be proﬁtable, although, at the time of investment,
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the value of the investment and the option deferral are the same. This is inconsistent with
value maximising behaviour; therefore, the only solution is that there is a smooth transition
from the value of the investment option to the value of the investment itself.
The related literature consists of several strands. Some literature discusses aspects of
subsidy design in dynamic models. Here, we ﬁnd Pennings (2000, 2005), Yu, Chang, and
Fan (2007), and Asano (2010), among others. A common theme in all of these researchers'
models is that the decision to oﬀer subsidy is an optimisation problem based on welfare for
the host country, subject to oﬀering a subsidy package such that the investment decision for
the ﬁrm satisﬁes an optimal timing constraint for the ﬁrm. We argue that this problem does
not take into account all of the ﬁrm's outside options. In particular, we argue that it must
be the case that the combined value of the subsidy plus investment is at least as high as
the value of the unsubsidised investment option. This constraint is violated in the research
by Pennings (2000, 2005) and Asano (2010). Additionally, we argue that, at the optimal
point, the ﬁrm should not be able to extract rent in excess of the value of its unsubsidised
investment option. This constraint is not binding in the work by Yu, Chang, and Fan (2007).
There is also a strand of literature that discusses the welfare eﬀects of FDI subsidy.
Besley and Seabright (1999) provided an excellent overview of this literature. In addition
to the immediate welfare eﬀect of the FDI subsidy decision for the host country, they also
examined the wider externalities on other non-subsidising countries. Black and Hoyt (1989)
pointed out that subsidy may reduce distortions in the investment decision and therefore
create welfare beneﬁts. Albornoz et al. (2009) studied the eﬀect of allowing acquisitions
as an alternative to greenﬁeld FDI. Chor (2009) studied FDI subsidy when small levels of
subsidy have a selection eﬀect by attracting only the most productive ﬁrms, and Fumagalli
(2003) studied the welfare eﬀects when investments in less developed regions have greater
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welfare eﬀects but lower proﬁt potential than similar investments in more developed regions.
The essential divide between the work cited above and ours is related to dynamics. We study
the welfare eﬀects of the option to change the timing of an investment project, which would
ultimately be made in any case, with varying kinds of preemption risk in the market for
investment and the market for subsidy. The one-shot models cited above do not capture this
eﬀect and will impose a winner-takes-all structure. For instance, in Chor's (2009) model, a
selection eﬀect is introduced that denies the losing ﬁrms in a subsidy game the opportunity
to invest at a later stage. This will inﬂuence behaviour within the model, but in practice,
the ﬁrm may anticipate multiple opportunities to make an investment further down the line,
more in line with our dynamic model, which has less inﬂuence on behaviour.
There is a growing amount of literature on policy to encourage investments in green
technology, but this literature is still relatively thin. Dutz and Sharma (2012) provided a
comprehensive overview of the policy practice in this area, and Agliardi and Sereno (2012)
built a model of the optimal switch from a non-renewable source of energy to a renewable
source. However, Agliardi and Sereno (2012) did not analyse the eﬀects of policy measures
to inﬂuence the switching decision.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, and in Section 3,
we present the main theoretical ﬁndings. In Section 4, we discuss the empirical implications
of the model, and Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Framework
In this section, we set out the model, discussing the various aspects in separate subsections.
First, we describe the investment opportunity for the ﬁrm, second, the investment subsidy,
third, the timing of the investment subsidy, and ﬁnally, the competitive aspects linked to
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preemption risk of various kinds.
2.2.1 Investment and Earnings
We outline a standard real options framework stripped down to its simplest form, where
investments are equity ﬁnanced. We suppose an investment I (net of all tax implications) at
time s yields an earnings ﬂow yt, where s ≤ t < ∞. The earnings are taxed at a corporate
rate of τ . The earnings ﬂow yt follows a geometric Brownian motion with risk-neutral drift
µ and diﬀusion σ, and we assume the ﬁrm can observe the earnings ﬂow free of cost to make
the investment at a time to maximise the NPV. The trigger value y∗ is the solution to this
problem, where the investment is made at the optimal stopping time that is deﬁned as the
event that the process yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. The instantaneous risk-free rate is r.
The value of a claim on the earnings ﬂow yt by paying the investment cost I, at the
investment trigger point y∗, can be written as:
V (yt|t < τ1) = E
(∫ ∞
τ1
e−r(s+τ1)ys(1− τ)ds− e−rτ1I
)
, (2.1)
where τ1 is the stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. The value of a
claim on the earnings ﬂow yt at the point the investment is just made is similarly:
V (yt|t ≥ τ1) = E
(∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−τ1)ys(1− τ)ds
)
. (2.2)
Dixit (1993), for instance, showed that:
L(V (yt|t < τ1)) = 0, L(V (yt|t ≥ τ1)) + yt(1− τ) = 0, L = 1
2
σ2y2t
d2
dy2t
+ µyt
d
dyt
− r,
(2.3)
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where L is the inﬁnitesimal operator associated with the Brownian motion governing the
earnings process yt. The solution to the ﬁrst equation is V (yt|t < τ1) = A0yλ1t + B0yλ2t
where A0 and B0 are arbitrary constants, and λ1 and λ2 are the positive and negative
roots, respectively, of the characteristic equation 1
2
σ2λ(λ − 1) + µλ − r = 0. The roots
are λ1 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
and λ2 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
) −√(1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
. Note that
λ2 < 0 < 1 < λ1 for r > µ. The solution to the second equation is V (yt|t ≥ τ1) =
A1y
λ1
t + B1y
λ2
t +
yt(1−τ)
r−µ , where A1 and B1 are again arbitrary constants. Since the solution
must satisfy V (kyt|t ≥ τ1) = kV (yt|t ≥ τ1), however, the constants A1 and B1 must be
zero. We impose boundary conditions or smooth-pasting conditions to identify the free
parameters A0 and B0 in the expression for the value of the investment opportunity. Using
value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions, we ﬁnd the optimal investment trigger
point y∗, which is the solution of the problem of ﬁnding a smooth ﬁt between the value of the
investment opportunity V (yt|t < τ1) and the value of the investment itself V (yt|t = τ1)− I.
In this case the investment trigger is given by:
y∗ =
I
1− τ (r − µ)
λ1
λ1 − 1 . (2.4)
Note that given the assumptions of the model, the unsubsidised investment trigger point
y∗, assuming there are no eﬀects of competition, is exogenously determined.
2.2.2 Investment Subsidy
Suppose an unsubsidised investment will be made in a country at the investment trigger
given by Eq. (2.4). Suppose a host country is willing to oﬀer a subsidy package, denoted as
K, which consists of a lump sum investment support ∆ and a tax relief δ, which leads to
earlier investment. We assume that both ∆ and δ are functions of yt, so that the value of the
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subsidy package ﬂuctuates with the earnings level yt. If the ﬁrm makes the investment at
time t when the earnings are equal to yt, the ﬁrm receives ∆(yt) as an instant transfer at the
time of investment, and will additionally keep ysδ(yt) and s ≥ t of its future earnings, which
otherwise would be paid in taxes. The subsidy package is K(∆(yt), δ(yt)). Let τ2 denote the
stopping time at which the subsidy is accepted and the investment is made. The value of
the investment opportunity to a ﬁrm that accepts the subsidy is:
V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) = E
(∫ ∞
τ2
e−r(s+τ2)ys(1− τ)ds+ e−rτ2(K(yτ2)− I)
)
. (2.5)
Note that, in this expression, we capture all value eﬀects of the investment subsidy into the
value functionK. A natural constraint on the value of the subsidised investment opportunity
is that it is at least as large as the value of the unsubsidised investment opportunity (i.e.,
that V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) ≥ V (yt|t < τ1)). It is not possible that the ﬁrm would accept an
investment subsidy that would allow the country oﬀering the subsidy to extract rent from
the ﬁrm. On the other hand, we expect that the subsidy is no greater than it needs to be,
so the constraint above is likely to be binding.
2.2.3 Timing of Subsidy
The host country receives welfare beneﬁts from attracting the investment earlier than it
would otherwise occur. The beneﬁt takes the form of a constant ﬂow w for the duration
between the timing of the subsidised investment to the time the investment would have
been made in any case. The stopping time for the event that the unsubsidised investment
takes place is the event that yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. If the country seeks to attract
investment early, say at the stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗∗ < y∗ for the ﬁrst time,
the country receives a constant welfare beneﬁt ﬂow w from the latter stopping time to the
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former stopping time (i.e., in the time it takes for the earnings ﬂow to go from y∗∗ to the
ﬁrst instance in which the earnings ﬂow reaches y∗). The cost of inducing early investment
is K(∆(y∗∗), δ(y∗∗)), and the country will set the optimal timing of its subsidy package to a
time that maximises the welfare beneﬁt of receiving the welfare ﬂow w against the cost of
inducing investment. If the country waits until yt = y
∗ the net welfare eﬀect is zero because
the value of the beneﬁt ﬂow w is zero and because the cost of the subsidy package is also
zero. If w is suﬃciently large, it is always optimal to oﬀer subsidy prior to this point in time.
We can write the welfare beneﬁt of the subsidy as follows:
W (yt|t < τ2) = E
(∫ τ1
τ2
e−r(s+τ2)wds− e−rτ2K(y∗∗)
)
, (2.6)
where τ2 is the stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗∗ for the ﬁrst time, and τ1 is (as
before) the stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time. After a subsidy
package is oﬀered and accepted at yt = y
∗∗, the welfare beneﬁts take the value:
W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = E
(∫ τ1
t
e−rswds
)
. (2.7)
These expressions satisfy the following conditions:
L(W (yt|t < τ2)) = 0, L(W (yt|t ≥ τ2)) + w = 0, (2.8)
where L is deﬁned above. The optimal timing of subsidy is the trigger point y∗∗, which
maximises the welfare of the subsidy, W (yt|t < τ2).
41
2.2.4 Preemption Risk
Finally, we investigate the eﬀect of preemption risk in the market for investment and in the
market for subsidy. Let τC be the stopping time at which the winner and losers of the race
to make an investment ﬁrst becomes known, and the investment is made by the winning
ﬁrm. The value of the investment opportunity, conditional upon it belonging to the winning
ﬁrm, is the following:
V (yt|t < τC ,Win) = E
(∫ ∞
τC
e−r(s+τC)ysds+ e−rτC (K(yτC )− I)
)
, (2.9)
and the value, conditional upon it belonging to the losing ﬁrm, is the following:
V (yt|t < τC ,Lose) = 0, (2.10)
where the right-hand side is zero because the winner who makes the investment destroys the
value of the investment for the loser. Preemption risk of this kind was studied by Lambrecht
and Perraudin (2003).
When there is preemption risk in the market for investment subsidy, the winning country
receives the welfare beneﬁt, but the loser will receive nothing. Again, using τC as the stopping
time at which the winning and losing countries become known and the subsidy is oﬀered, we
ﬁnd that the welfare, conditional upon it belonging to the winning country, is the following:
W (yt|t < τC ,Win) = E
(∫ τ1
τC
e−r(s+τC)wds− e−rτCK(y∗∗)
)
, (2.11)
and the welfare, conditional upon it belonging to the losing country, is the following:
W (yt|t < τC ,Lose) = 0. (2.12)
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The incremental welfare of the option to attract business by giving investment subsidy
will, therefore, vanish completely unless there is some probability that the country can win
the preemption game.
Note that the form of competition implied by preemption in the market for investment
will have a rent dissipation eﬀect in the sense that when the probability of winning the
preemption game is low, the ﬁrm makes an investment that has a relatively low ﬁnancial
value since it is made earlier than would otherwise be the case. There is no eﬀect on the
product prices or the earnings ﬂow to the winning ﬁrm. The case where competition has an
eﬀect on product prices is investigated in Chapter 4.
2.3 Theoretical Results
In this section, we review the theoretical results relating to the parts in the preceding section.
First, we study the optimal design of the subsidy package, second, the timing of the subsidy,
and ﬁnally, the eﬀect of preemption risk.
2.3.1 Optimal Subsidy Design
A ﬁrm that owns an investment opportunity and is additionally oﬀered a subsidy package
will look at the investment decision as one where the timing of the investment maximises
the value of the total investment plus subsidy package. The problem itself does not change,
and we can apply the standard techniques developed by Dixit (1993). The ﬁrm, when
deciding to make the investment at the stopping time at which the earnings ﬂow reaches
the investment/subsidy trigger point y∗∗, expects to make a present value of y
∗∗(1−τ)
r−µ from
its future earnings, spends I on making the investment, and accepts K(y∗∗) in subsidy. The
optimal stopping time for y∗∗ is achieved when the value and the marginal value of the
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total package equals the value and the marginal value of the option to defer the investment,
respectively. We ﬁnd the following results.
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Proposition 2.1: The optimal investment trigger for a ﬁrm faced with a subsidy package
K(∆(yt), δ(yt)) is given by the investment trigger y
∗∗, where:
y∗∗ =
(
y∗ − K(y
∗∗)(r − µ)
(1− τ)
λ1
λ1 − 1
)(
1− r − µ
(1− τ)(λ1 − 1)
d
dy
K(y∗∗)
)−1
, (2.13)
where y∗ = I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1λ1−1 is the unsubsidised investment trigger.
We notice that the subsidy has a value eﬀect in the sense that the investment trigger
point is lowered by a positive value of K, which is measured by the ﬁrst bracket on the right-
hand side of Eq. (2.13). This eﬀect is a straightforward compensation eﬀect, in the sense
that the ﬁrm now views the problem of timing from the point of view as the net investment
cost I −K. There is, however, a secondary eﬀect measured by the second term. We notice
that it is not only the value of the subsidy that matters but also the marginal value. If
the marginal value is zero, for instance, if K is represented by a lump sum in investment
support that is not aﬀected by the market conditions yt, then
d
dy
K = 0 and the second
bracket equals one. In this case, the value eﬀect of K is the only aspect that has an eﬀect
on the investment decision. However, if the marginal subsidy is not zero, there will be an
additional eﬀect on the timing of the investment. For instance, if the marginal subsidy is
positive so that a deferral of the investment leads to a higher subsidy, then we would expect
the investment trigger to be greater than what is indicated by the ﬁrst bracket. The second
bracket becomes, in this case, greater than one, and the additional delay is achieved. If the
marginal subsidy is negative, we obtain the opposite eﬀect.
Technically, Proposition 2.1 is obtained by evaluating the functional forms of the value of
the investment opportunity and evaluating a smooth transition to the NPV of the investment
(including the subsidy package), which takes place at the investment trigger point. The value
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of the investment opportunity is implied by the restriction imposed by Eq. (2.3) and by
imposing an additional boundary condition in which the value of the investment opportunity
must approach zero as the earnings ﬂow yt approaches zero. The latter condition is implied
by the fact that the probability that a geometric Brownian motion reaches the investment
trigger point is very small if it is suﬃciently small.
We also notice that if K = 0 and d
dy
K = 0, the right-hand side is just the unsub-
sidised investment trigger I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1λ1−1 , which has the usual interpretations. The ﬁrst
term I
1−τ (r−µ) is the point where the NPV is exactly zero, and the second term λ1λ1−1 makes
the optimal adjustment to take into account the option value of delaying the investment. By
receiving a subsidy worth K > 0, but where d
dy
K = 0, the ﬁrm will speed up the investment
to a point where the ﬁrm would have made an unsubsidised investment costing I − K, as
explained above. Finally, if d
dy
K 6= 0, the ﬁrm will also make a further adjustment depend-
ing on whether the subsidy will increase or decrease if there is a delay. If d
dy
K > 0, the
ﬁnal term on the right-hand side is greater than one, so the ﬁrm will delay the subsidised
investment beyond the point at which the value eﬀect is taken into account. If d
dy
K < 0, the
ﬁrm will speed up the investment. We can think of this ﬁnal eﬀect as a reward or penalty
for delay imposed on the ﬁrm depending on whether the subsidy will increase or decrease,
respectively, with the market conditions. This eﬀect implies that y∗∗ may be greater than
or less than the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗, even if we set K(y∗) = 0. For instance,
if d
dy
K(y∗) > 0, the ﬁrm will delay the investment beyond the unsubsidised investment trig-
ger I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1λ1−1 . Pennings (2000) suggested that oﬀering a negative tax relief for FDI
investments (i.e., δ < 0) to ﬁnance an investment support package (i.e., ∆ > 0), which is
self-ﬁnancing at the unsubsidised investment point y∗, will delay the investment trigger point
beyond y∗. This is because we can write, with ∆ > 0 and δ < 0 constant, the value of the
46
subsidy as K(yt) = ∆ +
δyt
r−µ , and if we calibrate the package such that ∆ +
δy∗
r−µ = 0 it be-
comes self-ﬁnancing at the optimal trigger point y∗. Since the derivative is d
dyt
K(∆, δ) = δ
r−µ ,
which is positive, the ﬁrm will delay the investment beyond y∗. It is possible, therefore, to
reduce the investment support ∆ by a small amount to restore investment at the unsub-
sidised trigger point y∗, and there is, in this case, rent extraction equal to the reduction
in ∆. We argue later that this strategy is unlikely to be credible. The country eﬀectively
oﬀers a subsidy with a negative value at y∗∗ = y∗, based on the assumption that the ﬁrm
maximises the value of the `investment plus subsidy' over all possible trigger points. This
implicitly assumes that the ﬁrm believes that if it makes the investment at a point y < y∗ it
would actually receive the NPV plus an even smaller subsidy (since the value of the subsidy
is increasing in yt). However, in this region, the ﬁrm would simply prefer to hold on to the
value of the investment opportunity, ignoring the subsidy. Therefore, this particular subsidy
package violates the constraint that V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) ≥ V (yt|t < τ1). We explore what
implications this has on optimal subsidy design below.
Proposition 2.2: Let y∗ be the investment trigger point of a ﬁrm that receives no investment
subsidy. If the host country wants to speed up the investment trigger point from y∗ to y∗∗ ≤ y∗
the investment subsidy K(y∗∗) must satisfy the ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE):
d
dyt
K(y∗∗)− λ1
y∗∗
K(y∗∗) = λ1I
(
1
y∗
− 1
y∗∗
)
. (2.14)
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The solution to this problem is the subsidy:
K(y∗∗) =
I
λ1 − 1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+
(
1− λ1
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
)
I, (2.15)
where at y∗∗ = y∗, K(y∗) = d
dyt
K(y∗) = 0 for all y∗∗ ≤ y∗, K(y∗∗) ≥ 0, and d
dyt
K(y∗∗) ≤ 0.
Note that, if we substitute y∗ = I
1−τ (r − µ) λ1λ1−1 into Eq. (2.15), we can ﬁnd that
K(y∗∗) = I
λ1−1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1 − (y∗∗(1−τ)
r−µ − I
)
, as shown in Fig. 2.1.
The ODE in Eq. (2.14) arises from the expression for the optimal investment trigger
point in Proposition 2.1. The ODE characterises all available trigger points y∗∗ that are
available to the ﬁrm. If we can ﬁnd one boundary point on this curve we will have the entire
curve. One such boundary point is that the ﬁrm receives no subsidy and a second is that it
is in the ﬁrm's interest to invest at the unsubsidised trigger point y∗. Therefore, a point on
the curve in Eq. (2.14) is that as y∗∗ = y∗ and K(y∗) = 0 so that the value of the subsidy
is zero, and d
dy
K(y∗) = 0 so that there is no eﬀect on the timing of the investment. Taking
into account these boundary conditions we ﬁnd Eq. (2.15). We expect that the eﬀect of the
boundary condition is to make the NPV plus the investment subsidy exactly equal to the
value of the investment opportunity.
Figure 2.1 shows that if we add K(y∗∗) and
(
y∗∗(1−τ)
r−µ − I
)
together, the value adds up
to the value of the investment opportunity exactly. The reason is that the subsidy must
compensate the ﬁrm for making the investment early such that the combined value of the
investment and the subsidy package must at least be equal to the ﬁrm's outside option,
which is to keep the unsubsidised investment opportunity, but it will never be optimal to
compensate the ﬁrm more. Therefore, this constraint will always be binding.
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Values
y
y∗
y(1−τ)
r−µ − I
−I
Investment Opportunity
K(y∗∗) = I
λ1−1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1 − (y∗∗(1−τ)
r−µ − I
)
y∗∗
Figure 2.1: If we add K(y∗∗) and y
∗∗(1−τ)
r−µ − I together, we ﬁnd that the value adds up
to the value of the investment opportunity I
λ1−1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
. The reason is that the subsidy
must compensate the ﬁrm for making the investment sooner and the combined value of the
investment and the subsidy must at least be equal to the ﬁrm's outside option, which is to
wait and keep the investment opportunity. However, it will never be optimal for the host
country to compensate the ﬁrm more. Therefore, this constraint will always be binding.
The parameter values used in this illustration are I = 3, r = 10%, µ = 2%, σ = 25%, and
τ = 20%. In this case, y∗ = 5.83 and y∗∗ = 4.
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We can look at two special cases. First, suppose the investment support is oﬀered as the
only ingredient in the subsidy package such that we can write K(∆(yt), δ(yt)) = ∆(yt). The
optimal investment trigger deﬁned by Proposition 2.1 becomes:
y∗∗ =
(
y∗ − ∆(y
∗∗)
1− τ (r − µ)
λ1
λ1 − 1
)(
1− r − µ
(1− τ)(λ1 − 1)∆
′(y∗∗)
)−1
. (2.16)
Similarly, suppose that tax relief, δ(> 0), is oﬀered as the only ingredient in the subsidy
package. Since K(∆(yt), δ(yt)) =
δ(yt)yt
r−µ in this case, the optimal investment trigger in
Proposition 2.1 becomes the following:
y∗∗ =
(
y∗ − δ(y
∗∗)y∗∗
1− τ
λ1
λ1 − 1
)(
1− δ
′(y∗∗)y∗∗ + δ(y∗∗)
(1− τ)(λ1 − 1)
)−1
. (2.17)
Both deliver exactly the same eﬀect on the investment trigger point, at exactly the same cost
to the country, depending on ∆(y∗∗) = δ(y
∗∗)y∗∗
r−µ and ∆
′(y∗∗) = y
∗∗δ′(y∗∗)+δ(y∗∗)
r−µ , so the only
problem is to calibrate the responsiveness of the subsidy package correctly to the market
conditions yt. The following results summarise this calibration process, and this is a direct
corollary from Proposition 2.2.
Corollary 1: In the case that K(∆(y), δ(y)) = ∆(y), the optimal investment support ∆(y∗∗)
must satisfy the following ODE:
d
dyt
∆(y∗∗)− λ1
y∗∗
∆(y∗∗) = λ1I(
1
y∗
− 1
y∗∗
), (2.18)
with the solution:
∆(y∗∗) =
I
λ1 − 1(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1 + I(1− y
∗∗
y∗
λ1
λ1 − 1). (2.19)
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In the case that K(∆(y), δ(y)) = δ(y), the optimal tax relief δ(y∗∗) must satisfy the following
ODE:
d
dyt
δ(y∗∗)− λ1 − 1
y∗∗
δ(y∗∗) =
λ1I(r − µ)
y∗∗
(
1
y∗
− 1
y∗∗
)
, (2.20)
with the solution:
δ(y∗∗) =
I(r − µ)
λ1 − 1
y∗∗λ1−1
y∗λ1
+ I(r − µ)
(
1
y∗∗
− 1
y∗
λ1
λ1 − 1
)
. (2.21)
The cost to the host country for inducing any investment trigger point y∗∗ is the same re-
gardless of method.
These results are immediate from Proposition 2.2, and given these results, we can justiﬁ-
ably write K(yt) instead of K(∆(yt), δ(yt)) since it is immaterial how the investment subsidy
is implemented as long as the restrictions on K satisfy Proposition 2.2. We ﬁnd that the
costs of the subsidy to lower the optimal investment trigger to a given target level are the
same regardless of the form of the subsidy, counter to the assertions made in Pennings (2000)
and Yu et al. (2007). The main reason for this is that they assume that the slope of K(y) is
unconstrained, and much of their results hinge on the observation that if the country oﬀers
a ﬁxed investment support K ′(y) = 0, whereas if the country oﬀers a tax relief, the slope is
K ′(y) > 0. We argue that neither is optimal and that in general K ′(y) ≤ 0 is in equilibrium.
In Fig. 2.2, we illustrate the investment choices in Pennings (2000).
In Fig. 2.2, the result in the work of Pennings (2000) is transparent. Pennings suggested
that the host country should impose an extra tax on FDI ﬁrms that will fund a package of
direct investment support. These measures are denoted as ∆Pi (the investment support) and
δPi (the extra tax rate) in the ﬁgure where the subscript i(= 1 or 2) represents the two cases
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y
y∗
y(1−τ)
r−µ − I
−I
y(1−τ−δP1 )
r−µ − (I −∆P1 )
−I + ∆P1
A1
−I + ∆P2
y(1−τ−δP2 )
r−µ − (I −∆P2 )
A2
yP
Figure 2.2: The straight line marked y(1−τ)
r−µ −I is the NPV of the unsubsidised investment, and
the investment trigger y∗ is the optimal timing of the investment without subsidy. Pennings
(2000) demonstrated that the host country can extract rent from the ﬁrm by oﬀering a
direct investment support (denoted by ∆P1 ) at the same time as increasing the tax rate
(denoted by δP1 ) without changing the optimal investment trigger point. The magnitude of
the rent extraction is A1. Additionally, Pennings (2000) demonstrated that, by oﬀering a
contract that is self-ﬁnancing, the host country can lower the investment trigger point to
yP and extract rent. The subsidy is denoted by ∆P2 and δ
P
2 , and the magnitude of the rent
extraction is A2. The parameter values used in this illustration are I = 5, r = 10%, µ = 2%,
σ = 25%, τ = 20%, ∆P1 = 3, and δ
P
1 = 5%. In this case, y
∗ = 5.83 and yP = 4.
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analysed by Pennings (2000). As we can see, they will tilt the NPV of the investment such
that it becomes ﬂatter, but they will not change the cut-oﬀ point where the NPV is zero,
and it is in this sense that the package is self-ﬁnancing. As we can see, the ﬁrm will not
change investment behaviour, but the proﬁts at the point of investment are lower than the
proﬁts at the investment point in an unsubsidised industry. Although the subsidy package
is self-ﬁnancing, it will allow the host country to extract rent from the ﬁrm at the optimal
investment trigger (denoted by A1 in Fig. 2.2). If the ﬁrm has a choice between receiving
a subsidy or not, the ﬁrm will be better oﬀ declining the oﬀer of a subsidy. In Fig. 2.3, we
illustrate the investment choices in Yu et al. (2007).
The host country seeks to reduce the investment trigger (such as yY shown in Fig. 2.3) so
that the investment is sped up, and the subsidy is either in the form of a direct investment
support worth ∆Y or a reduction of the tax rate equal to δY . We see the eﬀect of each when
the reduction of the investment trigger is exactly the same, and from the ﬁgure, we clearly
see that the ﬁrm can extract higher rent when the host country uses tax relief than when it
uses direct investment support.
53
Values
y
y∗
y(1−τ)
r−µ − I
−I
yY
y(1−τ)
r−µ − (I −∆Y )
y(1−τ+δY )
r−µ − I
−I + ∆Y
B1
B2
Figure 2.3: The straight line marked y(1−τ)
r−µ − I is the NPV of the unsubsidised investment,
and the investment trigger y∗ is the optimal timing of the investment without subsidy. Yu
et al. (2007) showed that it is cheaper to oﬀer a direct investment subsidy (denoted by ∆Y )
than a tax relief (denoted by δY ) if the host country wants to lower the investment trigger
to a point yY < y∗. However, both lead to rent extraction by the ﬁrm, denoted by B1 and
B2, respectively. The parameter values used in this illustration are I = 5, r = 10%, µ = 2%,
σ = 25%, τ = 20%, and ∆Y = 2.14. In this case, y∗ = 5.83 and yY = 4.5.
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Pennings (2000) did not consider the unsubsidised investment opportunity as an outside
option for the ﬁrm, which can be unrealistic. When this option is open to the ﬁrm, it
would not accept a subsidy that allows the host country to extract rent in the way that is
illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Yu et al. (2007), on the other hand, did allow the ﬁrm to extract
rent by exploiting the rigidity of the subsidy package. If the host country is able to adjust
its subsidy to the changing market conditions, such extraction can be avoided by allowing
∆ or δ to be functions of yt. The optimal packages will exactly match the value of the
unsubsidised investment opportunity, thereby oﬀering the ﬁrm suﬃcient rent to meet its
incentive compatibility constraint but, at the same time, prevent rent extraction beyond
this point.
2.3.2 Optimal Timing of Subsidy
The host country receives a welfare beneﬁt w from the time of the investment, which is the
stopping time for the investment trigger point y∗∗ at which the investment takes place at a
cost K(y∗∗), to the time at which the investment would have taken place anyway, y∗. We
ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 2.3: Given the investment cost I and the unsubsidised investment trigger point
y∗, the optimal timing of the investment subsidy K(y∗∗) is given implicitly by the following
expression for the subsidy trigger y∗∗:
y∗∗ = y∗max
(
0, 1− w
rI
)
. (2.22)
Everything else being equal, the closer y∗∗ is to y∗, the greater the investment cost I and
the lower the welfare ﬂow w. The welfare at the time the subsidy is oﬀered is W (y∗∗) =
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w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗).
The functional form of the welfare of the option to oﬀer investment subsidy is implied by
the conditions in Eq. (2.3). The optimal timing of the investment subsidy can be found by
evaluating the point at which the welfare of the option to oﬀer subsidy achieves a smooth
transition to the welfare of the investment. Additional boundary conditions are found by
evaluating the welfare of the subsidy option as the earnings ﬂow is suﬃciently close to zero,
as there are two possibilities in this case. Either the subsidy trigger is zero and no smooth
transition to the welfare of the investment is found, or there is no likelihood that the subsidy
trigger is reached. At the time the subsidy is oﬀered, the welfare is the expected value of
the welfare ﬂow w, which equals the ﬁrst term in the expression for W (y∗∗) minus the value
of the subsidy package, which is the second term.
A starting point for a discussion about this result is the ratio w
rI
. The numerator is the
welfare ﬂow that arises from the investment, and the denominator is the capital ﬂow that
is necessary to justify the investment cost I. If this ratio is greater than one, the welfare
ﬂow w dominates the capital ﬂow rI, so investment can be justiﬁed on welfare grounds even
if the earnings ﬂow is zero. In this case, we will always ﬁnd that the optimal timing is
y∗∗ = 0. When this is not satisﬁed, the optimal timing is positive so that y∗∗ > 0, but it
will always be less than the unsubsidised trigger point y∗. Therefore, as long as there is a
positive incremental welfare beneﬁt, it will always be optimal to oﬀer a subsidy package that
speeds up the investment. What we ﬁnd is that the sooner the optimal subsidy is oﬀered,
the greater the welfare ﬂow w and later the greater the capital ﬂow rI, everything else being
equal. Figure 2.4 illustrates the timing problem.
In Fig. 2.4, the host country must ﬁnd the optimal timing of the transition from holding
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Values
y
y∗y∗∗
Ayλ1
w
r
(
1−
(
y
y∗
)λ1)−K(y)
Figure 2.4: Optimal timing of investment subsidy. The investment trigger y∗ is the unsub-
sidised investment trigger, and the investment trigger y∗∗ is the optimal subsidised invest-
ment trigger. The parameter values used in this illustration are I = 5, r = 10%, w = 0.48,
µ = 2%, and σ = 25%. In this case, y∗ = 6.972 and y∗∗ = 4.183.
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the option to oﬀer a subsidy to oﬀering the subsidy and attracting an investment. The
incremental welfare is the value of attracting the investment before market conditions lead to
it being made in the ﬁrst place, so the incremental welfare goes to zero when the subsidised
investment trigger y∗∗ approaches the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗. If yt = 0 and
unsubsidised investment will never take place, a subsidy will be oﬀered if the welfare beneﬁt
w
r
is greater than the subsidy K(0) = I. This corresponds to a situation in which w > rI,
and we see that y∗∗, in this case, is zero. In the ﬁgure, we are given a situation where w < rI,
and in this case, y∗∗ > 0.
2.3.3 Preemption Risk
We now take into account preemption risk. When ﬁrms are competing to invest in a single
country, preemption risk in the market for investment can loosely be deﬁned as the negative
externality on the value of other ﬁrms' investments arising from the event that the ﬁrm
makes an investment. When countries are competing to attract an investment to their own
locations, preemption risk in the market for subsidy is the externality on other countries'
welfare arising from the event that a given country successfully attracts business through a
subsidy package.
The ﬁrst problem is studied by Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), and if we assume there is
preemption risk in the market for investment, we can use Lambrecht and Perraudin's (2003)
results directly. To introduce incomplete information, they assume that a ﬁrm conjectures
that its competing ﬁrm makes an investment when yt crosses some level y
∗
C for the ﬁrst
time, and y∗C is independently drawn from a probability distribution F (y
∗
C). They deﬁne
hF (y
∗
C) =
f(y∗C)
1−F (y∗C) as the hazard rate at which the investment will be made by the competitors
in the next increment dy, conditional on the event that it has not yet happened (f(y) is the
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density function f(y) = d
dy
F (y)). They found that the unregulated investment trigger point
for a ﬁrm is the following:
y∗ =
I
1− τ (r − µ)
λ1 + y
∗hF (y∗)
λ1 − 1 + y∗hF (y∗) . (2.23)
When the hazard rate goes to zero, the investment trigger will converge to the `normal'
trigger point in Eq. (2.4).
It shows that, when there is preemption risk in the market for investment, the investment
trigger point is lowered, and the value of the investment opportunity is aﬀected. Proposition
2.2 still applies; however, so the functional form of the investment subsidy is still given by
K(y∗∗) = I
λ1−1
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1
+
(
1− λ1
λ1−1
y∗∗
y∗
)
I, and only the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗ is
now given by Eq. (2.23). The country will, for the desired timing y∗∗, oﬀer a subsidy K(y∗∗)
such that the value of the investment opportunity (under preemption risk) exactly matches
the NPV of the investment project plus the value of the subsidy. We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 2.4: An increase in the preemption risk in the market for investment that
lowers the unsubsidised investment trigger point y∗ will also lead to a lowering of the subsidy
trigger point y∗∗ for w
rI
< 1. There is, moreover, no loss in the incremental welfare of the
optimal investment subsidy at the optimal subsidy trigger y∗∗ (i.e., the welfare W (y∗∗) does
not depend on y∗).
The case in which w
rI
≥ 1 is in this context is not very interesting since, in this case, the
subsidy trigger is always minimal and y∗∗ = 0. Therefore, the result focuses on the converse
case. Proposition 2.4 is illustrated in Fig. 2.5.
We see that the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is lowered when ﬁrms compete in the market for
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Figure 2.5: The eﬀect of preemption risk between ﬁrms on the optimal timing of investment.
We use y∗ to denote the investment trigger, y∗∗ to denote the subsidy trigger, Ayλ1 to denote
the welfare of the option to oﬀer subsidy, and w
r
(
1−
(
y
y∗
)λ1)−K(y) to denote the welfare
of the investment subsidy when there is no preemption risk. The corresponding notation
for the case of preemption risk is y¯∗, y¯∗∗, A¯y¯λ1 , and w
r
(
1−
(
y¯
y¯∗
)λ1) − K¯(y¯), respectively.
The parameter values used in this illustration are I = 5, r = 10%, w = 0.48, µ = 2%,
and σ = 25%. The hazard rate, hF (y
∗), is assumed to be 0.1. In this case, y∗ = 6.972,
y∗∗ = 4.183, y¯∗ = 5, and y¯∗∗ = 3.
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investment but that the welfare beneﬁt at the optimal subsidy trigger remains at a con-
stant level. The reason this is the case is best understood in the relationship between the
unsubsidised investment trigger y∗ and the subsidy trigger y∗∗. Since the welfare beneﬁts
depend on the incremental welfare from inﬂuencing the timing of investment, they depend
on the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ only and not on the levels of y
∗ and y∗∗. This relationship is not aﬀected
by the preemption risk in the market for investment, as Proposition 2.3 still applies. Thus,
although y∗ is aﬀected by the preemption risk, the welfare beneﬁts remain constant.
Next, consider that there is preemption risk in the market for subsidy. Consider the
probability distribution function G deﬁned by:
G(y) = P(Subsidy of a competing country is oﬀered at yt ≤ y). (2.24)
Deﬁne further y¯t = max0≤x≤t yt as the `all time high' of the earnings process ys up to and
including time t. If no subsidy has been oﬀered at time t, we know that the probability that
the subsidy is oﬀered at earnings levels y¯t is zero. The conditional probability G(y|y¯t) and
y ≥ y¯t is then deﬁned as:
G(y|y¯t) = G(y)−G(y¯t)
1−G(y¯t) . (2.25)
Let y∗∗ be the trigger point for oﬀering a subsidy and let τ2 be the stopping time for the
event that yt = y
∗∗ for the ﬁrst time and τ1 be the stopping time for the event that the
unsubsidised investment trigger yt = y
∗ > y∗∗ is reached for the ﬁrst time. The value of the
option to oﬀer a subsidy at the trigger point y∗∗ is then:
W (yt|t ≤ τ2, y¯t) =
(
1− G(yt)−G(y¯t)
1−G(y¯t)
)
E
(∫ τ1
τ2
e−r(s+τ2)wds− e−rτ2K(y∗∗)
)
, (2.26)
where the right-hand side is the probability of having the winning subsidy at the trigger
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point y∗∗ times the welfare of the winning subsidy. The event that somebody else has the
winning subsidy leads to zero welfare. We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 2.5 The optimal timing y∗∗ of an investment subsidy is given implicitly by the
following equation:
w
r
+
y∗∗
λ1
hG(y
∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
= I
(
1− y
∗∗
y∗
)
, hG(y
∗∗) =
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗) .
(2.27)
When there is no preemption risk in the market for subsidy, the left-hand side equals w
r
and
the condition above implies Proposition 2.3. When the hazard rate hG(y
∗∗) > 0 is increasing
in y∗∗, the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is either zero or
y∗∗
y∗ < 1− wrI . The welfare at the time when the subsidy is
oﬀered is W (y∗∗) = w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗) and is therefore unaﬀected by the preemption
risk.
The eﬀect of the preemption risk is to speed up the timing of oﬀering the subsidy. The
ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is lowered relative to the level we would expect without preemption risk, which we
can see from the fact that the second term on the left-hand side is positive except in the
special case where the welfare W (y∗∗) = 0. This implies that the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is lower with
preemption risk and that the welfare W (y∗∗) is lower with preemption risk, relative to what
it would be without the preemption risk.
Proposition 2.2, which sets out the form of the optimal subsidyK(y∗∗), is therefore robust
to preemption risk in the sense that the functional form of K remains intact, but the ratio
y∗∗
y∗ which enters the expression for K may change. If there is preemption risk in the market
for investment, the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ will not change, and the required subsidy remains exactly the
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(
y∗∗
y∗
)
P
−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)
N
, WP (y
∗∗)−WN(y∗∗)
y∗N − y∗P0
Figure 2.6: The eﬀect of preemption risk in the market for subsidy. The x-axis measures
the degree to which there is preemption risk in the market for investment measured by the
diﬀerence between the unsubsidised investment trigger without (N) and with (P ) preemption
risk, and the y-axis measures the eﬀect of preemption risk in the market for subsidy on the
ratio y
∗∗
y∗ and the welfare W (y
∗∗) with (P ) and without (N) preemption risk. The solid lines
show the results for the y
∗∗
y∗ -ratio and the dashed lines show the results for the welfareW (y
∗∗).
The parameter values used in this illustration are I = 5, r = 10%, w = 0.48, µ = 2%, and
σ = 25%. The hazard rate, hG(y), is assumed to equal
1
a−y and a is assumed to be 5.
same. If there is preemption risk in the market for subsidy, the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ will be lowered,
but the functional form of the investment subsidy will remain as outlined in Proposition 2.2.
Thus, the only eﬀect on K comes from the lowering of this ratio.
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd analytical expressions for the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ and the welfare W (y
∗∗) since
y∗∗ is a root of a high order polynomial, but by making assumptions about the hazard rate
hG(y), we can evaluate them numerically. Assume that the hazard rate is increasing in y
and given by the function hG(y) =
1
a−y for some a > 0. We then evaluate Eq. (2.27), and
the results are given in Fig. 2.6.
The ﬁgure shows that the eﬀect of preemption risk in the market for subsidy lowers the
subsidy trigger further relative to the situation in which there is no preemption risk but that
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the eﬀect is smaller if preemption risk already exists in the market for investment. The same
pattern holds for the welfare of subsidy, which is lower when there is preemption risk in the
market for subsidy, but the eﬀect is again smaller if preemption risk already exists in the
market for investment.
2.4 Empirical Predictions for FDI Subsidy
Our model will predict the likelihood of the event that subsidy packages are oﬀered. For
example, if we are experiencing market conditions yt < y
∗∗, the likelihood that a subsidy
is made depends on the distance between yt and the subsidy trigger y
∗∗. When the level
of the subsidy trigger y∗∗ is lowered in an industry relative to another industry, we expect
that we are more likely to observe a subsidy oﬀered in that industry. This eﬀect can arise
in two ways. First, it can arise from the fact that the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗ is
lowered relative to another industry, but that the relative level y
∗∗
y∗ remains constant. This is
an industry-related eﬀect on FDI subsidy. Second, it can arise from the fact that the relative
level y
∗∗
y∗ is lowered. This eﬀect arises in the context of parameters describing the market for
subsidy and is therefore a subsidy market-related eﬀect on FDI subsidy.
2.4.1 Industry-Related Subsidy Eﬀects
The unsubsidised investment trigger is lowered by the degree to which there is competition
in the form of preemption risk in the market for investment. When ﬁrms compete for
investments more strongly, the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗ is lowered, and this has
a direct knock-on eﬀect on the subsidy trigger y∗∗. The ratio y
∗∗
y∗ remains constant, but
the lowering of the unsubsidised investment trigger also feeds directly into a lowering of the
subsidy trigger.
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This means that we should expect to see investment subsidy in industries where there
is preemption risk. As mentioned before, preemption risk will not change the earnings ﬂow
or product prices, so it is a special type of competition that dissipates industry proﬁts by
lowering the likelihood that the ﬁrm makes an investment rather than reduces the proﬁts of
the ﬁrms that do make the investment.1 Therefore, we should be able to talk speciﬁcally
about the kind of industries where the preemption risk in the market for investment is high.
The industries aﬀected by investment are those in which the investment by one ﬁrm has a
negative externality on the investments that could be made by others. This necessitates that
the industry is made up by a relatively small number of large ﬁrms where investments have
strategic commitment value, deﬁned as the value of making an investment that discourages
others from investing in the same industry. This points to a symbiotic relationship between
ﬁrms that are keen to build capacity in an industry, which may not have great short-term
ﬁnancial proﬁt potential but could be strategically important in the longer run, and countries
that are keen to attract investments from overseas.
2.4.2 Subsidy Market-Related Eﬀects
The ratio of the subsidy trigger over the unsubsidised investment trigger, y
∗∗
y∗ , is lowered
in two ways. First, it depends on the factor w
rI
, which is the ratio of the welfare ﬂow that
is a result of attracting investment w, and the amortised investment cost rI. When this
ratio is high, the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ is likely to be low. Investment subsidy is likely to be targeted to
locations and industries where the welfare beneﬁts are the greatest relative to the amortised
investment cost. We should expect that investment subsidy is used to attract businesses to
areas where there is a lack of jobs (i.e., where the welfare beneﬁt w is large). Note that
1The case in which competition leads to lower earnings and product prices needs separate rigorous treat-
ment, which we do not provide here. We leave a study of this type of competition to future research.
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the value of this welfare beneﬁt is measured as the incremental welfare of attracting the
investment to the host country, relative to the unsubsidised investment trigger y∗, at which
the investment would have taken place in any event.
Thomas (2007) carried out a case study of the investment support for the call centre
business (customer support centres), which is a very labour-intensive business with relatively
low setup cost. The amortised investment cost in this industry is likely to be linked to the
wage level in the location where the business is located. We expect, therefore, that the
locations that call centres are likely to be attracted into are areas where the unemployment
is high and the wages are low. Thomas (2007) found that subsidies for call centre locations
have been oﬀered even for Indian call centres where wages are already very low.
Second, the ratio y
∗∗
y∗ depends on the degree to which there is preemption risk in the
market for subsidy. Competition between countries in the form of preemption risk will,
therefore, also increase the likelihood of observing subsidy as a means of attracting FDI
projects. Thomas (2007) carried out several case studies of bidding wars in the biofuel pro-
duction industry, microchip manufacturing industry, and automotive industry. The biofuel
production industry is predominantly capital intensive and will not generate a large number
of jobs. However, there are only so many production facilities being planned at any one point
in time, and once a location decision is made, it is unlikely that other locations will be able
to attract a similar investment. This will also be true for the microchip manufacturing and
automotive industries. The bidding wars that Thomas (2007) reported in these instances
can, therefore, be explained by the preemption risk in the market for subsidy that is linked
to these kinds of investments.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the optimal design and timing of FDI subsidy, and how competition
between ﬁrms seeking investment subsidy and countries oﬀering investment subsidy aﬀect
the two. We derive the optimal timing and value of the subsidy package and ﬁnd that
preemption risk in the market for investment leads to industries where there are ﬁrst-mover
advantages in the investment process, which are more likely to attract FDI subsidy than
other industries. We also ﬁnd that investments that create a large welfare beneﬁt relative
to the amortised investment cost are also attractive targets for FDI subsidy. Finally, we
ﬁnd that preemption risk in the market for subsidy leads to industries where there are ﬁrst-
mover advantages of subsidy oﬀers, which are more likely to attract FDI subsidy than other
industries.
We ﬁnd that the implementation of the optimal investment subsidy package, exempliﬁed
by the choice between oﬀering a front-loaded investment support or a back-loaded tax relief,
plays no role. The form of FDI subsidy matters, however, in the sense that the investment
subsidy should deter the delay of investment to some degree, implying that the ﬁrm will
receive a smaller subsidy if it postpones investment in order to beneﬁt from improved market
conditions.
We can apply our model to any kind of investment subsidy, and in the introduction,
we mention the example of subsidy to promote investments in a switch from traditional
to green technology. Many of the issues that arise in this area are similar to the issues
that arise in the FDI market, and we can transfer the results we obtain for FDI directly.
There are, however, interesting additional eﬀects in the market for green investments. For
instance, the welfare beneﬁts from a switch to green technology are likely to be global rather
than national; therefore, free riding between countries is likely. Dutz and Sharma (2012)
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pointed to the fact that most governmental support for research and development in green
technology has taken place in Western developed nations. Therefore, to fully study the
optimal subsidy of investments in a switch to green technology necessitates, a more complex
modelling environment that goes beyond the scope of this thesis may be needed.
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2.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The ﬁrm regards the subsidy package as just another investment
or borrowing opportunity, the NPV of which can be maximised by optimal timing. The
investment opportunity (prior to investment) takes values that can be expressed as Ayλ1t for
some constant A, and the NPV of the investment (at the point of investment) including the
value of subsidy package is (
yt(1− τ)
r − µ − I
)
+K(yt). (2A.1)
The ﬁrm decides on the optimal timing when the value of the investment opportunity equals
the NPV of investment, and when there is a smooth ﬁt at the investment trigger point. This
yields two equations that determine the optimal investment trigger point y∗∗ and the free
constant A. The conditions are as follows:
Ay∗∗λ1 =
(
y∗∗(1− τ)
r − µ − I
)
+K(y∗∗), (2A.2.a)
λ1Ay
∗∗λ1−1 =
1− τ
r − µ +
d
dyt
K(y∗∗). (2A.2.b)
Solving for A and y∗∗ simultaneously gives the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Equation (2.14) follows directly from Eqs. (2A.2.a-b). Equation
(2.15) follows from the solution to a linear ﬁrst order ODE, which implies that:
K(y) = Cyλ1 + I(1− λ1
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗
) (2A.3),
where C is an integration constant. We use the constraint that V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) ≥
V (yt|t < τ1). Since the problem is the same along all investment trigger points y∗∗, we only
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need to ﬁt one boundary condition, and we can ﬁt the ODE to the point y∗∗ = y∗ and
K(y∗) = d
dy
K(y∗) = 0, which yields the solution
C =
I
λ1 − 1(y
∗)−λ1 (2A.4).
By substituting C back in the expression for K(y) the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3: Using arguments outlined in Section 2, we can write W (yt|t ≥
τ2) = Ay
λ1
t + By
λ2
t +
w
r
for arbitrary constants A and B. We know that limyt→0W (yt|t ≥
τ2) =
w
r
since there is no likelihood that τ1 will be reached at this limit point, and this
implies that B = 0. Additionally, we know that limyt→y∗W (yt|t ≥ τ2) = 0 since there is no
likelihood that the welfare ﬂow will continue, and this implies that A = −w
r
(
1
y∗
)λ1
. This
implies thatW (yt|t ≥ τ2) = wr
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
. If we look at the time prior to τ2, we ﬁnd that
W (yt|t < τ2) = A′yλ1t +B′yλ2t . Moreover, B′ must vanish because limyt→0W (yt|t < τ2) = 0, so
the value-matching condition and the smooth-pasting condition imply the following system,
where y∗∗ is the solution:
W (yt|t < τ2) = A′y∗∗λ1 = w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗) (2A.5.a)
d
dyt
W (yt|t < τ2) = λ1A′y∗∗λ1−1 = d
dyt
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
= −λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− λ1
λ1 − 1I
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
+
λ1
λ1 − 1
I
y∗
. (2A.5.b)
Combining the two equations and eliminating A′, we ﬁnd the solution:
y∗∗ = y∗max
(
0, 1− w
rI
)
(2A.6).
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The results follow. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4: The ﬁrst part is obvious from (21): dy
∗∗
dy∗ =
(
1− w
rI
)
> 0 for w
rI
<
1. The second part can be evaluated by evaluating the derivative dW (y
∗∗(y∗))
dy∗ =
∂W
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂y∗ +
∂W
∂y∗ .
We ﬁnd that ∂y
∗∗
∂y∗ =
(
1− w
rI
)
and that:
∂W
∂y∗∗
∂y∗∗
∂y∗
= −λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)
1− w
rI
y∗
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
+ λ1
I
λ1 − 1
1− w
rI
y∗
(2A.7)
∂W
∂y∗
= λ1
(
w
r
+
I
λ1 − 1
)
y∗∗
y∗2
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
− λ1 I
λ1 − 1
y∗∗
y∗2
. (2A.8)
By combining terms, we ﬁnd dW
dy∗ , and we ﬁnd:
y∗2
Iy∗∗
dW
dy∗
=
λ1
λ1 − 1
((
1− w
rI
) y∗
y∗∗
− 1
)(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1)
−λ1w
rI
((
1− w
rI
) y∗
y∗∗
− 1
)(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1
(2A.9).
However, since y
∗
y∗∗ =
(
1− w
rI
)−1
, the right-hand side is zero. Hence, dW
dy∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5: The value of the option to oﬀer subsidy at time t, conditional
on the all-time-high earnings level y¯t, can now be written as Ay
λ1
t for some constant A. At
the optimal time of subsidy, this value smooth pastes into the welfare of the investment
subsidy (1 − G(yt|y¯t))
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)−K(y∗∗)). We ﬁnd, therefore, the following two
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conditions:
Ay∗∗λ1 = (1−G(y∗∗|y¯t))w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗), y¯t = y∗∗, G(y∗∗|y¯t) = 0
(2A.10)
λ1Ay
∗∗(λ1−1) = − g(y
∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
− λ1w
r
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1−1 1
y∗
− d
dy
K(y∗∗).
(2A.11)
Combining the two expressions, we ﬁnd the expression:
w
r
+
y∗∗
λ1
g(y∗∗)
1−G(y∗∗)
(
w
r
(
1−
(
y∗∗
y∗
)λ1)
−K(y∗∗)
)
= K(y∗∗)− y
∗∗
λ1
d
dy
K(y∗∗) (2A.12).
Since the preemption risk in the market for subsidy will not aﬀect the subsidy itself, the
right-hand side equals I
(
1− y∗∗
y∗
)
. The result follows. 
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2.7 Guide to Notation
The table below lists the notation used in this chapter in order of appearance in the text.
Notation Interpretation
I Investment cost
yt Earnings ﬂow at time t
τ Corporate tax rate
y∗ Optimal investment trigger for unsubsidised investment
r Instantaneous discount rate
V (yt|t < τ1) Value of the unsubsidised investment opportunity prior to the stopping time τ1
τ1 Stopping time for the event that yt = y
∗ for the ﬁrst time
V (yt|t ≥ τ1) Value of the earnings ﬂow yt after the stopping time τ1
L Inﬁnitesimal operator associated with the Brownian motion governing the earnings process
I Identity operator
K Subsidy package consisting of a lump sum support and a tax relief
∆ Lump sum support
δ Tax relief
∆(yt) Lump sum support whose value ﬂuctuates with the earnings level yt
δ(yt) Tax relief whose value ﬂuctuates with the earnings level yt
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K(∆(yt), δ(yt)) Subsidy package whose value ﬂuctuates with the earnings level yt
τ2 Stopping time when the subsidy is accepted and the investment is made
V (yt|t < τ2, Subsidy) Value of the investment opportunity of the ﬁrm who accepts the subsidy
w Welfare beneﬁts received by the host country from stopping time τ2 to τ1
y∗∗ Investment trigger for optimal subsidised investment
K(∆(y∗∗), δ(y∗∗)) Cost of the subsidy package inducing the investment to be made at y∗∗
W (yt|t < τ2) Value of the welfare beneﬁts of the subsidy prior to the stopping time τ2
W (yt|t ≥ τ2) Value of the welfare beneﬁts after the stopping time τ2
τC Stopping time when the winning ﬁrm becomes known and makes the investment
V (yt|t < τC ,Win) Value of the investment opportunity, conditional on it belonging to the winning ﬁrm
V (yt|t < τC , Lose) Value of the investment opportunity, conditional on it belonging to the losing ﬁrm
W (yt|t < τC ,Win) Value of the welfare, conditional on it belonging to the winning country
W (yt|t < τC , Lose) Value of the welfare, conditional on it belonging to the losing country
K(y∗∗) Value of the subsidy package to induce the investment when y∗∗ is reached
∆(y∗∗) Value of the investment support to induce the investment when y∗∗ is reached
δ(y∗∗) Value of the tax relief to induce the investment when y∗∗ is reached
∆Pi Investment support oﬀered by the host country in the work by Pennings (2000)
δPi Extra tax rate imposed by the host country in the work by Pennings (2000)
74
yP Optimal investment trigger when a self-ﬁnancing subsidy package is provided in the work by Pennings (2000)
∆Y Investment support oﬀered by the host country in the work by Yu et al. (2007)
δY Extra tax rate imposed by the host country in the work by Yu et al. (2007)
yY Optimal investment trigger in the work by Yu et al. (2007)
W (y∗∗) Value of the welfare beneﬁt when investment is made at y∗∗
y∗C Optimal investment trigger of a competing ﬁrm
F (y) Probability distribution of the optimal investment trigger of a competing ﬁrm
hF (y) Hazard rate that the investment will be made by a competing ﬁrm
f(y) Probability density function of F (y)
G(y) Probability that a competing country oﬀers a subsidy at yt ≤ y
y¯t `All time high' of the earning process up to and including time t
G(y|y¯t) Probability that the subsidy is oﬀered by a competing country at yt ≤ y given y¯t
W (yt|t < τ2, y¯t) Value of the option to oﬀer a subsidy at y∗∗
g(y) Probability density function of G(y)
hG(y) Hazard rate that the subsidy will be oﬀered by a competing country
Chapter 3
Mode of Entry
3.1 Introduction
When ﬁrms decide to engage in FDIs, the choice of entry mode is one of the fundamental
issues that must be considered (Buckley and Casson, 1998). This chapter will focus on
market entry mode, that is, how the FDIs should be organised and governed. Sharma and
Erramilli deﬁned entry mode as: A structural agreement that allows a ﬁrm to implement its
product market strategy in a host country either by carrying out only the market operations
(i.e. via export modes), or both production and marketing operations there by itself or in
partnership with others (contractual modes, joint ventures, wholly owned operations).(2004,
p.2)
We can also broadly categorise market entry modes into two types: equity modes, such
as JVs, WOSs, and acquisitions, and non-equity modes, such as exporting, licensing, and
franchising.
The mode of entry in the area of FDI is extensively studied, and many theories have been
proposed to explain a ﬁrm's choice of entry mode. Among them, the transaction-cost theory
75
76
is the most fundamental and commonly used. The theory provides a cost-based view and
suggests that ﬁrms choose certain entry modes to minimise transaction costs arising from
entering and operating in a host country (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1989;
Williamson, 1979, 1985). The OLI theory is another inﬂuential theory (Dunning, 1993).
As suggested by its name, the OLI theory identiﬁes three factors that aﬀect a ﬁrm's choice
of entry mode  ownership, location, and internalisation. Culture/cultural distance theory
has also been used to account for the inﬂuences of culture/cultural distance on the choice of
entry mode and to examine the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the cultural backgrounds of partners in
ventures. Institution theory emphasises the eﬀects of the institutional aspects, such as rules,
norms, and values, in the selection of the entry mode and operation in a foreign country.
Other theories and constructs include control, internationalisation, risk, resource-based view,
FDI, organisational capabilities, knowledge-based view, and uncertainty. 1
In this thesis, it is assumed that the investment environment is highly uncertain and
that the investment is irreversible. Under uncertainty and irreversibility, management ﬂex-
ibility should be considered valuable and carefully taken into account when evaluating the
investment project and choosing an entry mode. Real options theory can be applied in this
situation and oﬀers a unique view. When choosing an entry mode, ﬁrms should not only
consider the value of real options embedded already (e.g., the option to wait), they can also
create real options to deal with the uncertainty through selecting a certain entry mode. The
selection of an entry mode can be regarded as a means to deal with or even take advantage
of market uncertainty. For example, international JVs (IJVs) are always considered to in-
corporate real options. By establishing an IJV, an MNE can create a foothold when market
conditions are unfavourable and retain the opportunities to acquire or disinvest in the future.
The MNE can acquire more equity stake from partners when market conditions improve or
1Canabal and White III (2008) provided a comprehensive overview.
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sell equity stake to partners when market conditions deteriorate. This option limits the loss
and retains the potential proﬁts and thus is analogous to a call option.
There are also a few studies analysing the choice of entry mode from the real options
perspective. Kogut (1991) qualitatively examined why JVs can be interpreted as options
to expand and acquire a venture and analysed the factors that increase the likelihood of
an acquisition through statistical investigations. Chi and McGuire (1996) used a two-stage
binomial model to study the inﬂuences of transaction cost and strategic option on the valua-
tion of a collaborative venture. They found that the option to acquire or sell out adds value
to the JV when the partners have diﬀerent views on the future value of the venture. Buckley
and Casson (1998) conceptually identiﬁes the real option of an IJV in the sense that a ﬁrm
taking this mode has the option to acquire its partner's equity when market conditions are
favourable, and disinvest when market conditions are unfavourable. Pennings and Sleuwae-
gen (2004) attempted to study timing and entry mode simultaneously. Following Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), they derived the optimal trigger values of proﬁts for setting up a WOS,
a non-cooperative JV, and a cooperative JV. They found that the choice of entry modes
depends on several factors, such as market uncertainty, tax diﬀerentials, cost advantage,
institutional requirements, and degree of cooperation between partners. Li and Rugman
(2007) used two-period binomial models to analyse an MNE's choices of investment location
and market entry mode. They distinguished between the exogenous uncertainty and the
endogenous uncertainty and suggested that both the magnitude and the type of uncertainty
can inﬂuence the choice of entry mode. Chi and Seth (2009) employed a model combining
real options theory and game-theoretical concepts to examine the factors that will inﬂuence
the choice of entry mode. These factors include the parties' absorptive capacities, frictions in
knowledge and asset markets and associated incentive problems, cost of switching from one
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mode to another, and cost associated with jockeying for power among stakeholders. They
used simulations to examine how these factors aﬀect the choice of entry modes and derived
a number of conditions for one factor to dominate another.
In this chapter, we study investment timing and choice of entry mode simultaneously
and aim to provide decision rules for entry choice between a JV and WOS. We argue that
investment timing and entry choice can be studied together because, from a ﬁrm's point of
view, choosing a diﬀerent entry mode may aﬀect the value of the investment project and
may further aﬀect the optimal investment timing. From a host country's point of view, if it
prefers the investment to be made at a certain point in time, the subsidy packages required
to inﬂuence a ﬁrm's optimal investment timing are diﬀerent when diﬀerent entry modes are
adopted by the ﬁrm. Therefore, the interplay between investment timing and choice of entry
mode motivates us to study them simultaneously.
We focus on and compare two types of entry modes: a JV and WOS. Both of them
are referred to as equity entry modes in the sense that they require higher levels of resource
commitments and thus require higher levels of control. They are still diﬀerent in several ways.
As suggested by Li and Rugman (2007), these two types of entry modes are distinguishable
from each other in the following aspects. First, they may require diﬀerent initial costs to set
up the investments. Li and Rugman (2007) suggested that it is reasonable to assume that a
WOS requires higher initial investments than a JV. Second, they may be subject to diﬀerent
costs to exercise the options. Speciﬁcally, a WOS can expand its production capacity with
no costs. A JV has to expand through acquiring its local partner's equity and may have to
pay a certain amount of premium to its local partners. Last, they may diﬀer in the ability
to obtain information and reduce uncertainty. Since both types of entry modes are very
commonly used in practice, the concern about which mode is better is universal. Empirical
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evidence on this issue is quite mixed. Luo (1996) found that the WOS has signiﬁcantly
higher proﬁtability than the JV for China. However, Pan and Chi (1999) found that JVs are
more proﬁtable.
It should be noted that diﬀerent modes of entry have diﬀerent implications for the beneﬁts
of the investment to the investing ﬁrm. Owning the investment outright means that the ﬁrm
can exercise full control on the subsidiary. Sharing control in a JV means that some control
is delegated to a local interest, which may be costly to the ﬁrm since it has to co-operate
with its local partner. In the following analysis, we structure this problem around the control
of output. We assume that, if the investing ﬁrm can exercise full control of a subsidiary,
the production may be scaled up in good times and scaled back in lean times in order to
maximise proﬁts. In contrast, we assume that such down-scaling of output is not feasible if
the ﬁrm enters into a JV agreement. There are also implications for the host country. A JV
gives the host country a stake in an investment, which may be proﬁtable and therefore may
partially ﬁnance a subsidy, and the fact that output can be better controlled gives a stable
welfare beneﬁt. The optimal mode of entry for an unsubsidised investment is, therefore, not
necessarily the same as the mode of entry for a subsidised investment.
There is much research on the choice between structuring an FDI investment as a WOS
with full control and on structuring it as a JV that is, in part, locally controlled.2 However,
much less work has been done on the mode of entry in the context of investment subsidy,
which forms another motivation for the following analysis. Is it cheaper to attract invest-
ments if the host country takes a stake in the ﬁrm? How does this arrangement aﬀect the
welfare beneﬁts of the investment? These are the two issues addressed in this chapter. Ad-
ditionally, we investigate the dynamic nature of subsidies, where the timing and magnitude
of the optimal subsidy is analysed. The work is done in the context of FDI, but this problem
2See Canabal and White III (2008) for a review.
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is more general, as it applies to any form of investment in which operational ﬂexibility is an
issue and in which an outside agent may have an interest in inﬂuencing the behaviour of the
investing ﬁrm.
As mentioned in previous chapters, FDI subsidies can take various forms but can be
broadly categorised into two types  those that provide investment support at the time of
investment, for instance by oﬀering land subsidies, cheap access to infrastructure, cheap
ﬁnancing, and support in the form of research and development and those that provide
cheaper operating costs in the longer term, for instance a reduced corporate tax rate, tax
holidays, and accelerated depreciation. 3 Our focus in this chapter is instead on whether it
is optimal for the host country to oﬀer a subsidy for an investment where the control right
over output is given to the ﬁrm (a WOS) or to the country (a JV). We assume that the
essential diﬀerence is that, with a WOS, the ﬁrm may scale back production under poor
market conditions to maximise proﬁts, but with a JV, there is less ﬂexibility for the ﬁrm
and the output will be kept at capacity even under poor market conditions to maximise the
welfare eﬀects of the investment to the host country.
We evaluate the investment given diﬀerent entry modes and derive their respective in-
vestment thresholds. We compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent entry modes on the timing and the
value of investment from the ﬁrm's perspective. From the country's perspective, we derive
the optimal subsidy package given diﬀerent entry modes and attempt to determine which
mode dominates the other under diﬀerent conditions.
This rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we set up the assumptions
and models in which no subsidy is oﬀered by the host country. We evaluate the investment
3Some literature investigates which form of subsidy is best (see e.g., Asano, 2010; Pennings, 2000, 2005;
Yu et al., 2007, among others) and other literature that investigates the welfare eﬀects of subsidy. For an
overview see Besley and Seabright (1999) and for recent contributions see Albornonz et al. (2009) and Chor
(2009).
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projects in which diﬀerent entry modes are selected and derive the respective investment
thresholds. We also derive the welfare of the host country when diﬀerent entry modes are
adopted. Last, we provide decision rules for the choice of entry mode between a JV andWOS.
In Section 3.3, we extend the models to the case in which an investment subsidy is oﬀered
by the host country and derive the optimal investment subsidies for a JV and WOS. We
also attempt to determine the optimal entry model through comparing a) the values of the
investment projects when the investment triggers are set as identical and b) the investment
triggers when the values of the investment projects are set as identical. Then, we introduce
the knowledge transfer beneﬁts and study their eﬀect on the choice of entry mode. Section
3.4 presents some empirical implications, and Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Unsubsidised Investment
In this section, we consider the case in which no subsidy is oﬀered by the host country.
Consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm that has monopolistic access to invest in a project no matter
whether in the form of a JV or WOS. The ﬁrm will operate in continuous time indexed by
t ∈ [0,∞). The risk-free interest rate is known and constant at r > 0 per unit of time.
To undertake the investment at time t, the ﬁrm has to incur an initial ﬁxed investment
cost, I, at that instant. We do not take into account personal and corporate taxes in this
chapter since it will not alter our conclusions but would make the derivations more complex.
Suppose the investment in a production facility can produce qt units of a good at a
variable cost of v
2
qt and can be sold at price pt at time t. The market price of the good, pt,
evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian motion:
dpt = µptdt+ σptdBt, (3.1)
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where µ < r and σ > 0 are constant and denote the drift and volatility of the process,
respectively, and dBt is the increment of a standard Brownian motion.
4 The Eq. (3.1)
implies that the growth rate of pt is normally distributed with mean, µ, and variance, σ
2,
per unit of time. Suppose the initial value of pt at t = 0 is p0. We assume that p0 is
suﬃciently small such that the immediate investment is not optimal.
The decision rule is the same as stated in the previous analysis: when the market price
pt is large enough such that the investment project becomes suﬃciently attractive, the ﬁrm
ﬁnds it is optimal to undertake the investment project and give up the option value of
waiting, which can be regarded as the opportunity cost. Hence, the focus of the analysis
is to ﬁnd a threshold value, p∗ > p0, such that the ﬁrm should invest at the ﬁrst instant
when pt reaches p
∗ from below. 5 We refer to p∗ as the optimal investment trigger and let
T = inf{t > 0 : pt = p∗} be the ﬁrst time that pt reaches p∗ from below, starting from t = 0.
We will study two types of entry mode in the following sections. The ﬁrst entry mode is
an investment structured as a JV between the foreign ﬁrm and the host country, in which
the foreign ﬁrm owns α per cent of the investment and the host country owns 1 − α per
cent of the investment. The second entry mode is structured as a WOS, in which the foreign
ﬁrm owns the enterprise outright and dictates both the timing of the investment and the
output. As mentioned above, a JV is assumed to choose its optimal production level once the
investment is made and stick to it thereafter since the host country wants the JV to maintain
production even in bad times to guarantee employment. A WOS is supposed to have full
control over its production and can scale up and back its production freely according to
market conditions. In the following analysis, variables with subscripts 'J' and 'S' correspond
to JVs and WOSs, respectively.
4The condition µ < r is needed to ensure the expected present value of the investment project is ﬁnite.
5See McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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3.2.1 Joint Venture
We ﬁrst consider the case of a JV. A JV is an agreement to share the proﬁt ﬂow and the
investment cost of the enterprise between the foreign ﬁrm and host country. The foreign
ﬁrm owns α ∈ (0, 0.5) of the enterprise, while the host country owns 1−α. We assume that
α is exogenously decided (for example because the host country does not permit a foreign
ﬁrm to own more than half of the shares of a JV) but large enough to give the foreign ﬁrm
veto rights on the timing of the investment, and 1 − α is large enough to give the host
country veto rights on the output of the investment. In other words, it is the foreign ﬁrm
who decides when to invest. Once the investment is made, the JV has to commit to a certain
level of production. The proﬁt ﬂow is given by qt
(
pt − v2qt
)
. When the production ﬂow is
kept constant at capacity qt = q indeﬁnitely, the value of all discounted future proﬁts for a
JV is given by:
VJ(pt|q) = E
(∫ ∞
t
q
(
ps − v
2
q
)
e−r(s−t)ds
∣∣∣∣ pt) = qptr − µ − vq22r , (3.2)
when the investment is made at pt.
6
Since the value of the investment project and the investment cost will be shared between
the foreign ﬁrm and the host country, the value for the foreign ﬁrm is then αVJ(pt|q) and
the cost is αIJ when IJ denotes the cost of setting up the JV. Similarly, the value for the
host country is (1− α)VJ(pt|q), and the cost is (1− α)IJ .
The investment opportunity is worth αVJ(pt|q) − αIJ at the time of investment. The
6It should be noted that we neglect the sequential option to acquire the equity stake from the local partner
that a JV is usually thought to hold. As pointed out by Li and Rugman (2007), these options to acquire and
expand ventures require diﬀerent costs to be exercised. A ﬁrm may need to pay a premium (or discount) to
acquire equity stake from its local partner for switching from a JV to a WOS. The exercise cost can be so
high that the option value of acquiring or selling out can be totally oﬀset.
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optimal investment trigger can be obtained as:
p∗J =
λ
λ− 1(r − µ)
(
vq
2r
+
IJ
q
)
, (3.3)
where λ =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
(see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 7 The optimal
capacity can be found by maximising the value of all discounted future proﬁts when the
investment is made at p∗J , VJ(p
∗
J |q), which yields q∗ = p
∗
J
v
r
r−µ . Substituting q
∗ back into
VJ(p
∗
J |q), we can ﬁnd that VJ(p∗J |q∗) = r(r−µ)2
(p∗J )
2
2v
.
Using value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we can
also ﬁnd the following:
Proposition 3.1 Under all of the above assumptions, the value of the investment opportunity
for a JV can be expressed as:
α (VJ(pt|p∗J)− IJ) = α
IJ
γ − 1(
pt
p∗J
)2γ, (3.4)
where γ is the positive root of the quadratic equation 2σ2γ(γ − 1) + (2µ+ σ2)γ − r = 0. The
optimal investment trigger p∗J for a JV satisﬁes:
p∗J =
√
2vγ
γ − 1
(r − µ)2
r
IJ . (3.5)
It can be shown that γ = λ/2. This expression assumes that γ > 1 or equivalently, λ > 2.
It shows that the expected payoﬀ at the time of investment for the foreign ﬁrm is
7Note that the optimal investment trigger, p∗J , is not aﬀected by the equity share α since, in our model,
the value of the investment and the cost are shared in the same proportion between the foreign ﬁrm and the
host country, which is diﬀerent from the analysis by Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2004) who assumed that the
foreign ﬁrm has to be compensated for its input of knowledge and technology.
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αVJ(p
∗
J |q∗) = α γIJγ−1 .
3.2.2 Wholly-Owned Subsidiary
Next, we consider the case of a WOS. The foreign ﬁrm can dictate both the timing of
investment and the output when it invests in a WOS, where the investment cost is denoted
by IS. When the investment is made, the proﬁt ﬂow is qt
(
pt − v2qt
)
. Suppose the ﬁrm can
adjust its production level qt without cost, it can then maximise the proﬁt ﬂow with respect
to qt point by point. This yields an optimal production q
∗
t =
pt
v
. The maximised proﬁt
ﬂow is then equal to
p2t
2v
, which depends on the evolution of p2t . Since pt follows a geometric
Brownian motion, using Ito's lemma, we ﬁnd that dp2t = (2µ+ σ
2) p2tdt + 2σp
2
tdBt, which
indicates p2t also follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift 2µ + σ
2 and diﬀusion 2σ.
We assume that 2µ+ σ2 < r.8 The value of the future discounted proﬁts is given by:
VS(pt|q∗t ) = E
(∫ ∞
t
p2S
2v
e−r(s−t)ds
∣∣∣∣ pt) = p2t2v(r − 2µ− σ2) . (3.6)
Using the above approach (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we can ﬁnd the following:
Proposition 3.2 Under all of the above assumptions, the value of the investment opportunity
for a WOS is:
VS(pt|p∗S)− IS =
IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ, (3.7)
where γ has been deﬁned above. The optimal investment trigger p∗S for a WOS satisﬁes:
p∗S =
√
2vγ
γ − 1(r − 2µ− σ
2)IS. (3.8)
8This assumption holds when the growth rate and the volatility of product prices are suﬃciently small.
A natural growth rate for product prices is inﬂation, which is typically lower than the discount rate, and it
is argued (see e.g., Miao, 2005) that in industry equilibrium, the product prices are much less volatile than,
for instance asset prices.
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This expression also assumes that r > (2µ+ σ2) and γ > 1 or λ > 2, equivalently.
Proposition 3.2 shows that the expected payoﬀ at the time of investment is VS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) =
γIS
γ−1 .
If both modes are to have the same optimal investment trigger (i.e., p∗J = p
∗
S), we ﬁnd
that:
IJ = IS
r(r − 2µ− σ2)
(r − µ)2 . (3.9)
Since (r−µ)
2
r
> (r−2µ−σ2), we ﬁnd the ratio r(r−2µ−σ2)
(r−µ)2 is always less than one, which im-
plies that if we want both modes of entry to have the same investment timing, the investment
cost for a JV, IJ , must be less than the investment cost for a WOS, IS, since the ﬂexibility
to vary output freely is valuable. This requirement is consistent with the ﬁndings of Li and
Rugman (2007) who stated that it is reasonable to assume that a WOS requires higher initial
investments than a JV since a JV may have access to some unique local resources. The in-
cremental investment IS − IJ can be interpreted as the investment in technology that allows
the ﬁrm to scale up or down production with no further costs, whereas IJ is the investment
in ﬁxed capacity q =
p∗J
v
r
r−µ . Note that, since IS > IJ , VS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) = γISγ−1 will always be greater
than VJ(p
∗
J |q∗) = γIJγ−1 at the time of investment, implying that an investment project in the
form of a WOS will have a higher value. Thus, a WOS will be preferred by the foreign ﬁrm.
Another natural basis for comparison between the two entry modes is that we make the
expected NPV of the investment project the same at the time of investment, regardless of
the decision to structure the investment as a JV or WOS, which implies that VJ(p
∗
J |q∗) = γIJγ−1
has the same as VS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) = γISγ−1 , implying IJ = IS.
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If IJ and IS have the same value of I, it can be shown that p
∗
J > p
∗
S since
p∗J =
√
2vγ
γ − 1
(r − µ)2
r
I =
√
2vγ
γ − 1(r − 2µ+
µ2
r
)I
, and it is obvious that (r − 2µ + µ2
r
) > (r − 2µ − σ2). It implies that, other things being
equal, a WOS that has more ﬂexibility will have a lower investment trigger and make the
investment sooner. Thus, a WOS will have a higher discounted value of investment project
at time 0. Since p∗J > p
∗
S, VS(pt|p∗S) will always be greater than VJ(pt|p∗J) at any given pt,
indicating that, at any given point in time prior to the investment, the value of the investment
opportunity for a WOS will be higher. This does make sense since, with all other things
being equal, the ﬁrm with full control over production has extra 'ﬂexibility'. Therefore, a
WOS will again be preferred by the ﬁrm.
In summary, we ﬁnd that a WOS will always be preferred by the ﬁrm from a commercial
point of view to undertake an investment when the investment environment is uncertain and
the investment is irreversible but ﬂexible. The reason is that a WOS can oﬀer the ﬁrm full
control over its production and this 'ﬂexibility' is valuable.
3.2.3 Welfare
In this section, we consider the welfare beneﬁts for the host country. The host country could
obtain welfare from two sources: the output qt, which indicates the level of economic activity
of the enterprise, and the commercial value of an ownership stake when a JV is established.
We assume that the output-related welfare can be measured as a constant w per unit of
output. If an enterprise is established (i.e., the investment is made) at time t in the form of
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a JV producing output q, the welfare can be expressed as:
WJ(pt|q) =
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)wqds+ (1− α) (V (pt|q)− IJ) = wq
r
+ (1− α)
(
qpt
r − µ −
vq2
2r
− IJ
)
.
(3.10)
If a JV produces the optimal output q∗ = pt
v
r
r−µ , we can ﬁnd that:
WJ(pt|q∗) = w
v
pt
r − µ + (1− α)
(
1
2v
r
(r − µ)2p
2
t − IJ
)
. (3.11)
Substituting p∗J =
√
γ
γ−1
(r−µ)2
r
2vIJ into the above equation, then we obtain:
WJ(pt|q∗) = w
v
pt
r − µ + (1− α)
(
γIJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2
− IJ
)
. (3.12)
If an enterprise is established at time t in the form of a WOS producing the optimal
output q∗t =
pt
v
, the welfare is
WS(pt|q∗t ) =
∫ ∞
t
wq∗t e
−r(s−t)ds =
w
v
pt
r − µ. (3.13)
For a JV, if we evaluate the welfare at the optimal investment trigger derived above, p∗J
(given in Eq. (3.5)), we ﬁnd the welfare function equals:
WJ(p
∗
J |q∗) =
w
v
p∗J
r − µ + (1− α)
IJ
γ − 1 . (3.14)
For a WOS, if we evaluate welfare at the investment trigger, p∗S (given in Eq. (3.8)), we
ﬁnd the welfare function equals:
WS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) =
w
v
p∗S
r − µ. (3.15)
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It suggests that if we make the timing of investment for both entry modes the same,
which implies that p∗J = p
∗
S, the host country will gain more welfare beneﬁts when a JV
is established. If we equalise the welfare beneﬁts for both entry modes, we can ﬁnd that
pS > pJ , indicating that the investment in the form of a JV will be made sooner. Thus, at
time 0, the discounted value of the investment in the form of a JV will be higher. It seems
that a JV will always be preferred by the host country from the social welfare point of view.
3.2.4 Optimal Unsubsidised Investment
We now analyse the optimal decision making for an unsubsidised investment problem, and
ﬁnd the following rule.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose we consider two cases, Case 1 where the investment triggers are
identical, so that p∗J = p
∗
S and the timing decision would be the same for a JV and WOS
for the ﬁrm, and Case 2 where the NPVs of the investments are identical
qp∗J
r−µ − vq
2
2r
− IJ =
p2S
2v(r−2µ−σ2) − IS so that the surplus from investment is the same at the time the investment
is made. Then, we ﬁnd:
(1) In Case 1, the ﬁrm prefers a WOS, and the host country prefers a JV.
(2) In Case 2, the ﬁrm prefers a WOS, and the host country may prefer either, depending
on model parameters.
A WOS would, therefore, always be preferred to a JV by the ﬁrm from a commercial
point of view. The reason for this is that the ﬁrm would either achieve a higher NPV at the
investment point or would achieve the same NPV at an earlier date with a WOS. The latter
point is often not obvious in static models where timing is not modelled. The welfare eﬀect
is always greater with a JV. This is because the optimal capacity under a JV is calibrated
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such that the welfare eﬀect of output is the same for both a WOS and JV, but the host
country additionally has a commercial stake in the investment, which has positive value.
3.3 Subsidised Investment
In this section, we analyse the case in which the host country intends to lower the investment
trigger level and speed up the investment by providing a subsidy package.
3.3.1 Investment Subsidy
First, we analyse the case when the investment can be organised either in the form of a JV
or in the form of a WOS. However, the ﬁrm cannot choose between them now or later.
We know from Chapter 2 that the optimal investment subsidy package must compensate
the ﬁrm for the diﬀerence between the value of the investment opportunity, which is the
ﬁrm's opportunity cost, and the value of the investment at an earlier time point. Suppose
the subsidy package is denoted by K(pt), where pt can be regarded as the host country's
desired investment trigger. If pt is also the optimal investment trigger for the ﬁrm in the sense
that the ﬁrm decides to invest when the state variable ﬁrst reaches pt from below, some value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions must be met and the value of the subsidy package
can be derived (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
For a JV, the foreign ﬁrm decides when to invest and set up the venture. The value of
the optimal subsidy package should be αKJ(pt) and can be expressed as follows:
αKJ(pt) = α
(
IJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
+ IJ − γIJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2)
. (3.16)
The equity share of the foreign ﬁrm, α, comes into play since the foreign ﬁrm shares future
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proﬁt and investment cost with the host country and pursues maximisation of its own proﬁt.
Similar results can also be obtained for a WOS. The value of the subsidy package to
lower the optimal invest trigger to pt takes the value:
KS(pt) =
IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ + IS − ( pt
p∗S
)2
γ
(γ − 1)IS. (3.17)
As can be seen from Eqs. (3.16) and (3.17), when investment triggers are kept unchanged
(i.e., pt = p
∗
J or pt = p
∗
S), the value of the subsidy packages are equal to zero, indicating that
the host country needs to pay nothing to let the investment take place naturally, when pt
approaches zero, KJ(pt) and KS(pt) approaches IJ and IS, respectively.
When the host country considers subsidising the ﬁrm, it faces a trade-oﬀ between the
incremental welfare, which is the diﬀerence between the welfare beneﬁts from the subsidised
investment and the unsubsidised investment and the cost of providing the subsidy package.
For a JV, the incremental welfare can be expressed as:
∆WJ(pt) = WJ(pt|q∗)−WJ(p∗J |q∗)
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
, (3.18)
where WJ(pt|q∗) and WJ(p∗J |q∗) are given in Eqs. (3.12) and (3.14), respectively. Addition-
ally,
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
denotes the discount factor because WJ(p
∗
J |q∗) is evaluated at the time when p∗J
is ﬁrst reached and because we have to discount it to the time of pt so that Eq. (3.18) makes
sense.9
9See Harrison (1985) for the derivation of the discount factor.
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The incremental welfare minus the cost of the subsidy is then given by:
∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt) = w
v(r − µ)
(
pt − p∗J
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ)
+
(
γIJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2
− IJ
)
− IJ
γ − 1(
pt
p∗J
)2γ.
(3.19)
Please note that the parameter α does not enter the right-hand side of this expression,
so it is immaterial whether the ﬁrm holds a large commercial stake in the JV and pays a
small subsidy or whether it holds a small commercial stake and pays a large subsidy.
Similarly, we can ﬁnd that the incremental welfare for a WOS is given as follows:
∆WS(pt) = WS(pt|q∗t )−WS(p∗S|q∗t )
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
, (3.20)
where WS(pt|q∗t ) and WS(p∗S|q∗t ) are given in Eqs. (3.13) and (3.15), respectively. Moreover,(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
denotes the discount factor.
The incremental welfare minus the cost of the subsidy for a WOS is given by:
∆WS(pt)−KS(pt) = w
v(r − µ)
(
pt − p∗S
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ)
+
(
γIS
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗S
)2
− IS
)
− IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ.
(3.21)
If we want to ﬁnd out which mode of entry is more attractive to the host country, we
need to compare ∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt) with ∆WS(pt)−KS(pt).
We have studied the case in which the ﬁrm cannot choose between a JV and a WOS.
Next, we analyse the case when the foreign ﬁrm has the option to choose between the two
types of entry mode.
As stated in Section 2, a WOS would always be preferred over a JV from the foreign ﬁrm's
point of view. Now, if the host country wants to lower the optimal investment trigger and
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speed up the investment through providing a subsidy package, the optimal subsidy package
must be structured in such a way that it compensates the ﬁrm for the diﬀerence between the
ﬁrm's best outside option, which we know from the preceding section is equal to the value
of the investment in the form of a WOS, and the value of the investment made at the time
stipulated in the subsidy contract. For instance, if the ﬁrm is oﬀered a subsidy for a JV at a
time where the product price p∗∗, which is lower than the unsubsidised investment trigger for
a WOS, p∗∗ < p∗s, then the subsidy must compensate for the diﬀerence between the value of
the opportunity to invest as a WOS minus the NPV of the JV. The value of the opportunity
to invest in a WOS has been worked out in Section 2 as VS(pt|p∗S)− IS = ISγ−1( ptp∗S )
2γ, which
is the value of the outside option for the ﬁrm at a time when the product market price is
pt < p
∗
S.
The NPV for the ﬁrm of a JV where the subsidised investment is made at a time when the
price is pt is α
(
ptq
r−µ − vq
2
2r
− IJ
)
. Using the optimal capacity decision q = pt
v
r
r−µ , we ﬁnd the
NPV α
(
1
2v
r
(r−µ)2p
2
t − IJ
)
. Given that p∗J =
√
γ
γ−1
(r−µ)2
r
2vIJ , the NPV is α
(
γIJ
γ−1(
pt
p∗J
)2 − IJ
)
.
The NPV for the ﬁrm of a WOS when the subsidised investment is made at a time
the price is pt is
(
1
2v
p2t
(r−2µ−σ2) − IS
)
. Given that p∗S =
√
γ
γ−1(r − 2µ− σ2)2vIS, the NPV is(
γIS
γ−1(
pt
p∗S
)2 − IS
)
.
We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 3.4 The optimal subsidy for a JV with ownership stake α for the foreign ﬁrm
is:
KJ(pt) =
IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ − α
(
γIJ
γ − 1(
pt
p∗J
)2 − IJ
)
, (3.22)
and the optimal subsidy for a WOS is:
KS(pt) =
IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ −
(
γIS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2 − IS
)
. (3.23)
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Comparing Eqs. (3.23) with (3.17), we ﬁnd that the value of the subsidy package needed
to lower the optimal invest trigger to pt remains the same for a WOS. Comparing Eqs. (3.22)
with (3.16), we ﬁnd that, when the foreign ﬁrm has the option to choose between the two
types of entry mode, the host country has to provide additional subsidy for a JV.
Therefore, the welfare for the host country of subsidising an investment via a JV is the
incremental welfare arising from a subsidy at the price pt minus the cost of the optimal
subsidy package KJ(pt). To work out the incremental welfare, we need to consider the
welfare to the host country when no subsidy is oﬀered and when there is a subsidy oﬀered.
When there is no subsidy oﬀered and the ﬁrm has the option to choose between the
two entry modes, the ﬁrm will always choose a WOS, as we have mentioned above. The
welfare to the host country of an unsubsidised investment is given by WS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) = wv
p∗S
r−µ .
Since there is no subsidy oﬀered, the investment will be made when the optimal investment
trigger p∗S is reached, and the host country can obtain welfare ﬂow from then on. Further,
WS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) is actually the value of all discounted future welfare at the time of investment,
TS = argmint{pt = p∗S}.
When the host country provides subsidies to lower the optimal investment trigger to pt
and the investment is in the form of a JV, the welfare to the host country of a subsidised
investment via a JV is given by Eq. (3.12) as w
v
pt
r−µ + (1 − α)
(
γIJ
γ−1(
pt
p∗J
)2 − IJ
)
at time t.
Since the optimal investment trigger is lower and the investment is sped up, t < TS.
Therefore, when we calculate the incremental welfare, we need to discount WS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) to
time t. The discount factor E[exp(−r(TS − t))], with TS = argmint{pt = p∗S}, equals
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
(see Harrison, 1985). Then, the incremental welfare of a subsidised investment via a JV
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minus the optimal subsidy can be written as:
w
v
pt
r − µ + (1− α)
(
γIJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2
− IJ
)
− w
v
p∗S
r − µ
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
−KJ(pt)
=
w
v(r − µ)
(
pt − p∗S
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ)
+
(
γIJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2
− IJ
)
− IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ. (3.24)
We notice that the parameter α cancels out and does not enter Eq. (3.24), so it is immaterial
whether the ﬁrm holds a large commercial stake in the JV and pays a small subsidy or
whether it holds a small commercial stake and pays a large subsidy.
The welfare to the host country of a subsidised investment via a WOS is given by Eq.
(3.13) as w
v
pt
r−µ .
Therefore, similarly to the expression for the JV, the incremental welfare of a subsidised
investment via a WOS minus the optimal subsidy can be written as:
w
v
pt
r − µ −
w
v
p∗S
r − µ
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
−KS(pt)
=
w
v(r − µ)
(
pt − p∗S
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ)
+
(
γIS
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗S
)2
− IS
)
− IS
γ − 1(
pt
p∗S
)2γ. (3.25)
Then, we ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 3.5 The optimal subsidy trigger for a JV is given by:
p∗∗J =
(
p∗J
2 +
(
w
r − µ
r
λ− 1
λ− 2
)2) 12
− wr − µ
r
λ− 1
λ− 2 < p
∗
J . (3.26)
The optimal subsidy trigger for a WOS is given by:
p∗∗S =
(
p∗S
2 +
(
w
r − 2µ− σ2
r − µ
λ− 1
λ− 2
)2) 12
− wr − 2µ− σ
2
r − µ
λ− 1
λ− 2 < p
∗
S. (3.27)
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The proof of Proposition 3.5 is in Appendix 3.6.
3.3.2 Optimal Mode of Entry
In this section, we will investigate the optimal mode of entry. We analyse two situations: a)
when the ﬁrm cannot choose between a JV and a WOS and b) when the ﬁrm has the option
to choose between the two entry modes and always prefer a WOS.
When the ﬁrm cannot choose between a JV and WOS, we compare (∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt))
and (∆WS(pt)−KS(pt)), which have been deﬁned above under two cases.
First, we consider the situation when investments via both entry modes have the same
optimal investment trigger (i.e., p∗J = p
∗
S). As mentioned above, when p
∗
J = p
∗
S, IJ < IS.
When p∗J = p
∗
S, we ﬁnd that:
(∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt))− (∆WS(pt)−KS(pt))
=
(
γ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2
− 1− 1
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ)
(IJ − IS). (3.28)
Note that the second term of the expression, (IJ − IS), is negative. Thus, we focus on
the ﬁrst term of the expression. If we let x = pt
p∗J
= pt
p∗S
, since 0 < pt ≤ p∗J = p∗S, 0 < x ≤ 1.
Let
f(x) =
γ
γ − 1x
2 − 1− 1
γ − 1x
2γ. (3.29)
Then, the ﬁrst derivative of f(x) with respect to x is:
f ′(x) =
2γ
γ − 1(x− x
2γ−1). (3.30)
Since γ > 1, 2γ − 1 > 1. Since x < 1, x2γ−1 < x or x − x2γ−1 > 0. Therefore, f(x) is an
97
increasing function. Since f(x) = 0 when x = 1, we ﬁnd that the maximum value of f(x) is
zero. When 0 < x < 1, f(x) will always be less than zero.
Because the ﬁrst term of Eq. (3.28) is also less than or equal to zero, we ﬁnd that
(∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt))−(∆WS(pt)−KS(pt)) will be greater than or equal to zero, indicating
that the incremental welfare subtracting the cost of subsidy will always be higher for a JV.
Thus, in this situation, a JV will be more attractive than a WOS to the host country.
Second, we consider the situation in which the expected NPVs of the investment projects
are the same at their respective times of investment for both entry modes (i.e., IJ = IS). As
mentioned above, when IJ = IS, p
∗
J > p
∗
S.
In this situation, we can ﬁnd that:
(∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt))− (∆WS(pt)−KS(pt))
= − wpt
v(r − µ)
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ−1
+
γIJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2
− IJ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
−
(
− wpt
v(r − µ)
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ−1
+
γIS
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗S
)2
− IS
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ)
.
(3.31)
Let g(y) = − wpt
v(r−µ)y
2γ−1 + γIJ
γ−1y
2 − IJ
γ−1y
2γ, and let y1 =
pt
p∗J
and y2 =
pt
p∗S
. Then, the ex-
pression of [(∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt))− (∆WS(pt)−KS(pt))] |IJ=IS becomes g(y1)−g(y2). Note
that 0 < pt ≤ p∗S < p∗J , so 0 < y1 < y2 ≤ 1. The ﬁrst derivative of g(y) with respect to y is:
g′(y) = −(2γ − 1)wpt
v(r − µ) y
2γ−2 +
2γIJ
γ − 1y −
2γIJ
γ − 1y
2γ−1. (3.32)
In this case, the value of g′(y) depends on the parameter values. If g′(y) > 0, g(y) is an
increasing function. Since y1 < y2, g(y1) < g(y2). Then, g(y1)− g(y2) is negative, and so is
[(∆WJ(pt)− αKJ(pt))− (∆WS(pt)−KS(pt))] |IJ=IS , implying that the incremental welfare
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subtracting the cost of subsidy for a WOS will be higher. Thus, a WOS will be more
attractive to the host country. When g′(y) < 0, the result will be reversed. When g′(y) = 0,
the host country will be indiﬀerent to the two types of entry modes.
Until now, we have studied the situation in which the host country oﬀers subsidy packages
and when the ﬁrm cannot choose between a JV and WOS. We ﬁnd that when investments
via both entry modes have the same investment trigger, a JV will be more attractive to the
host country. When the expected present values of the investment projects are the same,
the host country may prefer either mode depending on model parameters.
Second, we consider the situation in which the ﬁrm has the option to choose between the
two entry modes and always prefer a WOS. The ﬁrst issue is which of the subsidy trigger
points in Proposition 3.5 is the smallest. If we start from a situation in which the unsubsidised
investment triggers are identical (i.e., that p∗J = p
∗
S), then we ﬁnd that p
∗∗
J < p
∗∗
S . Note that
this does not necessarily mean the host country will choose the JV as the optimal mode
of entry since the option to delay the subsidy and oﬀer the ﬁrm the option to invest in a
WOS may yield even greater welfare. Therefore, the optimal mode of entry is not directly
associated with the lowest subsidy trigger point.
As stated in Eq. (3.9), when pJ = pS, IJ = IS
r(r−2µ−σ2)
(r−µ)2 . Since the ratio
r(r−2µ−σ2)
(r−µ)2 is less
than one, IJ < IS. The diﬀerence between the incremental welfare of a subsidised investment
minus the optimal subsidy for a JV and for a WOS is given by diﬀerence between Eq. (3.24)
and Eq. (3.25), which is: (
γ
γ − 1
(
pt
p∗S
)2
− 1
)
(IJ − IS). (3.33)
From Eq. (3.8), we obtain p∗S
2 = 2vγ
γ−1(r − 2µ − σ2)IS. Substituting p∗S2 and IJ into Eq.
(3.33), it can be simpliﬁed to:
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(
p2t
2v
− (r − 2µ− σ2)IS
)(
r
(r − µ)2 −
1
r − 2µ− σ2
)
. (3.34)
Again, since (r−µ)
2
r
> (r − 2µ − σ2), r
(r−µ)2 − 1r−2µ−σ2 < 0. We can ﬁnd a certain value
of p˜ =
√
2v(r − 2µ− σ2)IS that makes the value of Eq. (3.34) equal zero. Note that
p˜ < p∗J = p
∗
S in this case. Thus, when pt > p˜, the ﬁrst term in Eq. (3.34) is positive, and
the value of Eq. (3.34) is negative, and so is the value of Eq. (3.33), which implies that the
incremental welfare of a subsidised investment minus the optimal subsidy for a JV is less
than that for a WOS. The WOS will always be preferred from the host country's point of
view when pt > p˜. When pt < p˜, the ﬁrst term in Eq. (3.34) is negative and the value of Eq.
(3.33) is greater than zero, implying that the incremental welfare of a subsidised investment
minus the optimal subsidy for a JV is greater than that for a WOS. It should be noted that
this does not necessarily mean a JV will be preferred by the host country. We need to make
sure that the values of the incremental welfare of a subsidised investment minus the cost of
the subsidy package (given in Eqs. (3.24) and (3.25)) are positive.
Figure 3.1 depicts what we have discussed above when values are assigned to the param-
eters. The ﬁgure shows the welfare of oﬀering an investment subsidy at all price levels below
the unsubsidised investment trigger for a JV and WOS. This ﬁgure assumes that the unsub-
sidised investment trigger points are the same. We see that the subsidised investment trigger
for a JV is below the subsidised investment trigger for a WOS, but nonetheless delaying the
subsidy and instead supporting a WOS has greater welfare eﬀect.
We also note that when lim pt → 0, the welfare eﬀect is more negative for a WOS than
for a JV. The reason is that the welfare eﬀect is exactly equal to the investment cost, and
because the unsubsidised investment triggers are the same, the investment cost for a WOS is
greater than the investment cost for a JV. Next, we note that, at the unsubsidised investment
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p
−IJ
−IS
p∗∗J
p∗∗S
p∗J = p
∗
S
Figure 3.1: Optimal timing of investment subsidy when the unsubsidised investment triggers
are identical. The dashed lines show the case of a JV; the solid lines show the case of a WOS.
The parameter values used in this illustration are IJ = 6.667, IS = 7.758, r = 10%, µ = 2%,
and σ = 25%. In this case, p∗J = p
∗
S = 9.289, p
∗∗
J = 6.763, and p
∗∗
S = 7.369.
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trigger, pt = p
∗
J = p
∗
S, the welfare eﬀect is zero for the WOS but negative for the JV. The
reason for this is that the NPV of a WOS is greater than the NPV of a JV, and since the
WOS is the outside option for the ﬁrm, the host country needs to compensate the ﬁrm for
the diﬀerence in NPV for a switch to a JV.
Next, we consider the situation in which the unsubsidised NPVs of the investment in two
entry modes are identical, that is, IJ = IS. From Eqs. (3.5) and (3.8), we know that if
IJ = IS, then P
∗
J > P
∗
S since
(r−µ)2
r
> (r− 2µ− σ2). The diﬀerence between the incremental
welfare of a subsidised investment minus the optimal subsidy for a JV and for a WOS is
given by Eq. (3.24− 3.25), which is:
γIS
γ − 1
(
1
p∗J
2 −
1
p∗S
2
)
p2t . (3.35)
Since p∗J > p
∗
S,
1
p∗J
2 <
1
p∗S
2 . Thus, the value of the above expression is less than zero,
implying again that the incremental welfare of a subsidised investment minus the optimal
subsidy for a JV is always less than that for a WOS. The WOS will always be preferred from
the host country's point of view.
Figure 3.2 shows the case in which the NPVs are identical at their respective investment
trigger points. In this case, the JV model will never contribute positively to welfare for the
parameter values given in this example, so there is no meaningful subsidy trigger value for
this mode of entry. However, the investment cost for the WOS is lowered, which yields an
even greater welfare eﬀect, and the subsidy trigger point is lowered relative to the case in
Figure 3.1. The fact that the WOS mode of entry is more attractive makes the JV mode of
entry less attractive because the host country always needs to compensate the ﬁrm for the
best outside option, which in this case, has enhanced proﬁtability for the ﬁrm.
In summary, when the ﬁrm cannot choose between a JV and WOS, the host country
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−IJ = −IS
p∗∗S
p∗j
p∗s
Figure 3.2: Optimal timing of investment subsidy when the unsubsidised NPVs are identical
at the investment trigger points. In this case, the ﬁrm will invest sooner if the mode of
entry is a JV than if the mode of entry is a WOS. The dashed lines show the case of a JV;
the solid lines show the case of a WOS. The parameter values used in this illustration are
IJ = IS = 6.667, r = 10%, µ = 2%, and σ = 25%. In this case, p
∗
j = 9.289, p
∗
s = 8.611, and
p∗∗S = 6.71.
prefers to oﬀer subsidies to a JV. When the ﬁrm has the option to choose between the two
entry modes, a WOS becomes more attractive to the host country.
3.3.3 Knowledge Transfer Beneﬁts
The JV mode of entry has been associated with operational stability in the preceding section,
but we may also consider the case in which a JV can lead to additional beneﬁts on top of the
beneﬁt of operational stability to the host country, for example knowledge transfers. In this
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section, we explore this possibility that obviously may lead to a reversal of the conclusions
reached in the previous sections.
Consider a JV with an added welfare ﬂow u, which arises from knowledge transfers.
The formation of a JV through a subsidy will lead to a welfare ﬂow that otherwise could
never be achieved through unsubsidised investments (because a WOS is always the preferred
choice); therefore, the added incremental welfare from a JV through knowledge transfers is
just u
r
. The question we address in this section is the following: Can we ﬁnd a welfare eﬀect
of knowledge transfers associated with JVs, u
r
, such that the host country would prefer to
subsidise a JV rather than a WOS?
Note that the welfare eﬀect of knowledge transfers does not aﬀect the unsubsidised in-
vestment trigger p∗J . This is because this trigger level is determined on the basis of corporate
proﬁts only and not the wider welfare eﬀects. Next, the welfare eﬀect of knowledge transfers
does not aﬀect the optimal subsidy of a JV, KJ(pt). The reason is that the subsidy is com-
pensation to the ﬁrm for accepting a JV rather than taking the best outside option, which
is a WOS, and since the welfare eﬀect does not aﬀect this problem, the subsidy remains
the same. The only place where the welfare eﬀect enters the problem for the host country
is in the timing problem for the subsidy oﬀer, and here the welfare eﬀect aﬀects the level
of welfare but not the marginal welfare. Therefore, all eﬀects of the welfare of knowledge
transfers can be traced by deﬁning a new investment cost I ′J = IJ − ur . If the host country
is just indiﬀerent between the two modes of entry, the subsidy trigger for a WOS is greater
than the subsidy trigger for a JV, or p∗∗S > p
∗∗
J . This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
The ﬁgure demonstrates that we can always ﬁnd a knowledge transfer beneﬁt that makes
the host county indiﬀerent between a JV and WOS, but in this case, the timing of the
subsidy depends on the mode of entry. A JV will be subsidised at lower price levels than a
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Figure 3.3: Optimal timing of investment subsidy when the JV produces additional knowl-
edge transfer welfare. The host country is, in this case, indiﬀerent between subsidising a JV
(dashed lines) and subsidising a WOS, but the timing of the subsidy would be diﬀerent de-
pending on the mode of entry. The parameter values used in this illustration are IJ = 6.667,
IS = 7.758, u = 0.035, r = 10%, µ = 2%, and σ = 25%. In this case, p
∗
s = 9.289, p
∗∗
J = 6.518,
and p∗∗S = 7.369.
WOS.
3.4 Empirical Implications
The fundamental empirical prediction in this chapter is that ﬁrms prefer FDIs, subsidised
or unsubsidised, to be structured as WOSs rather than JVs.
When there is no subsidy provided, the foreign ﬁrm makes the choice of entry mode and
a WOS will always be preferred since it can oﬀer the ﬁrm full control over the production,
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and this kind of 'ﬂexibility' is valuable. Despite that, in this case, a JV is preferred by the
host country from a welfare point of view.
When the host country intends to aﬀect the foreign ﬁrm's choice of entry modes through
providing subsidy packages, it prefers the WOS when the ﬁrm can choose between the two
entry modes and always has the WOS as its best outside option.
In either situation, WOSs are preferred to JVs. The JVs will be used only if they can
provide the host country with certain beneﬁts that cannot be provided byWOSs, for instance,
the direct access to new technology, which has beneﬁts beyond the direct welfare beneﬁts of
the investment.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyse the timing of investment and the choice of entry modes simul-
taneously, and compare the entry modes of a JV and a WOS. We conﬁrm that the choice
of entry modes will aﬀect the value of the investment project and further aﬀect the timing
of investment. We ﬁnd that when there is no subsidy oﬀered by the host country, a WOS is
always preferred to a JV by the ﬁrm from a commercial point of view. The reason is that a
WOS will give the ﬁrm full control over the production. The investment project in the form
of a WOS would obtain higher value if it has the same investment timing as an investment
project in the form of a JV. If the investments in both entry modes have the same NPVs at
their respective times of investment, the investment in the form of a WOS will have a lower
optimal investment trigger and thus arrive sooner. However, the welfare for the host country
is always greater with a JV since the welfare eﬀect of production output is the same for both
entry modes, while the host country has an additional commercial stake in the investment
in the form of a JV.
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When the subsidy is provided by the host country in order to aﬀect the ﬁrm's choice
of entry modes, we can ﬁnd that the WOS is more attractive to the host country through
making a trade-oﬀ between the incremental welfare from speeding up the investment and
the cost of providing the subsidy. The host country has to subsidise the foreign ﬁrm for its
best outside option, which, in our case, is the option to invest in the form of a WOS. The
investment in the form of a JV needs to be subsidised more than the investment in the form
of a WOS. Therefore, the WOS mode of entry is more attractive to the host country. Either
in the case in which the unsubsidised investment triggers are identical (i.e., p∗J = p
∗
S) or in
the case in which the expected NPVs are identical (i.e., IJ = IS) at their respective times of
investment, the WOS will be found more attractive to the host country.
In summary, no matter whether the subsidy is oﬀered or not, we ﬁnd that a WOS will be
more attractive than a JV because of its operational ﬂexibility. A JV will be preferred only
if some deﬁnable beneﬁts from the arrangement for the host country, for example knowledge
transfer beneﬁts, can be found in addition to the direct welfare beneﬁts of the investment.
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3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We ﬁrst study a JV. As mentioned in the text, the present
value of the revenue stream net of cost at time t is VJ(pt|q) = qptr−µ − vq
2
2r
. The investment
cost is IJ , and since the ﬁrm has veto rights over the timing of the investment, it chooses
to time the investment to maximise the NPV VJ(pt|q) − IJ . The value of the investment
opportunity prior to investment can be written in the form Apλt , where λ > 1 is deﬁned
in the text. The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions Apλt = VJ(pt|q) − IJ (for
arbitrary constant A) and λApλ−1t =
q
r−µ , respectively, yields two conditions to determine
both A and the investment trigger p∗J , as follows:
Apλt =
qpt
r − µ −
vq2
2r
− IJ (3A.1)
λApλ−1t =
q
r − µ. (3A.2)
Solving for this system of equations, we ﬁnd that p∗J =
λ
λ−1(r − µ)
(
vq
2r
+ IJ
q
)
.
Next, both parties have the incentive to choose a capacity q that maximises the NPV of
the ﬁrm at the point of investment. The ﬁrm may wish to reduce output if future market
conditions are poor, but the host country has veto over such a decision, so the capacity
decision leads to a ﬁxed output. We ﬁnd the optimal capacity by maximising VJ(p
∗
J |q)− IJ ,
which yields the ﬁrst order condition
p∗J
r−µ − vq
∗
r
= 0 or q∗ = p
∗
J
v
r
r−µ . Substituting the optimal
capacity into the expression for the trigger price above yields:
p∗J =
√
2vλ
λ− 2
(r − µ)2
r
IJ .
Given λ = 2γ, we ﬁnd p∗J =
√
2vγ
γ−1
(r−µ)2
r
IJ . Substituting p
∗
J and q
∗ back into Eq. (3A.1),
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we can ﬁnd that A = IJ
γ−1
(
1
p∗J
)2γ
. Then, the value of the investment opportunity for a JV,
VJ(pt|p∗J), is obtained.
Proof of the Proposition 3.2: In this case, we can address the smooth-pasting problem
directly without worrying about production capacity since output is optimal point for point,
that is, q∗t =
pt
v
. Therefore, we ﬁnd that:
Apλt =
p2t
2v(r − 2µ− σ2) − IS (3A.3)
λApλ−1t =
pt
v(r − 2µ− σ2) . (3A.4)
Solving for this system of equations, we ﬁnd that p∗S =
√
2vλ
λ−2(r − 2µ− σ2)IS. Given
λ = 2γ, p∗S =
√
2vγ
γ−1(r − 2µ− σ2)IS. Substituting p∗S and q∗t back into Eq. (3A.3), we
can ﬁnd that A = IS
γ−1
(
1
p∗S
)2γ
. Then, the value of the investment opportunity for a WOS,
VS(pt|p∗S), is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Case 1: Let us ﬁrst examine the welfare comparison. We
ﬁnd that the welfare is wq
r
+ (1 − α)
(
qp∗J
r−µ − vq
2
2r
− IJ
)
for a JV and w
v
p∗S
r−µ for a WOS. If
the capacity decision is optimal, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst expression becomes: w
r
p∗J
v
r
r−µ + (1 −
α)
(
qp∗J
r−µ − vq
2
2r
− IJ
)
= w
v
p∗J
r−µ + (1 − α)
(
qp∗J
r−µ − vq
2
2r
− IJ
)
, and the host country will have a
share of (1− α) in the NPV of the investment.
Next consider the ﬁrm's decision. The NPV of a JV is
α
(
qp∗J
r−µ − vq
2
2r
− IJ
)
, and substituting for the optimal capacity and the optimal trigger price
p∗J , we ﬁnd α
(
p∗J
r−µ
p∗J
v
r
r−µ − v2r
p∗2J
v2
r2
(r−µ)2 − IJ
)
= α IJ
γ−1 . The NPV of a WOS is
p∗2S
2v(r−2µ−σ2)−IS.
Substituting for the optimal trigger price p∗S, we ﬁnd
1
2v(r−2µ−σ2)2vIS(r− 2µ−σ2) γγ−1 − IS =
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IS
γ−1 . If the trigger values are the same, it follows from p
∗
J = p
∗
S that IJ
(r−µ)2
r
= IS(r−2µ−σ2)
or IJ = IS
r(r−2µ−σ2)
(r−µ)2 . The factor on the right-hand side is less than one (r(r − 2µ − σ2) <
(r−µ)2 reduces to 0 < rσ2 +µ2, which clearly is true), so it follows that IJ < IS. Therefore,
it follows that IS
γ−1 >
IJ
γ−1 ≥ α IJγ−1 so the ﬁrm prefers a WOS to a JV.
Case 2: Using the above expressions, we ﬁnd that if the NPVs are identical at the point
of investment, IJ and IS must be the same. This implies further that p
∗
S < p
∗
J so that the
ﬁrm invests sooner if it invests as a WOS. The value of the investment opportunity at the
point pt < min(p
∗
J , p
∗
S) is, therefore, α
IJ
γ−1
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
for a JV and IS
γ−1
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
for a WOS. Since
α ≤ 1, and since p∗S < p∗J , it follows that α IJγ−1
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
≤ IJ
γ−1
(
pt
p∗J
)2γ
< IS
γ−1
(
pt
p∗S
)2γ
, and the
ﬁrm prefers to make the investment in a WOS.
Looking at welfare, it suﬃces to make a comparison at p∗S, since whichever welfare is
greater at this point will be preferred by the host country for all pt ≤ p∗S (for all pt > p∗S, the
investment decision will be made regardless of whether a subsidy is oﬀered).
Proof of Proposition 3.5: This is a standard smooth-pasting problem. Take ﬁrst the case
of a JV. The option to oﬀer a subsidy has value Apλt for some constant A; the welfare at the
optimal trigger point p is w
v(r−µ)
(
p− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+ p
2
2v
r
(r−µ)2 − IJ − IS 22−λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ
. Therefore,
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the coeﬃcient A and the optimal trigger point p are jointly determined by the system:
Apλ =
w
v(r − µ)
(
p− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+
p2
2v
r
(r − µ)2 − IJ − IS
2
2− λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ
(step 1)
λApλ−1 =
w
v(r − µ)
(
1 + p∗Sλ
(
p
p∗S
)λ−1
1
p∗S
)
+
2p
2v
r
(r − µ)2 − IS
2
λ− 2λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ−1
1
p∗S
Apλ =
w
v(r − µ)
(
p− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+
p2
2v
r
(r − µ)2 − IJ − IS
2
2− λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ
(step 2)
Apλ =
w
v(r − µ)
(
p
λ
− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+
p2
v
r
(r − µ)2
1
λ
− IS 2
λ− 2
(
p
p∗S
)λ
0 =
wp
v(r − µ)
λ− 1
λ
+
p2
2v
r
(r − µ)2
λ− 2
λ
− IJ . (step 3)
Solving the quadratic equation in Step 3 yields the trigger point p∗∗J .
The case of a WOS is identical, only the right-hand side with the welfare and marginal
welfare are slightly diﬀerent. We ﬁnd the system:
Apλ =
w
v(r − µ)
(
p− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+
p2
2v
1
(r − 2µ− σ2) − IS − IS
2
2− λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ
(step 1)
λApλ−1 =
w
v(r − µ)
(
1 + p∗Sλ
(
p
p∗S
)λ−1
1
p∗S
)
+
2p
2v
1
(r − 2µ− σ2) − IS
2
λ− 2λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ−1
1
p∗S
Apλ =
w
v(r − µ)
(
p− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+
p2
2v
r
(r − µ)2 − IJ − IS
2
2− λ
(
p
p∗S
)λ
(step 2)
Apλ =
w
v(r − µ)
(
p
λ
− p∗S
(
p
p∗S
)λ)
+
p2
v
1
(r − 2µ− σ2)
1
λ
− IS 2
λ− 2
(
p
p∗S
)λ
0 =
wp
v(r − µ)
λ− 1
λ
+
p2
2v
1
(r − 2µ− σ2)
λ− 2
λ
− IS. (step 3)
Again, solving the quadratic equation in Step 3 yields the trigger point p∗∗S .
To show that these triggers are less than their unsubsidised counterparts, consider the
fact that both equations are of the form p∗∗ = (p∗2 + a2)
1
2 − a for some a > 0. Taking the
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right-hand side and putting (p∗2 + a2)
1
2 − a < p∗ we ﬁnd:
(
p∗2 + a2
) 1
2 − a < p∗ (step 1)(
p∗2 + a2
) 1
2 < p∗ + a (step 2)
p∗2 + a2 < (p∗ + a)2 (step 3)
p∗2 + a2 < p∗2 + a2 + 2p∗a
, and with p∗, a > 0 the latter equation obviously holds.
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3.7 Guide to Notation
The table below lists the notation used in this chapter in order of appearance in the text.
Notation Interpretation
r Risk-free interest rate
I Investment cost
qt Units of a good produced at time t
v
2
Unit variable cost to produce a good
pt Market price of a good at time t
p0 Market price of a good at t = 0
p∗ Optimal investment trigger when no subsidy is oﬀered
T Stopping time for the event that pt reaches p
∗ from below for the ﬁrst time
α Percentage share of an enterprise owned by the foreign ﬁrm
1− α Percentage share of an enterprise owned by the host country
q Constant production
VJ(pt|q) Value of the future discounted proﬁts for a JV when production ﬂow, qt, is kept constant at q
IJ Investment cost for a JV
q∗ Optimal constant production for a JV
p∗J Optimal investment trigger for a JV trigger when no subsidy is oﬀered
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VJ(p
∗
J |q∗) Value of the investment for a JV at the time of investment
VJ(pt|p∗J) Value of the investment opportunity for a JV
IS Investment cost for a WOS
q∗t Optimal variable production for a WOS
VS(pt|q∗t ) Value of the future discounted proﬁts for a WOS when the good is produced at q∗t
VS(pt|p∗S) Value of the investment opportunity for a WOS
p∗S Optimal investment trigger for a WOS trigger when no subsidy is oﬀered
VS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) Value of the investment at the time of investment for a JV
WJ(pt|q) Welfare beneﬁt for the host country when a JV produces the good at q
WJ(pt|q∗) Welfare beneﬁt for the host country when a JV produces the good at q∗
WS(pt|q∗t ) Welfare beneﬁt for the host country when a WOS produce the good at q∗t
WJ(p
∗
J |q∗) Welfare beneﬁt for the host country evaluated at p∗J , when a JV produces the good at q∗
WS(p
∗
S|q∗t ) Welfare beneﬁt for the host country evaluated at p∗S, when a WOS produces the good at q∗t
K(pt) Investment subsidy package whose value is a function of pt
KJ(pt) Optimal subsidy package for a JV
KS(pt) Optimal subsidy package for a WOS
∆WJ(pt) Incremental welfare beneﬁts for a JV
∆WS(pt) Incremental welfare beneﬁts for a WOS
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p∗∗ Optimal subsidy trigger
TS Stopping time when the optimal investment trigger point p
∗
S is reached for the ﬁrst time
p∗∗J Optimal subsidy trigger for a JV
p∗∗S Optimal subsidy trigger for a WOS
u Welfare ﬂow arising from knowledge transfer in the case of a JV
Chapter 4
Competitive Product Markets
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we studied investment timing and choice of entry mode simultaneously. We
derived decision rules of entry choice between a JV and a WOS under two cases when subsidy
packages are oﬀered by the host country and when there is no subsidy oﬀered. However,
we did not take into account the eﬀect of industry structure and assume that the newly
established ﬁrm (the JV or the WOS) is a local monopoly. Then, it is a logical step to
extend our analysis to the case in which competition in the product market exists and
investigate the eﬀect of competition on the choice of entry modes when the host country has
the option to speed up the investment through providing subsidy packages. This forms the
direct motivation for the analysis in this chapter.
The conclusion drawn from the preceding chapter is that it can be costly for the host
country to subsidise JVs unless there are speciﬁc beneﬁts associated with such arrangements,
for instance knowledge transfer beneﬁts that arise from the fact that the host country takes a
commercial stake in the investment. This conclusion is made, however, assuming the product
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markets are non-competitive. Non-competitive product markets oﬀer the ﬁrm attractive
options to delay investment hoping that the market conditions will improve in the future
and options to vary output according to the prices in the product markets. Either eﬀect is
less pronounced in competitive markets.
Competition imposes certain restrictions on the movement of the state variable. When
product markets are assumed to be non-competitive, we usually treat the payoﬀ of the
investment project or the output price as a state variable that follows a certain process, in
particular the geometric Brownian motion. Since no restrictions have been imposed, the
state variable can range over (0, ∞). However, in practice, there are always restrictions on
the state variables. In a competitive industry, when the ﬁrms can enter and exit the market
freely, the output price will be bounded above since new ﬁrms will enter the industry if the
output price exceeds a certain level and the investment becomes proﬁtable. Because there
are more ﬁrms in production, the total output will increase. The increase in aggregate supply
will bring the output price down. The output price will also be bounded below since existing
ﬁrms will leave the industry if the output price falls below a certain level and the ﬁrms suﬀer
losses. Since fewer ﬁrms are in production, the total output will decrease and the reduction
in aggregate supply will cause the output price to rise. Therefore, the free entry to and
exit from a competitive market will result in both the upper and lower bounds of the state
variable. In this chapter, we study the ﬁrms' investment timing and entry mode when the
output price is regulated. We attempt to address the following issues: a) When the market
is competitive, how do entry and exit of ﬁrms aﬀect the valuation of the investment projects
and the investment thresholds? b) What are the eﬀects of product market competition on
the values of the investment projects and the timing of investment when diﬀerent entry
modes are adopted? c) How should the host country subsidise the ﬁrms to speed up the
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investment under this market structure? We also try to investigate whether one entry mode
will be preferred under this market structure.
The analysis in this chapter relates to several strands of literature. One strand refers
to the framework of dynamic contingent claims analysis. Brennan and Schwartz (1984),
Mello and Parsons (1992), and Mauer and Triantis (1994) studied the interaction between
investment, production and foreclosure, and ﬁnancing decisions. Leland (1994) and Leland
and Toft (1996) analysed the eﬀect of ﬁrm's foreclosure on optimal capital structure and the
valuation of bonds with inﬁnite and ﬁnite maturity, respectively. All these models assume
that the ﬁrm has monopolistic access to the investment. In addition to the literature that
considers the monopoly case, Lambrecht (2001) studied an intermediate duopoly case that
requires the modelling of strategic behaviour between the ﬁrms. He provided a dynamic
contingent claims model of strategic entry and exit in a duopoly. He found the factors that
determine the order in which ﬁrms exit. When it comes to market entry, he found that
the need to borrow money will delay a ﬁrm's entry, while the ﬁnancial vulnerability of the
incumbent induces earlier entry.
The approach we take in this chapter follows Dixit (1989), Leahy (1993), Fries et al.
(1997) and Miao (2005). Dixit (1989) examined the entry and exit decisions under uncer-
tainty by assuming the output price follows a diﬀusion motion. His model considers a single
ﬁrm with two states: when the ﬁrm is idle, it decides whether to continue being idle or to
enter and, when the ﬁrm is active, it decides whether to continue being active or to exit. He
analytically derived a pair of entry and exit triggers. While Dixit (1989) in eﬀect assumed
that the ﬁrm is a monopolist, Leahy (1993) extended Dixit's (1989) model to the case in
which a ﬁrm faces competitors and investigates the investment decisions in competitive equi-
librium. He considered two types of ﬁrm  ﬁrms that consider the actions of the competitors
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and the ﬁrms that ignore the actions of the competitors  and showed that competition
does not aﬀect investment timing at all, in the sense that the investment triggers for the
two types of ﬁrms are identical. While both the models of Dixit (1989) and Leahy (1993)
assumed pure equity ﬁnancing of the ﬁrm, Fries et al. (1997) considered the eﬀect of the
ﬁnancial structure on ﬁrm valuation. They started from a single-ﬁrm benchmark model, in
which the output price is exogenously given, to the case of a competitive equilibrium, in
which the output price is endogenously determined. They studied how the options of entry
and exit aﬀect the valuation of the ﬁrm's equity and debt and derived its optimal capital
structure. They also showed how the ﬁrm will optimally adjust the leverage and priced the
ﬁrm with leverage adjustments. Miao (2005) studied the production/investment decisions,
the capital structure choices, and their interactions in a competitive equilibrium model. The
ﬁrms' ﬁnancing, entry, exit, and production decisions are subject to idiosyncratic technology
shocks and are chosen to maximise equity value after debt is in place. To reach the opti-
mal capital structure, the ﬁrm needs to make trade-oﬀs between tax beneﬁts of debt and
the associated bankruptcy and agency costs. His analysis conﬁrms the existence of a price
feedback eﬀect in the competitive equilibrium model.
This chapter also relates to the literature on the choice of entry mode from a real option
perspective, as we have mentioned in Chapter 3.
In our analysis, it should be noted that competition imposes certain cost structures on
the ﬁrm. A competitive market will attract only potential entrants that can compete in an
unsubsidised environment. Therefore, if JVs and WOSs are available as targets for subsidy,
they must also be potentially viable enterprises in an unsubsidised environment. In the
preceding chapter, we assumed that the unsubsidised mode of entry is either comparable
in terms of timing or comparable in terms of NPV. When we are looking at entry into
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competitive markets, we need to assume that both modes of entry are competitive without
subsidy, which means that both the timing and the NPV must be the same. This is only
feasible if the cost structures are diﬀerent for the ﬁrm established in diﬀerent forms, and we
consider the simplest cost structure such that both modes of entry are competitive. Some
ﬁxed cost is introduced in the case of a WOS, which is consistent with the ﬁnding that a
WOS usually requires higher initial investment cost than a JV (Li and Rugman, 2007).
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the output price in a competi-
tive industry in which a large number of ﬁrms who can enter and exit the industry freely exist
and presents the derivation of the value functions for a JV and WOS. Section 4.3 discusses
the ﬁrms' optimal entry and exit policy when diﬀerent market entry modes are adopted and
there is no subsidy oﬀered, and presents the derivation of the cost structure that is required
for both a JV and WOS to be competitive. The respective welfare for the host country
when diﬀerent entry modes are used is also derived in this section. Section 4.4 presents the
beneﬁts of the option to speed up the ﬁrms' entry into an industry using investment subsidy.
The respective optimal subsidy package for a JV and WOS is derived. The welfare from
unsubsidised entry before it happens is also derived for both cases. The optimal investment
triggers are also determined when diﬀerent entry modes are chosen. Section 4.5 concludes
the chapter.
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4.2 Competitive Product Markets
Suppose product prices are inﬂuenced in two ways:
pt = xtD(Qt), (4.1)
where xt is a state variable describing random demand shocks, and D(qt) is a function
measuring the price eﬀect of the aggregate quantity decisions Qt of the ﬁrms producing the
product. This formulation is assumed, for instance, by Fries et al. (1997), who utilised the
mathematical derivations of Harrison (1985). We assume here that D(Qt) is a decreasing
function of aggregate quantity Qt, such that net entry into the industry that leads to an
increase in Qt puts downward pressure on the product prices. Similarly, net exit leads to
an increase in the product prices. The uncertainty of demand channelled through the state
variable xt is the same as in the standard model. We assume that xt is a geometric Brownian
motion with drift µ and volatility σ. As usual, in the literature, the drift rate µ is assumed to
be smaller than the risk-free rate of interest, denoted by r. We can derive the price dynamics
as follows:
dpt = pt
D′(Qt)
D(Qt)
dQt + µptdt+ σptdBt, (4.2)
where dBt is a standard Brownian motion.
Assuming a large number of ﬁrms enter or exit the industry seamlessly, output will
increase if prices rise above a certain threshold, and output will decrease if prices fall below
a certain threshold, such that prices will become regulated at the threshold points, where
dQt 6= 0, but will otherwise behave according to a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ
and volatility σ.
If entry and exit decisions are instantaneous, the price process becomes a doubly absorb-
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ing barrier process that satisﬁes:
dpt = µptdt+ σptdBt + dM
+
t + dM
−
t , (4.3)
where M+t and M
−
t are stochastic regulator processes that apply at the barrier entry point
pE and the barrier exit point pB:
M+t = sup
0≤τ≤t
min(pE − (pτ − pB)−M−t , 0) (4.4)
M−t = sup
0≤τ≤t
min(pτ − pE −M+t , 0). (4.5)
For price levels pB < pt < pE, the stochastic regulators do not kick in, and the price process
reverts to a regular geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and diﬀusion σ. We derive the
barrier points pE and pB as the optimal entry and exit price levels, respectively, where, at
entry, the NPV of entry is zero, and, at exit, the present value of continuation is zero.
In competitive industries, we expect the investment trigger points to coincide with the
upper barrier point for product prices for the most competitive ﬁrms. Uncompetitive ﬁrms
will, therefore, never enter the industry without some form of investment incentive. Similarly,
the exit trigger points should also coincide for the most competitive ﬁrms. Uncompetitive
ﬁrms would otherwise exit sooner than the competitive ones; therefore, these ﬁrms would
not populate the industry in the long run. Thus, the entry and exit price levels impose
constraints on the cost structure of the ﬁrms in the industry if all ﬁrms are assumed to be
equally competitive in cost and ﬂexibility structures.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a JV, where the ﬁrm and the host country jointly invest IJ to set
up a production facility that produces a ﬁxed quantity q. We assume that this organisational
structure is competitive so that the investment trigger coincides with the entry barrier, and
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the shut-down barrier coincides with the exit barrier. The value function for an established
JV that produces a ﬁxed quantity q is given by:
VJ(pt|q) = Apλ1t +Bpλ2t +
(
ptq
r − µ −
vJ
2
q2
r
)
, (4.6)
where vJ
2
is the unit variable cost of the ﬁxed output q. 1 The third term in this expression
relates to the value of producing in an environment where there are no price barriers, and
the two ﬁrst terms relate to the correction to the value function associated with reaching
an absorbing upper barrier where the product price can go no further upwards and with
reaching an absorbing lower barrier where the product price can go no further downwards.
The constants A and B are decided in such a way that entry is just proﬁtable at the upper
barrier and exit is just proﬁtable at the lower barrier. The parameters λ1 and λ2 are given
by: λ1 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
((
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
) 1
2
> 1 and λ2 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
) − ((1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
) 1
2
< 0,
respectively.
Note that the production quantity enters the value function only through the third term.
If the capacity q could be chosen freely, it would be chosen such that it maximises the term(
ptq
r−µ − vJ2 q
2
r
)
, which yields the same optimal capacity as we found in the preceding chapter,
namely q∗ = pt
vJ
r
r−µ . The value function can, therefore, be rewritten as:
VJ(pt|q∗) = Apλ1t +Bpλ2t +
p2t
2vJ
r
(r − µ)2 . (4.7)
In the case of a WOS, where the ﬁrm invests IS to set up a production facility that
produces an optimal quantity determined by point-for-point value maximisation. We assume
1We do not take into account personal and corporate taxes in this chapter since it will not alter our
conclusions but add more complexity to the analysis. Please note that taking into account debt may alter
the results.
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that this organisational structure is also competitive so that the investment trigger coincides
with the entry barrier in the market, and the shut-down barrier coincides with the exit
barrier. The cash ﬂow of an established WOS is (ptqt − vS2 q2t − f), where vS2 is the unit
variable cost parameter associated with the output qt and f is the ﬁxed cost of production.
Maximising with respect to qt yields pt − vSqt = 0 or q∗t = ptvS . The value function for an
established WOS that produces a variable quantity q∗t is, therefore, given by:
VS(pt|q∗t ) = Apλ1t +Bpλ2t +
(
p2t
vS(r − 2µ− σ2) −
p2t
2vS(r − 2µ− σ2) −
f
r
)
= Apλ1t +Bp
λ2
t +
(
p2t
2vS
1
r − 2µ− σ2 −
f
r
)
. (4.8)
4.3 Unsubsidised Entry and Exit
In this section, we make an analysis of the ﬁrms' investment policy in an unsubsidised
competitive industry and the welfare of host countries within which these investments are
made.
4.3.1 Optimal Entry and Exit
Competitiveness for a JV implies that the NPV of entry at pE is zero and the NPV of exit
at pB is also zero. Moreover, since these price levels are absorbing barriers, the expected
marginal value is exactly zero. This generates the following results.
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Proposition 4.1: Competitive JVs For a JV investment to be competitive in an industry
with entry price trigger pE and exit price trigger pB, the following condition needs to be
satisﬁed:
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 p2E
pBpE
 =
 pλ1E pλ2E
pλ1B p
λ2
B

−1
p2E
2
− vJIJ (r−µ)2r
pEpB − p
2
E
2
 . (4.9)
Proposition 4.2: Competitive WOS For a WOS investment to be competitive in the
same industry, the following condition needs to be satisﬁed:
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 p2E
p2B
 =
 pλ1E pλ2E
pλ1B p
λ2
B

−1
p2E
2
− vSIS(r − 2µ− σ2)− vSf r−2µ−σ2r
p2B
2
− vSf r−2µ−σ2r
 .
(4.10)
We can use Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 to determine the cost structures for which both
modes of entry are competitive at the same time. We ﬁnd the following.
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Proposition 4.3: Cost Structure Provided the following conditions are satisﬁed, both a
JV and WOS are competitive:
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 0
(pE − pB)pB
 =
 pλ1E pλ2E
pλ1B p
λ2
B

−1 vSIS(r − 2µ− σ2)− vJIJ (r−µ)
2
r
+ vSf
r−2µ−σ2
r
− (pE−pB)2
2
+ vSf
r−2µ−σ2
r
 .
(4.11)
We notice that the modes of entry could have the same investment cost, but then there
must be a variable cost diﬀerential, or alternatively the modes of entry could have the same
variable cost, but then there must be an initial investment cost diﬀerential. It is necessary,
however, that the WOS operates with a ﬁxed cost that a JV does not have. The reason for
this is that a JV with ﬁxed output carries a ﬁxed cost component in maintaining output
when the market price is low. The ﬁnding that a WOS usually requires higher investment
cost is consistent with the ﬁndings of Li and Rugman (2007). The WOS will be able to scale
back production. Thus, in order for both types of ﬁrms to exit at the same time, we need to
impose a ﬁxed cost on a WOS. Alternatively, since the JV maintains ﬁxed output, the ﬁxed
cost component can be embedded in the variable cost component. Either interpretation can
apply.
In the following, we make use of a variable cost diﬀerential with identical investment
cost I for both modes of entry. If we make assumptions about the entry and exit prices, we
can then back-track what implications this has on the cost structures for the two modes of
entry. By taking r, µ, and σ as exogenous parameters, satisfying r − 2µ − σ2 > 0, and by
specifying pE, pB, I, and vS, we will automatically be given vJ and f . The only constraint
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Firm values VJ(pt), VS(pt)
pt
IJ = IS
pB pE
Figure 4.1: Optimal entry and exit in competitive industries. The ﬁgure shows the ﬁrm
values associated with JVs (dashed lines) and WOSs (solid lines). The parameter values
used in this illustration are IJ = IS = 7.714, vS = 0.05, r = 12%, µ = 2%, and σ = 25% in
order to guarantee that r − 2µ− σ2 > 0. In this case, pB = 3 and pE = 6.269.
is that all cost parameters need to be positive. With these constraints in mind, we continue
to examine subsidised investments.
Figure 4.1 shows the ﬁrm values associated with a JV and WOS, and we notice that, given
that the two organisational structures have cost structures that allow them to be competitive
(i.e., they both have the same exit and entry trigger points to the industry), the commercial
value of a JV is greater than the commercial value of a WOS. The JV will eventually endure
a higher cost associated with maintaining the output ﬂow, and this prompts exit at the exit
trigger, while the WOS will eventually endure a higher ﬁxed cost component in production,
which otherwise can be scaled back to reduce variable costs, and this prompts exit at the
exit trigger.
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4.3.2 Welfare in Competitive Industries
Since we operate in a competitive industry, the country has the same chance of gaining
an investment at the entry point as any other country and the same chance of losing an
investment at the exit point as any other country. Therefore, the welfare of the investments
made in the industry when it is unsubsidised can be normalised to zero. We can then
investigate the welfare of subsidised entry into the industry as the welfare ﬂow until the
entry trigger point pE is reached.
It is, however, of interest to investigate, in the case in which there is commercial indif-
ference between the modes of entry, whether indiﬀerence in welfare terms also exist. We
assume the welfare ﬂow can be quantiﬁed as w per unit of output. For a JV, this is just a
constant ﬂow wq, but, for a WOS, this is a variable ﬂow wq∗t . We ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 4.4 (Unsubsidised Welfare): The welfare of a ﬁrm that has entered the
industry as a JV can be written as:
WJ(pt) =

 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
(λ1 − η)pλ1B (λ2 − η)pλ2B

−1 0
η w
vJ
pE
r−µ


> pλ1t
pλ2t
+ wvJ pEr − µ, (4.12)
and the welfare of a ﬁrm that has entered the industry as a WOS can be written as:
WS(pt) =

 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
(λ1 − η)pλ1B (λ2 − η)pλ2B

−1 − wvS pEr−µ
−(1− η) w
vS
pB
r−µ


> pλ1t
pλ2t
+ wvS ptr − µ,
(4.13)
where η is the exit rate from the industry at the lower boundary point, which can be inter-
preted as the exit ﬂow that is necessary to support the exit trigger point.
128
Welfare WJ(pt), WS(pt)
pt
pB pE
Figure 4.2: Unsubsidised welfare in competitive industries. The ﬁgure shows the welfare
associated with JVs (dashed lines) and WOSs (solid lines). The parameter values used in
this illustration are vS = 0.05, r = 12%, µ = 2%, and σ = 25% in order to guarantee that
r − 2µ − σ2 > 0. Moreover, pB = 3 and pE = 6.269. The welfare ﬂow, w, is assumed to be
0.48, and the exit rate, η, is assumed to be 5%.
Since these expressions are diﬀerent, they may not generate the same welfare eﬀect even
though, in commercial terms, they generate the same proﬁts and the same timing of entry
to and exit from the industry.
The ﬁgure shows that the welfare eﬀect with JVs is less aﬀected by the price in the
product market, and this is because the welfare ﬂow is related to output, which is stable
with JVs. With WOSs, the welfare eﬀect is stronger than for JVs when the market price is
high but lower than for JVs when the market price is low. There is, therefore, a point at
which the welfare eﬀect is the same regardless.
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If investment has not happened yet, the welfare eﬀect is the expected value of the welfare
of an investment at the entry price trigger. The value of the ﬁrm is exactly equal to the
investment cost at the entry trigger point regardless of mode of entry, so the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between entry as a WOS and as a JV, so the host country will prefer that the mode of entry
is the one with the maximum welfare eﬀect, which is a WOS in the case of the ﬁgure above.
However, we notice that if a subsidy is considered, it may be better to subsidise a JV in some
states of nature because both the commercial value of the ﬁrm is greater and the welfare
eﬀect on the host country is greater with this mode of entry compared to a WOS.
4.4 Subsidised Mode of Entry
In this section, we look at the beneﬁts of the option to speed up entry into the industry using
investment incentives. We assume that such entry is small and will not aﬀect the product
prices even though the entry will happen between the entry price trigger point and the exit
price trigger point. We ﬁrst look at the optimal subsidy, then we look at the optimal timing
of subsidy given the mode of entry, and ﬁnally the optimal mode of entry for the subsidy.
4.4.1 Optimal Subsidy and Optimal Timing
If the host country wants to subsidise early investment and gain the welfare w, it must
compensate the ﬁrm for the costs. In Chapter 2, we show that this is done by providing the
ﬁrm with the diﬀerence between the value of the investment cost and the actual value of the
investment. Therefore, we ﬁnd the following result.
Proposition 4.5 The optimal subsidy oﬀered at the price pt = p is given by the following
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expressions. For subsidised JVs, the subsidy KJ(p) is given by:
KJ(p) = −α(VJ(p)− IJ), (4.14)
where α is the stake of the ﬁrm in the JV, VJ(p) is the present value of the investment at
the price p, and IJ is the investment cost. For subsidised WOSs, the subsidy KS(p) is given
by:
KS(p) = −(VS(p)− IS), (4.15)
where VS(p) is the present value of the investment at the price p, and IS is the investment cost.
Next, we look at the problem of optimal timing of subsidy. The incremental welfare from
subsidising early entry into an industry is deﬁned as the welfare of the investment minus
the welfare from the unsubsidised entry, which would happen in any case at the competitive
industry entry point. Therefore, we need an expression for the welfare from unsubsidised
entry before it happens. The following result demonstrates the expressions for a JV and
WOS.
Proposition 4.6 The welfare from unsubsidised entry in the form of a JV, before it has
happened, is given by W¯J(p), where:
W¯J(p) =

 pλ1E pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 WJ(pE)
0


> pλ1
pλ2
 . (4.16)
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The corresponding expression for a WOS is W¯J(p), where:
W¯S(p) =

 pλ1E pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 WS(pE)
0


> pλ1
pλ2
 . (4.17)
The welfare from unsubsidised entry for is, therefore, W¯ (p) = max(W¯J(p), W¯S(p)), which
means that the incremental welfare from oﬀering a subsidy in the form of a JV is WJ(p)−
W¯ (p) and in the form of a WOS is WS(p)− W¯ (p).
The option to oﬀer a subsidy for a JV can be studied as the option to collect the welfare
ﬂow WJ(p)−KJ(p)− W¯ (p), and the option to oﬀer a subsidy for a WOS investment as the
option to collect the welfare ﬂow WS(p) − KS(p) − W¯ (p). The following result yields the
timing.
Proposition 4.7 The optimal timing of a subsidised JV is given by the trigger point p∗∗J ,
satisfying the relationship:
Ξ>J
 p∗∗λ1J
p∗∗λ2J
+ pEvJ r(r − µ)2
(
p∗∗J −
pE
2
)
− IJ + w
vJ
pE
r − µ
=

 λ1p∗∗λ1J λ2p∗∗λ2J
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1

Ξ>J
 λ1p∗∗λ1J
λ2p
∗∗λ2
J
+ p∗∗J pEvJ r(r−µ)2
0


> p∗∗λ1J
p∗∗λ2J
 ,
(4.18)
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where ΞJ is given by:
ΞJ =

 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
(λ1 − η)pλ1B (λ2 − η)pλ2B

−1 0
η w
vJ
pE
r−µ
 −
 pλ1E pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1
×
 (WS(pE) ∨WJ(pE))
0
−
 pλ1E pλ2E
pλ1B p
λ2
B

−1
p2E
2vJ
r
(r−µ)2 − IJ
pE
vJ
r
(r−µ)2
(
pB − pE2
)

 , (4.19)
where (· ∨ ·) denotes the maximum operator.
It should be noted that this result assumes that a JV established at a point p∗∗J < pE
will produce at the same capacity as a JV established at the entry trigger point pE. If we
allow the JV to produce at a diﬀerent capacity with subsidised entry and with unsubsidised
entry, then it will no longer satisfy the conditions for competitiveness, since the capacity
decision eﬀects the cost structure of the ﬁrm. To avoid this problem, we simply assume the
subsidised JV is identical to the unsubsidised JV. This problem will not arise with a WOS
since the output is a direct function of the prevailing market price, so the subsidised WOS
will produce with the exact same cost structure as the unsubsidised WOS; the only diﬀerence
is the timing of entry. To make the situation similar for a JV, we simply assume the same
capacity decisions are made regardless of the timing of entry.
Proposition 4.8 The optimal timing of a subsidised JV is given by the trigger point p∗∗S ,
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satisfying the relationship:
Ξ>S
 p∗∗λ1S
p∗∗λ2S
+ p∗∗2S2vS 1r − 2µ− σ2 − fr − IS + wvS p
∗∗
S
r − µ
=

 λ1p∗∗λ1S λ2p∗∗λ2S
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1

Ξ>S
 λ1p∗∗λ1S
λ2p
∗∗λ2
S
+ p∗∗2SvS 1r−2µ−σ2 + wvS p∗∗Sr−µ
0


> p∗∗λ1S
p∗∗λ2S
 ,
(4.20)
where ΞS is given by:
ΞS =

 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
(λ1 − η)pλ1B (λ2 − η)pλ2B

−1 − wvS pEr−µ
−(1− η) w
vS
pB
r−µ
 −
 pλ1E pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1
×
 (WS(pE) ∨WJ(pE))
0
−
 pλ1E pλ2E
pλ1B p
λ2
B

−1
p2E
2vS
1
r−2µ−σ2 − fr − IS
p2B
2vS
1
r−2µ−σ2 − fr

 , (4.21)
where (· ∨ ·) denotes the maximum operator.
The following ﬁgure shows the optimal trigger points for the subsidised JV and WOS.
The ﬁgure shows the same familiar picture we obtain in non-competitive industries: the
option to oﬀer an investment subsidy has greater value for WOSs than for JVs. Therefore,
JVs need to oﬀer a welfare eﬀect beyond the welfare eﬀect associated with output in order
to be an attractive mode of subsidised entry into an industry.
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Welfare Eﬀect of Subsidy
pt
p∗∗J
p∗∗SpB
pE
Figure 4.3: Welfare eﬀects of subsidy in competitive industries. The ﬁgure shows the welfare
eﬀect of investment subsidy, the welfare eﬀect of the option to oﬀer investment subsidy,
and the optimal subsidy trigger points where the two coincide, associated with JVs (dashed
lines) and WOSs (solid lines). The parameter values used in this illustration are vS = 0.05,
r = 12%, µ = 2%, and σ = 25% in order to guarantee that r − 2µ − σ2 > 0. Moreover,
pB = 3 and pE = 6.269. The welfare ﬂow, w, is assumed to be 0.48, and the exit rate, η, is
assumed to be 5%. In this case, p∗∗J = 5.613 and p
∗∗
S = 5.652.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduce product market competition into our analysis. In a competitive
industry, when ﬁrms can enter and exit the industry freely, the net entry into the industry
leads to an increase in aggregate production and puts downward pressure on the product
prices while the net exit leads to an increase in the product prices. Then, the process of
the output price becomes a doubly absorbing barrier process. The upper barrier actually
coincides with the entry trigger point and the lower barrier coincides with the exit trigger
point.
Our result suggests that when no subsidy is oﬀered, the ﬁrms must have the same in-
vestment and disinvestment triggers so that both JVs and WOSs are equally competitive in
the sense they have the same entry trigger and exit trigger points as all other ﬁrms in the
industry. This condition imposes some constraints on the cost structure of the ﬁrms. It is
necessary for a WOS to operate with a ﬁxed cost that a JV does not have.
Although a JV and WOS are equally competitive, the welfare eﬀects of unsubsidised
entry are not the same. We ﬁnd by numerical evaluation that, with WOSs, the welfare eﬀect
is lower than that for JVs when the market price is low since the welfare ﬂow is related to
stable output with JVs. When the market price is high, the welfare eﬀect of unsubsidised
entry is greater when the mode of entry is a WOS than when it is a JV. This is also owing
to the operational inﬂexibility of JVs.
When a subsidy is oﬀered by the host country, we look at the optimal subsidy, the
optimal timing of subsidy given the mode of entry, and the optimal mode of entry for
the subsidy. It is very diﬃcult to derive closed-form solutions. To examine the empirical
implications, we assign values to the variables and obtain Fig. 4.3, which is similar to the
ﬁgure we obtain for non-competitive industries. The main conclusion from Chapter 3 is that
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a subsidy should favour the most operationally eﬃcient enterprise. We add to this in this
chapter by studying the subsidy of investments in competitive industries  where operational
eﬃciency is not really well deﬁned, as we make the assumption that both modes of entry
are equally competitive. Still, we ﬁnd that the subsidy should favour the most operationally
ﬂexible mode of entry. This is a surprising ﬁnding.
137
4.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1: The value of a JV is VJ(pt) and the investment cost IJ . If the
JV investment is valued at zero at the entry point, it must be the case that VJ(pE)− IJ = 0,
and if it is valued at zero at the exit point, it must be the case that VJ(pB) = 0. Using the
general expression for VJ(p), we ﬁnd the system:
Apλ1E +Bp
λ2
E = −
pEq
r − µ +
q2
2vJ
1
r
+ IJ (4A.1)
Apλ1B +Bp
λ2
B = −
pBq
r − µ +
q2
2vJ
1
r
. (4A.2)
Using the fact that capacity is set at the entry trigger so that q = pE
vJ
r
r−µ , we can solve for
A and B, and the solution is the right-hand side of the equation in Proposition 4.1 (after
multiplying by rvJ
(r−µ)2 ).
Next, we use the fact that, at the barrier points, the value function must have zero drift,
which yields the system:
λ1Ap
λ1−1
E + λ2Bp
λ2−1
E = −
q
r − µ (4A.3)
λ1Ap
λ1−1
B + λ2Bp
λ2−1
B = −
q
r − µ, (4A.4)
which again can be solved with respect to A and B, and the solution is the left-hand side
of the equation in Proposition 4.1 (after multiplying the ﬁrst row by rvJpE
(r−µ)2 and the second
row by rvJpB
(r−µ)2 ).
Proof of Proposition 4.2: The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 4.1, except
we use the value function VS(p) instead of VJ(p), with the optimal output q
∗
t =
p
vS
.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3: Here, we wish to impose the conditions in Propositions 4.1
and 4.2 at the same time, for given entry and exit prices pE and pB. We rewrite the left-hand
side in Proposition 4.1 as:
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 p2E
pBpE
 =
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1
 p2E
pBpE
+
 0
p2B − p2B


=
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 p2E
p2B

+
 λ1pλ1E λ2pλ2E
λ1p
λ1
B λ2p
λ2
B

−1 0
pEpB − p2B
 . (4A.5)
Now, putting the second term above to the right-hand side in Proposition 4.1, we ﬁnd iden-
tical left-hand sides in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. Then, making the right-hand sides identical
also yields Proposition 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.4: Case of JVs: The welfare ﬂow is wq, and since q = PE
vJ
r
r−µ ,
the ﬂow is pE
vJ
r
r−µw. The general form of the welfare arising from this ﬂow is, therefore,
WJ(pt) = Ap
λ1
t +Bp
λ2
t +
w
vJ
pE
r−µ for constants A and B. We know that the welfare must have
zero drift at the upper boundary point pE, which implies that λ1Ap
λ1−1
E +λ2Bp
λ2−1
E = 0. At
the lower boundary point pB, the drift must be positive, reﬂecting the possibility that the
investment is part of the exit ﬂow of capacity needed to support the price boundary pB. The
exit rate from the industry at the lower boundary point is η, which can be interpreted as
the exit ﬂow that is necessary to support the price at the lower boundary point even though
there may be negative exogenous demand shocks. Therefore, the boundary condition at the
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barrier pB is as follows:
λ1Ap
λ1−1
B + λ2Bp
λ2−1
B =
η
pB
(
Apλ1B +Bp
λ2
B +
w
vJ
pE
r − µ
)
. (4A.6)
The details of this derivation can be found in Fries et al. (1997). Multiplying the boundary
condition at pE by the price pE, and the boundary condition at pB by the price pB and
rearranging, we ﬁnd the system in the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4.4.
Now, doing the same for the case of a WOS, we ﬁnd the zero drift condition at pE becomes
λ1Ap
λ1−1
E + λ2p
λ2−1
E +
w
vS
1
r−µ = 0, and the positive drift condition at pB is:
λ1Ap
λ1−1
B + λ2Bp
λ2−1
B +
w
vS
1
r − µ =
η
pB
(
Apλ1B +Bp
λ2
B +
w
vS
pB
r − µ
)
. (4A.7)
Multiplying the ﬁrst condition by pE, and the second by pB and rearranging, we ﬁnd the
system in the second part of Proposition 4.4.
Proof of Proposition 4.5: Using the principles derived in Chapter 2, the optimal sub-
sidy is exactly equal to the diﬀerence between the value of the investment opportunity, which
equals zero in the case of competitive industries, and the value of the investment. It follows
that for an α stake in the ﬁrm, the subsidy for a JV equals −α(VJ(p) − IJ). Additionally,
for a WOS, the subsidy equals −(VS(p)− IS).
Proof of Proposition 4.6: The value of the welfare of unsubsidised entry, prior to it
actually happening at the entry price pE, takes the general form Ap
λ1
t + Bp
λ2
t . We know
that, at the entry point, it takes the value of the actual welfare, which is WJ(pE) in the case
of a JV and WS(pE) in the case of a WOS. We also know that, at the exit point, it must
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have zero drift, so that λ1p
λ1−1
B + λ2p
λ2−1
B = 0. This forms two systems that determine the
coeﬃcients A and B, and these systems are given in the expressions in Proposition 4.6. The
welfare from unsubsidised entry must be the maximum of these, as the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between the mode of entry as long as it is competitive.
Proof of Proposition 4.7: Take the case of a JV ﬁrst. The value of the option to grant
an investment subsidy takes the general form Apλ1t + Bp
λ2
t . At the lower barrier point pB,
this value must have zero drift, and at the subsidy trigger point p∗∗J , it must smooth paste
into the welfare ﬂow WJ(p
∗∗
J )−KJ(p∗∗J )− W¯ (p∗∗J ). Therefore, we can identify two conditions
involving the derivative of Apλ1t +Bp
λ2
t :
 λ1p∗∗λ1−1J λ2p∗∗λ2−1J
λ1p
λ1−1
B λ2p
λ2−1
B

 A
B
 =
 ddpW (p∗∗J )−KJ(p∗∗J )− W¯ (p∗∗J )
0
 . (4A.8)
The quantity W¯ (p∗∗J ) can be identiﬁed from Proposition 4.6. The quantityWJ(p
∗∗
J can be
identiﬁed from Proposition 4.4 (recognising that with subsidised entry, the host country takes
the stake (1−α)(VJ(p∗∗J )− IJ), which together with the subsidy −K(p∗∗J ) = α(VJ(p∗∗J )− IJ)
adds up to VJ(p
∗∗
J )−IJ . Finally, VJ(p∗∗J ) can be identiﬁed from Proposition 4.1. Putting all of
this together in the value-matching condition Ap∗∗λ1J +Bp
∗∗λ2
J = WJ(p
∗∗
J )−KJ(p∗∗J )−W¯ (p∗∗J ),
we ﬁnd the condition in Proposition 4.7.
Proof of Proposition 4.8: Repeating the procedure in the proof of Proposition 4.7,
substituting p∗∗S for p
∗∗
J , KS(p
∗∗
J ) for KJ(p
∗∗
J ), VS(p
∗∗
S ) for VJ(p
∗∗
S ), and ΞS for ΞJ , the result
is obtained.
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4.7 Guide to Notation
The table below lists the notation used in this chapter in order of appearance in the text.
Notation Interpretation
pt Market price of a good at time t
xt State variable describing random demand shocks
D(qt) Inverse demand function for industry output
Qt Aggregate quantity decisions of the ﬁrms producing a good
qt Units of a good produced at time t
r Risk-free interest rate
M+t Stochastic regulator process that applies at the entry point pE
M−t Stochastic regulator process that applies at the entry point pB
pE Market price for potential ﬁrms to enter the industry
pB Market price for existing ﬁrms to exit the industry
IJ Investment cost for a JV
q Constant production
VJ(pt|q) Value of the future discounted proﬁts for a JV when production ﬂow, qt, is kept constant at q
vJ
2
Unit variable cost to produce a good for a JV
q∗ Optimal constant production for a JV
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VJ(pt|q∗) Value of the future discounted proﬁts for a JV when production ﬂow, qt, is kept constant at q∗
IS Investment cost for a WOS
vS
2
Unit variable cost to produce a good for a WOS
f Fixed cost of production for a WOS
q∗t Optimal variable production for a WOS
VS(pt|q∗t ) Value of the future discounted proﬁts for a WOS when the good is produced at q∗t
I Investment cost for both modes of entry when IJ = IS.
VJ(pt) Value of the investment (ﬁrm) for a JV
VS(pt) Value of the investment (ﬁrm) for a WOS
w Welfare ﬂow per unit of output
WJ(pt) Welfare from unsubsidised entry in the form of a JV
WS(pt) Welfare from unsubsidised entry in the form of a WOS
η Exit rate from the industry at the exit trigger point that is necessary to support the price at the lower boundary point
p Price level at which the subsidy is oﬀered
KJ(pt) Optimal subsidy package for a JV
α Stake of the ﬁrm in the JV
KS(pt) Optimal subsidy package for a WOS
W¯J(p) Welfare from unsubsidised entry before it happens in the case of a JV
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W¯S(p) Welfare from unsubsidised entry before it happens in the case of a WOS
W¯ (p) Maximum welfare from unsubsidised entry of a host country
p∗∗J Optimal subsidy trigger for a JV
p∗∗S Optimal subsidy trigger for a WOS
Chapter 5
Conclusions
We have studied how a host country can inﬂuence the ﬁrm's investment decisions of timing
and choice of entry mode using investment incentives. The main contributions lie in three
areas. First, the thesis presents speciﬁc predictions about the form and timing of an optimal
investment subsidy package under various assumptions about ﬁrst-mover advantages among
the ﬁrms accepting investment subsidies and among the countries oﬀering investment subsi-
dies. Second, the thesis presents speciﬁc predictions about how to target the mode of entry
when oﬀering an investment subsidy, where the primary choice is between a JV arrange-
ment in which the ﬁrm must give up some operational ﬂexibility in the arrangement and a
WOS in which the ﬁrm retains full operational ﬂexibility. Finally, the thesis presents speciﬁc
predictions about how to target the mode of entry when oﬀering an investment subsidy for
investment into competitive industries.
In Chapter 2, we study the design of subsidy packages by assuming that the host country
can aﬀect the ﬁrm's investment timing decision through adjusting the value of the subsidy
package. We derive the optimal subsidy package and ﬁnd that it always compensates the ﬁrm
for giving up the investment opportunity and making the investment at the host country's
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desired timing. Neither the ﬁrm nor the host country should be able to extract rent from
the subsidy package. Our ﬁnding is contrary to the ﬁndings of Pennings (2000, 2005) and
Yu et al. (2007). We evaluate the incremental welfare beneﬁts and costs associated with the
subsidy package and ﬁnd the optimal timing for the host country to provide it. We also study
the eﬀect of preemption risk on the timing of investment and the optimal subsidy package.
We analyse two cases in which ﬁrms are competing to invest in a single country and when
host countries are competing to attract an investment to their own locations. We ﬁnd that
preemption risk in the market for investment (i.e., the former case) leads to industries where
there are ﬁrst-mover advantages in the investment process that are more likely to attract
FDI subsidy than other industries. We also ﬁnd that investments that create a large welfare
beneﬁt relative to the amortised investment cost are also attractive targets for FDI subsidy.
Finally, we ﬁnd that preemption risk in the market for subsidy (i.e., the latter case) leads to
industries where there are ﬁrst-mover advantages in oﬀering subsidies that are more likely
to attract FDI subsidy than other industries.
Our analysis can be applied in many other situations. In the introduction, we mention the
example of subsidy to promote investments in a switch from traditional to green technology.
Many of the issues that arise in this area are similar to the issues that arise in the FDI
market, and we can transfer the results we obtain for FDI directly.
In Chapter 3, we analyse the timing of investment and the choice of entry modes simul-
taneously and compare the entry modes of a JV and WOS. We conﬁrm that the choice of
entry modes will aﬀect the value of the investment project and further aﬀect the timing of
investment.
We ﬁnd that when there is no subsidy oﬀered by the host country, a WOS is always
preferred to a JV by the ﬁrm from a commercial point of view, while a JV is preferred by
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the host country from a social welfare point of view. When the subsidy is oﬀered, we ﬁnd
that a WOS is more attractive to the host country. The host country has to subsidise the
foreign ﬁrm for its best outside option, which, in our case, is the option to invest in a WOS.
The investment in the form of a JV needs to be subsidised more than the investment in the
form of a WOS. Therefore, a WOS is found to be more attractive than a JV.
In summary, no matter whether the subsidy is oﬀered or not, we ﬁnd that a WOS will
always be more attractive than a JV. A JV will be preferred only if some deﬁnable beneﬁts
from the arrangement can be found for the host country, for example, knowledge transfer
beneﬁts.
In Chapter 4, we introduce product market competition into our analysis. When ﬁrms
can enter and exit the industry freely, the process of the output price becomes a doubly
absorbing barrier process. The upper barrier coincides with the entry trigger point and the
lower barrier coincides with the exit trigger point. When no subsidy is oﬀered, the ﬁrms
must have the same investment and disinvestment triggers so that both JVs and WOS are
equally competitive. This condition imposes some constraints on the cost structure of the
ﬁrms. It is necessary for a WOS to operate with a ﬁxed cost that a JV does not have.
The welfare eﬀects of unsubsidised entry are not the same. We ﬁnd by numerical evalu-
ation that when the market price is low, the welfare eﬀect for a WOS is lower than that for
a JV, and when the market price is high, the welfare eﬀect of unsubsidised entry is greater
when the mode of entry is a WOS than when it is a JV. This is owing to the operational
inﬂexibility of a JV.
When subsidy is oﬀered, we look at the optimal subsidy, the optimal timing of subsidy
given the mode of entry, and the optimal mode of entry for the subsidy. We examine the
empirical implications by assigning values to the variables. Again, we ﬁnd that a WOS is
147
more attractive to the host country. The main conclusion from Chapter 3 is that a subsidy
should favour the most operationally eﬃcient enterprise. We add to this in this chapter by
studying the subsidy of investments in competitive industries  where operational eﬃciency
is not really well deﬁned, as we make the assumption that both modes of entry are equally
competitive. However, still we ﬁnd that the subsidy should favour the most operationally
ﬂexible mode of entry.
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